FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

JVLY

1960

VOL·38 NO·4 $1·50 A COPY

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AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

JULY 1960

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Published quarterly by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed at 10 McGovern Ave., Lancaster, Pa. Editorial and Business Offices, 58 East 68 Street, New York 21, N. Y. Cable address, Foraffairs, New York. Subscriptions, $6.00 a year, post free to any address. The Editors will consider manuscripts submitted, but assume no responsibility regarding them.

Vol. 38, No. 4.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 38 JULY 1960 No. 4

AFTER THE PARIS DEBACLE

By Lester B. Pearson

THE Summit Conference has collapsed, in anger, bewilderment and dismay: the Conference on which, for more than a year, the world had placed high hope. In this situation anything can happen—and probably won't. It is always risky to forecast what is going to occur in the kind of world in which we now live. It is more so than ever at this turbulent moment in the relations between the two super-powers.

We of the West are dealing with a man, Nikita Khrushchev, who is as unpredictable as he is touchy and tough; we are also dealing with a society, Russian and Communist, which functions in a way which we of the free and "open" West find it well-nigh impossible to understand. Such understanding is particularly difficult for North Americans who by tradition and temperament are prone to consider conflict between nations as something temporary and abnormal and who are not easily conditioned for trouble of indefinite duration and uncertain outcome. We like to think of other peoples as basically friendly and we find it difficult to understand the mentality of those for whom conflict and tension are a normal part of national and personal life.

So we are shocked that one man should smash so ruthlessly a Conference for discussion and negotiation which was largely his own creation and for which, presumably, he had been preparing for months. There are, of course, many reasons that can be produced for this irrational conduct: the stiffening of the Western position over Berlin; the contrast between the President's friendly attitude at Camp David and hard United States statements which followed it; a struggle between factions within the Soviet "governing clique," between those who wished to ease international tensions and the Stalinists; pressure from Peking. These, singly or in combination, plus the mercurial "kicks and carrots"

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disposition of Mr. Khrushchev, are enough to explain what happened.

There was also the U-2 incident which handed the Russians, no doubt to their surprise, the excuse they needed. They found it easy to transform this excuse into a reason. In doing so, they not only had the strong and organized backing of their own people; they also found considerable support in world public opinion.

We can leave aside speculation on the weight to be attached to these various reasons for the Summit collapse. We have already heard much and will hear more on this score. It is more important now to analyze the effect of this breakdown of summit diplomacy on the relations between the Communist bloc and the free democratic coalition; on relations within that coalition and, more particularly, on the position of the United States as its leader.

The signs point to a colder war than we have been experiencing of late. Coexistence is likely to become chilly. This may not happen, for Mr. Khrushchev's growling outbursts in Paris may be succeeded by peaceful and expansive words elsewhere. The "hot and cold" technique may be applied again to keep us off balance. We like to hear reassuring sounds and, as before, we may yield to the temptation to read into them more than they deserve, hence to forget the meaning—and the menace—of the Paris meeting.

The signs, however, though they may soon change, are for a return to a tougher and more intransigent line in Soviet policy, to a colder war. As one result, the words and attitudes of Soviet delegates at the United Nations and other international meetings may revert to the rough excesses of Mr. Vishinsky.

We should not react in kind. If Soviet manners change, we should remember that their objectives do not. It remains true, however, that any increase in tension, any deterioration of the atmosphere, will make progress more difficult on such matters as disarmament, banning of nuclear tests, coöperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, international control of outer space and on a host of other things where international coöperation and action are so important in the interest of global security and peace.

There may be more snarling than smiling, then, at the council table. That will be depressing, though nothing to cause panic. The Western countries, refusing to be stampeded into matching the talk or the methods of the other side, should remain calm as well as firm. We should refuse to let Mr. Khrushchev or his men

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determine our own course of conduct and action—by threats, any more than by promises.

We should, however, in my view, change the emphasis in our diplomatic methods. We are now more generally aware, after the sorry experience of Paris, of the dangers and difficulties of negotiation at the summit. The top is nearly always a dangerous and a slippery place. Diplomacy there has its value, but only when the circumstances are propitious and the preparation is thorough. Summit diplomacy, therefore, should not be exalted into a normal political practice, at least not for Western democratic countries. It was natural, and even necessary, for the court to follow the King in medieval times. In the more complicated political and economic society of today it is better for the leaders, and their foreign ministers, to make peregrinating diplomacy the exception rather than the rule.

There is something else, and it may be one of the saddest results of the Paris collapse. Disillusioned by this experience on the Summit, we may be tempted in the West to throw up our hands about the possibility of any successful negotiation with Communist governments on *any* issue; about the chances of easing any tensions through discussions and contacts. This would be a bad mistake—to yield to defeatist, I-told-you-so counsel, to fall back on more arms and less diplomatic effort, a policy of no truck or trade with the Soviets. This tactic would end whatever hope there is for finding any agreed solutions to specific international problems. Once again the United Nations, in so far as the great powers are concerned, with their satellites on one side and their friends and allies on the other, would become the battleground of the cold war. Negotiation would become merely an exercise in propaganda and diplomacy a mechanism of conflict rather than coöperation. The developing contacts on other than political-official levels between the people of the two worlds would cease. Relations would freeze into a state of fear and suspicion which would affect our national as well as our international attitudes.

For any such dismal result, the U.S.S.R. will have to take the sole responsibility, providing—and the proviso is all-important—that the West, in its own policies and tactics, continues to make a serious and persistent effort to bring about a better state of affairs. If we do not do this, we shall share the responsibility for the dangerous stalemate which will result, with the two sides dug deeply into their diplomatic trenches.

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We must do everything possible to avoid such a situation. If it arose, we may be sure that the consequential disputes could not be confined to those questions now directly at issue between the Kremlin and the Atlantic Alliance, such as Berlin, nuclear tests, spy flights, bases, etc. If we can't halt, and reverse, the retreat from reason which Khrushchev sounded in Paris, there is bound to be a broadening as well as an intensification of the cold war. There will be an extension of the lines of conflict, with each sector of the front, whether it is Quemoy or Berlin or Baghdad or Seoul, subject to controlled, inter-related pressures from a Communist center and with a continual probing for new weak points to be exploited. This will be the easier when the different sectors are defended separately and when some of the defenders think some of them should be abandoned.

Unity on our side will be all the more important, therefore, if things become more difficult. In the exchanges of friendly visits across the Channel and the Atlantic, in the temporary and uncertain calm in the Mediterranean, in Korea and off the China coast, we had begun to forget that the Western coalition is only half-united in its global aims and anxieties. It is a coalition—with NATO as its most important political expression—which is dedicated to the collective defense of its territories, and its values, against aggression and erosion. The coalition is finding the former —defense against aggression—easier to organize than the latter. But even here the unity is limited and the coöperation incomplete. The debacle at Paris should persuade us to do something about this.

The Council of NATO has had some success, but not nearly enough, in building up the defenses of the European part of the North Atlantic region. In the Mediterranean and on the continent of North America—the main base for the nuclear deterrent—there is nothing that can really be called collective security, in the sense of genuine collective responsibility for defense.

In regard to foreign policy, without which there can be no unity in defense, coördination is partial and incomplete. There is consultation, but it is not deep or broad enough. Nor should this coördination and unity of policy, if it is to be effective, be confined to the NATO area. We must surely have learned by now that there can be no boundaries to coöperation for peace and security. It will be increasingly difficult to be united over Berlin and divided over Peking.

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The NATO powers—especially the leaders—should do something about this before it is too late. Differences, wherever they exist, should be removed. Otherwise a deterioration of the general international position—and we are having it now—can be expected to show itself soon in Russian-Chinese attempts to foment serious tension on the Pacific front. Divergence of policy within the coalition—especially on China—is an invitation to do this. We have already only narrowly escaped some serious consequences from it.

Consideration by the Allies of these inter-related problems, on a global scale, is essential. The best international agency for this purpose is the Council of NATO. But it is far from good enough in its present form because the governments composing it refuse to use it for the kind of non-military and military coöperation which its founders hoped for. Its members cling to outworn concepts which require the NATO Council to act as a limited, diplomatic agency. Anything more than that is considered to be an inadmissible limitation on the freedom of national action, especially on that of the bigger powers. When will we learn that we can only defend the right which matters most, the right to be free, by surrendering some of the rights of national sovereignty which matter less? How many mistakes could have been avoided recently if we had had a central and really effective coördinating political agency for the whole Atlantic coalition, an agency which knew what was going on and could organize, consolidate and carry out genuinely collective policy for collective defense and collective action!

This raises another subject which is very much in all our minds. What has been the effect of the fiasco in Paris on the unity of the Western coalition and, more particularly, on the position within it of the leader, the United States of America?

The immediate effect of Khrushchev's crude behavior in Paris; of his sudden torpedoing of the Conference for which he bore so much responsibility in the first place; of his insulting attempt to humiliate the President by presenting him with demands which he knew would be entirely unacceptable—the immediate effect of all this was to bring the members of the Alliance closer together. That was the inevitable and the right reaction. A tight square was formed against the Cossack assault. If Khrushchev thought he could divide and rule through his shock tactics, he has learned little from the history of the last 15 years. Shock and fear have

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been the very foundations of the Atlantic Alliance—shock at Soviet aggressions, fear over their implications for peace.

But let us not draw wrong, if comforting, conclusions from this first reaction. The U-2 incident and, even more, the way it was handled in Washington, have caused some anxious questioning in other friendly capitals, not about the aims of United States policy so much as about the methods used in pursuing those aims, both in defense and diplomacy. It would be unwise to underestimate this uneasiness merely because of the quick and united reaction to the stupid over-playing of his hand by Mr. Khrushchev in Paris.

There can be no doubt in any informed and reasonable person's mind as to who torpedoed the Paris Conference. Moreover, Khrushchev has again appeared on our television screens. So has President Eisenhower. The difference between the two men was again made clear. We were made acutely conscious of something we were beginning to forget, that we are up against an enigmatic, massive and fearful force, alien and menacing to many of the things we take for granted in our own way of living. So we are looking again for unity and strength inside our group, and for steady, wise, confidence-inspiring leadership. In that search, recent events will prompt some earnest searching of the soul. We should carry this process through in a positive and constructive way. There should be no criticism for its own sake. But we should draw the right conclusions from the reëxamination we make, and act on them now so that we may not take wrong courses in the future.

We, who are friends of the United States, honest enough in our friendship to criticize as well as praise, must acknowledge with gratitude the great effort that it has made to discharge the responsibilities of free-world leadership which it did not seek but which have been accepted. We remember the great-hearted generosity that has inspired so much of its foreign policy. We know what the protection of its power means in a dangerous world. But we know also that we cannot escape the consequences, for good or ill, of American actions. So we scrutinize everything that goes on in Washington with a natural and intense concern. Certain things which we have seen since May 6 have increased that concern. They have raised doubts about the steadiness, wisdom and effectiveness of some aspects of American diplomacy.

Intelligence operations—spying, if you like—have been car-

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ried on by all governments ever since there has been political society of any kind. Only the methods have changed in recent years. The surprise and rage of Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues over the U-2 is sheerest hypocrisy. The whole Soviet system rests on spying, inside and outside its borders.

Intelligence operations, however, should be managed intelligently—especially when something misfires. In the light of the facts that are known, it is not easy to feel that this incident was so handled in Washington, that there was not some fumbling and confusion. That is how it was bound to appear to many. Anger over Khrushchev's personal attack on the President and admiration for Mr. Eisenhower's attitude and conduct in this trying situation cannot, and should not, conceal the fact that some damage has been done to the reputation of the United States. Therefore, the strength and unity of the coalition have suffered. It does no service to that unity to obscure this issue or to try to convert Khrushchev's mistakes into a victory for our side. What the Russian leader has done by those mistakes is to have saved us from a more embarrassing situation.

It is as well, perhaps, that we saw the other side of the Soviet chief, the side we do not see when he is tripping through the corn fields or visiting a supermarket. But it is not good for any free country to have the image of United States policy cast in shadow and blurred by misunderstanding and contradiction. Yet this did result from the denials and admissions, the explanations and counter-explanations, the advances and withdrawals, that came from various American quarters from May 6 to May 16. Furthermore, what seemed to many to be uneasiness, an absence of sure touch, came at the worst possible time, on the very eve of a conference on which so many people, unwisely perhaps, had set such high hopes. Before there was time to recover from the first confusion, to adopt a consistent line—one which would command general confidence and support—the Soviet leader had descended on Paris in circumstances that were made to order for the kind of sabotage operation he was about to launch.

If some damage has been done to United States leadership within the coalition, that can be and, we hope, soon will be repaired. This, however, must be more than a patching job, more than the comforting words of a communiqué. Otherwise there will be another crisis which will expose other weaknesses inside our coalition and which will require other remedies. We cannot

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afford this kind of erosion which, the Communists hope, will eventually lead to the disintegration of our alliance. If the Atlantic coalition is to survive, it must reduce these centrifugal disturbances to a minimum, through sure, confident and wise leadership and with continuous and far closer consultation among its members than previously, in order to work out a common policy in the face of a common threat. If the various governments make their separate plans, pursue their separate adventures, we will eventually succeed in doing ourselves what the rulers of Russia would dearly love to do, and have not been able to do by direct action—namely, destroy the Atlantic Alliance.

If *we* have lost some confidence by recent diplomatic developments, the Communist leaders may have gained some. Mistaking surface manifestations for something deeper, they may now have a lessened respect for American leadership, strength and skill and for the steady purpose and resolution of United States public opinion.

As Herman Kahn has written: "One gets the impression that up to about 1956 or 1957 the average senior Russian did have an enormous respect for United States planners and decision-makers —a respect which they have now begun to lose. Many of the comments they make on remarks that some of our military and political leaders have made are contemptuous."[1] It is doubtful whether the developments of the last three weeks have made the United States look more competent, diplomatically and politically, in these Russian eyes. This is a danger, because it might tempt them to rash courses, which would be fatal to themselves—and to us.

Competent leadership in the execution of wise policies is, however, not enough. There must be a strong, resolute and mature public opinion as a spur and support for such leadership. We have no right to assume that we always have this in our countries. Indeed, there are signs that it is lacking, that today we are more concerned with exploiting our material resources than with strengthening and defending the moral values of our society. We can and do measure up to the demands of war—or catastrophe. We can react with firm words, stout resolve and closed ranks to shock or crisis. But when the shock does not result in explosion and the crisis seems to have passed, we return with relief to our payola

[1] "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence," *Stanford Research Institute Journal*, v. 3, n. 4, 1959, p. 139.

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investigations, our adult westerns, to our campaigns for higher subsidies and lower taxes. We long for what we think is "normalcy," without realizing that what is comfortably normal for us has little meaning for the majority of the people of the world or that the problems which face us in our tight little nuclear globe are unprecedented and may not be susceptible to solution by normal processes.

The Communists, whose "normalcy" has been struggle and revolution, are more aware of this than we are. They may talk about "peaceful coexistence" and believe in it after their fashion. They may be quite sincere in proclaiming their desire to avoid a nuclear war. But they also take for granted—or their leaders do—that their relationship to the free, democratic and therefore anti-Communist world must be one of continuous and relentless conflict, not necessarily carried on by war but by such things as nuclear threats, missile boasts, divisive diplomacy, propaganda, subversion and trade. We should not reject their own assessment of this relationship, while striving with patience and persistence, but without illusion, to change it.

We should also realize—and examine our own societies in the light of the realization—that Communist states are organized for this conflict in every detail of national life; that their citizens make, or are forced to make, great sacrifices for it; that they serve, or are forced to serve, the State in ways which we of the free democracies do not accept save in time of great crisis or war.

If collapse on the Summit brings about a really serious reassessment of the position within and between the nations of the Atlantic coalition, a more than superficial analysis of our purposes and policies, a clearer understanding of our dangers and our opportunities, then some good will have come from this most recent shock treatment. We may come to certain conclusions that make sense and, more important, try to act on them. Here are three such.

First, there must be far greater and more continuous coördination of policy within the Atlantic Alliance. This can best be done by making the NATO Council into one of political leaders, deputies of their heads of government, meeting as a political general staff. I do not see how anything less than this will suffice if those countries, who have agreed to defend themselves collectively, are to solve collectively the problems that they face. I see no other way of bringing about that unity of policy inside the group and

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that cohesion in the execution of such policy which are essential.

If the coalition cannot strengthen its unity in this way, its value to many of its members will be reduced to a point where they may think that the liabilities and risks from membership exceed the advantages. This—as recent events have illustrated—would apply also to defensive democratic alliances other than NATO. Such a development would be a tragedy. But it could happen.

Second, the Atlantic Pact countries must use the United Nations far more than they have recently done in the search for solutions to problems that now divide and may destroy the world. This is particularly true of such matters as disarmament. The great powers, operating both within and without the United Nations, have shown their inability to make any significant progress in this field. Nor is such progress likely to be easier after the events of Paris. If deadlock results, why should a committee of middle powers not be asked by the United Nations to draft an actual disarmament convention? It would then be the responsibility of the great powers to prove its inadequacy or its undesirability. In doing so they would not, at least, be rejecting each other's ideas, whose source alone makes them often so suspect.

Third, there is one matter which should be pushed hard, without delay, and irrespective of what Mr. Khrushchev may have said or done in Paris. This is agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, where so much progress has already been made. The West should not be responsible for sacrificing this to Mr. Khrushchev's recent conduct.

The collapse in Paris has confirmed again what has been obvious for many years—that we are living in an era of towering material and scientific achievement, along with a stubborn refusal to accept, in political action, the implications of that achievement. It is a desolate thought that, in the field of coöperation for world peace, we are not far beyond the tribal in our hopes and fears, in our policies and practices. Man can now receive a message from a gadget 8,000,000 miles away in outer space, a gadget whose course around the sun he has determined. But a message of peace across a curtain is blocked or misinterpreted or misunderstood.

Humanity can—as we are so often told—be lost in the chasm created by this imbalance. This is no holiday from history. It is the time when man's destiny is to be decided. It is a time of challenge to our resolve—and our right—to survive.

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PAKISTAN PERSPECTIVE

By Mohammed Ayub Khan

I AM not sure if the peculiar strains which confronted Pakistan immediately on its emergence as a free state are adequately understood.

The first strain was ideological. It is a common fallacy to believe that the concept of Pakistan was formed in a poet's dream. The poet, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, was no idle dreamer. Nor can countries like Pakistan (364,737 square miles; population 80,000,000) spring from the nebulous realm of poetry alone. Iqbal was in fact a philosopher of traditional as well as modern thought who had made a careful study of human affairs, both East and West, and focussed the light of his inquiry on the causes of economic and cultural subjugation to which the Muslims of India had been systematically subjected since their first abortive struggle for independence in 1857. It was in his presidential address to the annual session of All-India Muslim League in 1930 that he spelt out the broad outlines of a plan under which the Muslims of India were led to aspire to an independent state in which they would be free to follow their own way of life.

The All-India Muslim League based its Charter on this idea and, under the leadership of Qaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, launched a struggle which culminated in the establishment of Pakistan in August 1947.

Iqbal's thesis that in their free state the Muslims were to practice their own way of life posed an ideological problem which was not easy to handle. On one hand, there were many outside Pakistan who charged us with planning to establish an obdurate theocracy in the mediæval sense of the term. On the other, most of us within Pakistan itself were not quite clear how to go about welding our spiritual ideals into the business of statecraft. The result was a great deal of loose groping which infected our politics and our intellect alike.

Pakistan was thus involved in the paradox of almost losing its ideology in the very act of trying to fulfill it. This distraction was totally unwarranted, for Iqbal, one of the main creators of our ideology, had taken pains to define it in very clear terms: "In Islam the spiritual and the temporal are not two distinct domains and the nature of an act, however secular in its import, is deter-

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mined by the attitude of mind with which the agent does it. It is the invisible mental background of the act which ultimately determines its character. An act is temporal or profane if it is done in a spirit of detachment from the infinite complexity of life behind it. It is spiritual if it is inspired by that complexity. In Islam it is the same reality which appears as Church looked at from one point of view and State from another."

According to this concept, the State owes a singular and specific duty to its people. "The essence of Tauhid (Unity of God) as a working idea is equality, solidity and freedom," according to Iqbal. "The State from the Islamic standpoint is an endeavor to transform these ideals into space-time forces, an aspiration to realize them in a definite human organization."

It is this sort of human organization which Pakistan aspires to become and one of my endeavors is to clear at least a part of the way by liberating the basic concept of our ideology from the dust of vagueness and ambiguities it has accumulated over the years.

The second strain which befell Pakistan immediately on its emergence was economic. Besides more than 9,000,000 refugees who poured over the border in a state of appalling terror and distress, food fell desperately short owing to hundreds of thousands of acres of land going out of use every year on account of salinity and water-logging, a menace which still continues unabated. As much as 10,000,000 acres of good fertile land have already fallen out of cultivation on this account. Moreover, successive governments were unable to control the situation adequately, and large-scale, organized smuggling, currency rackets, black-marketing and increasingly plastic standards of honesty and efficiency brought the affairs of the country to the verge of total ruin.

The third strain—which is a continuous one—is geographical. Divided into two wings (West Pakistan: 310,236 square miles, population 38,779,000; East Pakistan: 54,501 square miles, population 42,063,000), there are over 1,000 miles of India in-between without any assured means of land communications. Air travel is heavily subsidized but still too expensive for most people. The sea link involves a journey of about seven days. There is diversity of languages, scripts and social customs. By the very nature of things, these factors are centrifugal and call for a new and bold experiment with political and administrative science to weave unity out of diversity. The situation is often difficult but not baffling, for a common ideology provides a positive base for co-

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hesion. The firmness of this base is strong or weak accordingly as that ideology is understood and practiced rightly or wrongly.

Finally, there is the emotional factor. Till the advent of Pakistan, none of us was in fact a Pakistani, for the simple reason that there was no territorial entity bearing that name. Actually, the boundaries of Pakistan were still being drawn and re-drawn secretly in the Viceregal Lodge at New Delhi when independence was proclaimed. Never had the destiny of so many millions depended so helplessly on the arbitrary strokes of one man's pencil. It was because Mr. Radcliffe happened to make a small dent on the wrong side of the line that over 4,000,000 inhabitants of Jammu and Kashmir have been locked in a life-and-death struggle for self-determination for 13 long and dreadful years.

So, prior to 1947, our nationalism was based more on an idea than on any territorial definition. Till then, ideologically we were Muslims; territorially we happened to be Indians; and parochially we were a conglomeration of at least eleven smaller, provincial loyalties. But when suddenly Pakistan emerged as a reality, we who had got together from every nook and corner of the vast sub-continent of India were faced with the task of transforming all our traditional, territorial and parochial loyalties into one great loyalty for the new state of Pakistan. This process of metamorphism was naturally attended by difficult psychological and emotional strains which we have borne in full measure—and are still bearing.

Under normal circumstances, it would have required most extraordinary efforts by the best of governments to cope with the problems which have been confronting us. But unfortunately neither have our circumstances been normal, nor did we have good strong governments; and they did not make even ordinary efforts to resolve the problems in front of them.

The founder of Pakistan, Qaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, was already a sick man on the eve of his triumph. He died within about a year. His Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, who had been closest to him during the struggle for independence, fell to an assassin's bullet in 1952. This created a vacuum in top leadership; and in smaller hands party politics became a mad scramble for power. Government after government rose and fell and within a period of five years six Prime Ministers presided over precariously balanced cabinets. The real and pressing problems of the country were ignored in this hide and seek for power.

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It is now the fashion to blame the politicians outright for this mess. Yes, they were guilty of many misdeeds of omission and commission; but there is one fundamental point in which, I have a feeling, they were rather sinned against than sinning. That is, they were given a system of government totally unsuited to the temper and climate of the country.

The British parliamentary system which we inherited and later adopted in the Constitution of 1956 is largely an unwritten law and takes for granted too many prerequisites which do not really exist in a country like Pakistan. Our rate of literacy is appallingly low. Our means of communication are poor, even primitive. The rural population which constitutes over 80 percent of the total is hardly touched by the world outside the villages.

Just before independence, when Mr. Jinnah was anxious to put more and more of his party men in the Central and Provincial Assemblies of India to carry on the struggle for the idea of Pakistan, he issued an appeal: "Vote for a Muslim Leaguer even if it be a lamp-post." People complied cheerfully; some even literally! When independence came, the gentlemen thus elected found themselves in a position of vantage to assume power in the new state of Pakistan, and the political system in their hands enabled them to keep delaying the making of a constitution for about eight years. The outgoing Parliament of Pakistan had 80 seats, each member presuming to represent about a million of his countrymen for almost an indefinite period. Even under the Constitution of 1956, a member of the Provincial Assembly was required to be elected by more than 100,000 voters. Now this is the type of electoral college which just cannot work in Pakistan—or for that matter in any country where conditions like those of Pakistan obtain, as they do in many newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. An average villager with little or no education has no means of gaining any personal knowledge about a candidate who is mixed up in a population of 100,000 or more, spread over a large area without any advanced means of communication and contact. Votes cast under these circumstances cannot but be vague, wanton and responsive to fear, coercion, temptation and other modes of misguidance. This is exactly what had been happening in Pakistan. Whenever elections were held, they could be easily manipulated to return candidates with power to influence, money to bribe and nuisance value to coerce. Conditions such as these reduce the practice of democracy to a farce.

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But this does not dismay us. Nor should it be taken to imply that we can do—or wish to do—without democracy. The revolution of October 7, 1958, was not aimed against the institution of democracy as such. No, it was only against the manner in which its institutions were being worked. There are two main reasons why we in Pakistan cannot but adhere to a democratic pattern of life and government. In the first place, as Muslims, we are brought up on two basic ingredients of democracy, namely, equality and fraternity. Anything to the contrary would be the negation of our spiritual faith and practice. And, secondly, we have to fight a long and arduous battle for progress and development in which every man, woman and child of Pakistan must participate to the fullest possible extent. Democracy provides the only healthy and dignified way for arousing the willing coöperation of people and harnessing it to a sustained national endeavor.

We must, therefore, have democracy. The question then is: What type of democracy? The answer need not be sought in the theories and practices of other people alone. On the contrary, it must be found from within the book of Pakistan itself.

To my mind, there are four prerequisites for the success of any democratic system in a country like Pakistan:

1. It should be simple to understand, easy to work and cheap to sustain.
2. It should put to the voter only such questions as he can answer in the light of his own personal knowledge and understanding without external prompting.
3. It should ensure the effective participation of all citizens in the affairs of the country up to the level of their mental horizon and intellectual calibre.
4. It should be able to produce reasonably strong and stable governments.

The scheme of "basic democracies" which has been launched in Pakistan is designed to meet most of these fundamental prerequisites. Under this scheme, the two wings of the country have each been divided into 40,000 constituencies with an average population of about 1,000. Every constituency elects one representative by universal franchise. In such a small and well-defined field of choice, voters of the meanest intelligence cannot go far wrong in putting their finger on the right type of candidate.

Ten such constituencies form a Union Council in the rural areas, and this elects its own chairman from amongst the elected

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members. Provision has also been made for nominated members to ensure, where necessary, the representation of special interests, like women, minorities, etc. In towns and larger municipalities organization follows a similar pattern.

The elected chairmen of Union Councils and Town Committees represent their areas on the next tier of administration, namely, the Thana Council, which covers the entire area under the jurisdiction of a Police Station. From this stage, this system of associating the chosen representatives of the people with local administration travels upwards covering all intermediary tiers, like tehsils, districts and divisions, up to the provincial level. This is designed to ensure a full sense of coöperation between the official and elected agencies at all stages of public administration.

The first elections to basic democracies were held last December and I feel the results were quite heartening. The average percentage of votes cast was 67 percent by men and 42 percent by women. Those elected included 14 percent university graduates, 78 percent literate and 8 percent illiterate members. They came from the real hard core of the country, the majority of them being middle-class and lower middle-class agriculturists, lawyers, medical practitioners, businessmen, retired government servants, workers and artisans.

One great lesson which these elections brought out was that, for the first time in Pakistan, it seemed possible for an average citizen to seek election purely on his or her personal merit without the help of any financial, social or political backing. Also for the first time, the elected candidate finds himself in a position to participate effectively and directly in the affairs of the country as they exist immediately around him.

The Union Councils and Town Committees have been given a wide charter of duties and responsibilities ranging from local self-government to national reconstruction and development. Besides this, I am looking to this gigantic instrument of mass representation to achieve three other pressing objectives. First, to help throw up a fresh supply of local and national leaders. Second, to serve as a two-way traffic post between the government and the basic core of the people and to bridge the gulf which under the best of systems is bound to exist between them in countries where education is limited, distances are large and modern facilities for reaching the masses are not universal. And, third, I would personally like this body of 80,000 elected representatives

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to serve as the electoral college for the Parliament and, possibly, for the President. This is only my personal view, for I do not wish to pre-judge the recommendations of the Constitution Commission which is at the moment seized of this and other allied problems.

The Constitution Commission of Pakistan, consisting of eminent judges, lawyers and other interests, was set up in February this year and has been entrusted with the following terms of reference:

"To examine the progressive failure of parliamentary government in Pakistan leading to the abrogation of the Constitution of 1956 and to determine the causes and the nature of the failure;

"To consider how best the said or like causes may be identified and their recurrence prevented;

"And, having further taken account of the genius of the people, the general standard of education and of political judgment in the country, the present state of a sense of nationhood, the prime need for sustained development, and the effect of the constitutional and administrative changes brought into being in recent months, to submit constitutional proposals in the form of a report advising how best the following ends may be secured: a democracy adaptable to changing circumstances and based on the Islamic principles of justice, equality and tolerance; the consolidation of national unity; and a firm and stable system of government."

I trust that toward the end of this year we shall be in a position to determine the broad shape of our future constitutional pattern. I would like to move as fast as possible, but there are many in our country who look askance at this haste. Some of them fear that politicians may return and mess things up once again. Others suspect that reforms and innovations introduced under the Martial Law may backslide and that the development program may slow down with the return of normal conditions.

These misgivings are understandable, but I do not feel they are well-founded. The former politicians are no problem to us now or in the near future. We have taken good care to spare them the usual tragic fate of those overtaken by revolutionary upheavals. On the contrary, we are content to treat them as a big joke, just as they turned a perfectly sound country into the laughing-stock of the whole world. When they are confronted with skeletons collected from their cupboards, most of them wisely prefer to retire

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from public life for five to six years rather than face the risk of open trial. This saves a lot of dirty linen from being washed publicly, and decent folk prefer this quiet exit of errant politicians.

As regards the suspicion that the return of constitutional rule might undo or retard the progress of reforms launched under the Martial Law, this again is an unreal fear. These reforms were long overdue and have been fully and unequivocally acclaimed by the people. No future government dare retard or obstruct them. The only prerequisite is that the government should be strong enough to resist the pressure of vested interests which have been hit hard by some of the reforms. This, I am positive, the new Constitution must ensure.

Moreover, when circumstances such as our revolution concentrate power in the hands of one person, it is his bounden duty to pass that power on to a more broadly based system without avoidable delay. Individuals are fallible; but institutions stay. That is why I am in such a hurry to ensure the induction of a suitable constitutional system without any loss of time.

While the Constitution is still in the making, there is time to complete the reforms already in hand or give a start to those which are still under contemplation. The meaning of all this activity is to prepare the ground for the growth of a happy and healthy life which, after all, is the end-product of all human endeavor.

An archaic type of feudalism which existed in Pakistan—particularly West Pakistan—had vested the entire political, economic and social might of the country in a limited group of families. It was impossible to make any advance in any direction without first breaking this monopoly of power. Therefore, land reform was one of the first measures to be taken by the new régime. This was a major operation but it was performed peacefully and scientifically and was attended by no manner of tyranny or injustice. This is a far-reaching socio-economic change and its full impact will be felt only with the passage of time.

Other fields in which reforms have been undertaken include education, public health, fiscal systems, law courts, civil administration and the rehabilitation of refugees. The object is to get us to the starting point of development, whence we may be better able to grapple with some of the most pressing and immediate of our problems. These are: fighting the grave menace to the land of salinity and water-logging; curbing the excessive rate of growth of population; and launching the next Five Year Plan for national

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development, estimated to cost over 19,000,000,000 rupees (about $4,000,000,000). According to experts, these figures are not astronomical but only reasonable.

The next 15 to 20 years are going to be most crucial for Pakistan. Either we "make the grade" in this period or we do not. If we fail to make the grade, we are bound to be submerged under the tidal wave of Communism which is constantly lashing its fury all around us. Since we do not seek this fate we must move forward, and do so quickly. It is here that our eyes turn towards our friends and allies. They have already given us magnanimous aid, for which we are most grateful. But there are reasons of history which entitle us to claim still more.

During the last 200 years or so the area which is now Pakistan was subjected to foreign rule. This stunted our growth immeasurably and all this long period of time was lost to us for preparing ourselves to move with the modern scientific times. We have now to catch up with the fast-moving world—and this will require extraordinary endeavor as well as expenditure.

It was during the period of imperial rule that the British industrial development started and gained momentum with resources which to a large extent were taken from the colonial areas. The British industrial development in a way gave a fillip to the American industrial development. It is common knowledge that up to the Second World War, Britain had enormous investments in both the Americas. Most of the progress in the Commonwealth countries and Dominions was also stimulated by the British industrial development. So far as the area now forming Pakistan is concerned, its manpower was generally employed to man the British Armies to maintain and protect the Empire. For this reason, this part of the Indian sub-continent was purposely kept industrially backward so that the populace would not be diverted into other channels of employment.

Moreover, in the context of present-day world politics Pakistan has openly and unequivocally cast its lot with the West, and unlike several other countries around us, we have shut ourselves off almost completely from the possibility of any major assistance from the Communist bloc. We do not believe in hunting with the hound and running with the hare. We wish to follow, and are following, a clear and unambiguous path.

All these factors lead to one conclusion: that the English-speaking world ought to feel a special responsibility to assist Pakistan

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in attaining a reasonable posture of advancement. It is not just a claim. It is in fact the dictate of history.

Before I conclude, I would like to add a few words about our relations with our neighbors. I am quite clear in my mind that in order to be able to make some progress at home, we must have a long spell of undisturbed peace around us. But unfortunately our relations with India and Afghanistan have not been good. We have approached them and made every effort, without success, to get a settlement on mutually honorable and reasonable terms.

As regards Afghanistan, I really do not understand why there should be any trouble between us at all. The rulers of Afghanistan have woven so many vague and imaginary webs of grievances and demands that they now fancy they are inextricably caught in them. Somehow they suspect us and fear that a strong Pakistan would be a danger to Afghanistan. As a matter of fact, the truth is just the other way round. But we have not succeeded in bringing home this truth to the Afghan rulers. Let us hope they will see the light before it is too dark.

We have made some little progress with India in certain fields but we are stuck over the problem of Kashmir. There is some reluctance on the part of Indian leadership to move forward and discuss this problem in a spirit of realism and justice. They do not seem to realize that a running sore like this between two neighbors is a dangerous thing.

I think there is room and need for India and Pakistan to live as friends. If we cannot live as good friends, at least we should have a decent, human, neighborly relationship with each other. This is what we, on our part, are trying to develop. But this has so far remained a largely unilateral endeavor. We have had very little response from the other side. This does not dismay me. I still hope that one day realism will dawn in India too.

As a student of war and strategy, I can see quite clearly the inexorable push of the north in the direction of the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. This push is bound to increase if India and Pakistan go on squabbling with each other. If, on the other hand, we resolve our problems and disengage our armed forces from facing inwards as they do today, and face them outwards, I feel we shall have a good chance of preventing a recurrence of the history of the past, which was that whenever this sub-continent was divided—and often it was divided—someone or other invited an outsider to step in.

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ARMS CONTROL, INSPECTION AND SURPRISE ATTACK

By Henry A. Kissinger

IN THE past, a nation's security was guaranteed essentially by its military power. Though proposals for disarmament were made from time to time, particularly after World War I, there was an air of unreality about them. In the era of what we now call conventional weapons, the force-in-being was not nearly so significant as the industrial potential and the mobilization base. A country planning to attack had to engage in extended preparations very difficult to hide. Technology was relatively stable. Travel was unrestricted. Since surprise was not so crucial, and since victory could generally be achieved only through a prolonged mobilization of resources *after* a war had started, the contribution which arms control might make to stability seemed marginal. Armaments, it was then correctly said, were the symptom and not the cause of tension. The best method of achieving a stable peace was to remove the causes of political conflict.

Although this remains true today, physical conditions have basically altered. Technology is volatile. The advantage of surprise can be overwhelming. The forces-in-being are almost surely decisive—at least in all-out war. A major cause of instability is the very rate of technological change. Every country lives with the nightmare that even if it puts forth its best efforts its survival may be jeopardized by a technological breakthrough on the part of its opponent. It knows also that every invention opens up the prospect of many others. No country can protect itself against *all* the technological possibilities increasingly open to its opponents. Conversely, an advantage once achieved will produce a powerful incentive to exploit it, for the scientific revolution which made it possible also insures that it will be transitory.

The fear of a momentary weakness is compounded by the dangers of being surprised. As long as the retaliatory forces are composed primarily of liquid-fuel missiles and airplanes—as they will be until the middle sixties—the side which strikes first will have a perhaps decisive advantage unless the defender's retaliatory force is in a state of high readiness. But when two retaliatory forces so constituted confront each other, their very structure may contribute to instability regardless of the intentions of the

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two sides. Even if those intentions are peaceful, each side must seek to protect itself against catastrophe by increasing the readiness and security of its retaliatory force. Yet such measures, taken in what is conceived to be self-defense, may be indistinguishable to the other side from a decision to launch a surprise attack. For a force which requires no extended preparation before retaliating is also capable of striking without warning. There will consequently always exist a powerful incentive to anticipate this eventuality by launching a preëmptive attack, or at least to obtain the greatest degree of warning possible by any means available. Our aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union is the direct consequence of the nature of the retaliatory forces. Since the penalty for being surprised can be national catastrophe, the need to protect the retaliatory force may over-ride all other considerations.

After mobile, solid-fuel missiles become operational in the 1960s, vulnerability will be substantially reduced and the need for extreme readiness correspondingly lessened. Nevertheless, invulnerability is a relative term which depends on numbers, accuracy and defensive capabilities. In a volatile technology it will always be precarious. Both sides should therefore have an interest in stabilizing the arms race as much as possible. All countries should be concerned with preventing a war which might break out simply because of the automatism of the retaliatory forces. At the very least, they should strive to make certain that war, if it does start, is the result of a deliberate decision and is not produced because the opponents, in taking measures which they deem to be defensive, push the other side into an attack in self-defense. If the two sides cannot give expression to their desire to achieve this situation by proposing serious concrete programs, the future of negotiations is dim indeed.

II

The most obvious solution to the problem of surprise attack is to eliminate retaliatory forces and nuclear weapons altogether. But the seeming simplicity of such proposals is deceptive. To be effective, an arms control scheme must have a built-in incentive to observe it. The participants must not be able to achieve a decisive advantage through evasion or feel that they will put themselves at the mercy of the opponent if they observe the agreement but the other side cheats. Complete elimination of stockpiles of weapons and of retaliatory forces would have a built-in incentive

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for evasion. In case of complete nuclear disarmament even 50 hidden weapons would confer a perhaps overwhelming superiority. Since no conceivable inspection system could insure against such a possibility, both sides would be almost forced from the very beginning to hold back a part of their stockpile for fear that the opponent might do so. To observe the agreement might magnify a country's sense of insecurity. To evade it would be demoralizing and wreck all prospects for further progress in the field of arms control.

After a decade and a half of the growth of nuclear stockpiles and nearly a decade of the development of missiles, simple remedies can no longer work. The goal of responsible arms-control measures must be to determine, free of sentimentality, not how to eliminate retaliatory forces but how to maintain an equilibrium between them. It is more worthwhile—at least for the immediate future—to seek to reduce the incentive to attack than the capability for it.

What measures can reduce the incentive to make a surprise attack? An all-out nuclear attack is likely to result from one of two motives. An aggressor may feel sufficiently confident that a sudden attack could reduce the counterblow to acceptable proportions. Or a threatened country may feel so vulnerable that it seeks to lessen the danger through a preëmptive attack. Thus a control system will add to stability if it complicates the calculations of the attacker and facilitates those of the defender. Or, put another way, the objective should be to increase the uncertainty about the possibility of success in the mind of the aggressor and to diminish the vulnerability of the defender. To the degree that the aggressor feels uncertain either about the chances of success or, what amounts to the same thing, the likelihood of escaping unacceptable damage, deterrence will be increased. Stability will be enhanced if the defender does not feel so vulnerable that he feels obliged to launch his retaliatory force at the first ambiguous warning.

It follows that both sides can take unilateral measures designed to reduce vulnerability and thereby increase stability. It is essential to recognize, however, that unilateral actions, whatever their intent, may be interpreted as threatening by the opponent. Thus whenever a choice exists, it is desirable to opt for a measure whose defensive characteristics are easily identified. For example, the invulnerability of a retaliatory force is undoubtedly increased by

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multiplying the number of missiles and dispersing them. Even if each individual weapon is highly vulnerable, an aggressor now requires a more substantial force for success. This, coupled with the difficulty of coördinating a larger attack, complicates his calculations and thus adds to deterrence. At the same time, as the defending retaliatory force grows, it not only becomes more invulnerable but more threatening as well. The response of the other side may be to launch a preëmptive blow. Or more likely, the result would be a spiraling arms race. In either case, the result is to increase instability.

On the other hand, if we seek to achieve invulnerability not through numbers but through mobility or hardening of our retaliatory force, deterrence will be improved without adding to our offensive threat. Such a step can be considered a unilateral contribution to arms control. It enhances our ability to strike back; it does not add to our capacity for surprise attack. The Soviet Union loses only in the ability to destroy our retaliatory force; no additional threat is posed to its security. Here, then, is a unilateral measure which meets the two requirements for arms control outlined earlier: it complicates the calculations of the aggressor and it eases those of the defender. It magnifies the uncertainty of success of the attacker while increasing the security of the side which concedes the first blow.

While a secure retaliatory force is basic to any arms control scheme, invulnerability is a relative term. It depends on numbers, dispersal, mobility, hardening and similar factors. These relationships are so complicated that to seek to protect the retaliatory force solely through unilateral measures is almost certain to produce an arms race. If the goal is stability, negotiated arms-control schemes must therefore accompany unilateral measures. Their objective should be to define a stable equilibrium between the opposing retaliatory forces and then to devise a control system which protects both sides against violations. This raises the question of the significance of numerical limitation.

The foregoing discussion about nuclear disarmament has revealed the paradoxical fact that there is a certain safety in numbers. And this is true even if both sides religiously observe an agreement to limit nuclear weapons. Instability is greater if each side possesses ten missiles than if the equilibrium is stabilized at, say, 500. For an attack which is 90 percent successful when the opponent has ten missiles leaves him one—or a number hardly

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likely to inflict unacceptable damage. An attack of similar effectiveness when the opponent possesses 500 missiles leaves 50—perhaps sufficient to pose an unacceptable risk. And of course it is technically more complicated to destroy such a large number. Reduction of numbers is thus not an infallible remedy. A very small retaliatory force may increase the danger of war.

This leads to the conclusion that stability is greatest when numbers are sufficiently large to complicate the calculations of the aggressor and to provide a minimum incentive for evasion but not so substantial that they defeat control. The efficacy of a control scheme thus depends on the answer to two queries: What advantage will the side violating the agreement gain through its first violation? How difficult is the system to inspect for violations? If the number of permissible long-range missiles is set at zero—if, in other words, both sides agreed to destroy all I.C.B.M.'s and nuclear weapons—even a small evasion, say ten hidden missiles, will confer a decisive advantage. And such an evasion is almost impossible to discover. If the number is set very low, say at ten, an additional 15 may make a surprise attack possible. In such circumstances, there would be a dual incentive for evasion: fear of the opponent's evasion and the temptation to deal with the security problem once and for all by launching a surprise attack.

On the other hand, if the number is set relatively high, say at 500, even a fairly substantial violation would not confer a decisive advantage. In that case, 50 additional long-range missiles would not enable the violator to launch a surprise attack. A decisive advantage can be obtained only by so many weapons that the risk of detection is likely to appear excessive.

These considerations can be summed up as follows:

(a) The primary goal of any arms control scheme must be to increase stability. A precondition is that both sides should strive to develop invulnerable retaliatory forces.

(b) Since invulnerability is a relative term, the purpose of arms control measures must be to strengthen so far as possible the relative position of the defender, either by enhancing the security of his force or by complicating the calculations of the aggressor.

(c) The equilibrium should be established at a level at which a strategic advantage can be gained only by such a substantial violation that likelihood of its going undetected is very small. The

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goal should be a stable balance of forces such that deterrence will not fail even if the agreement is upset. A violation, in short, should start an arms race and not a war.

(d) In addition to negotiated schemes, or even in their absence, both sides can take unilateral steps which promote stability. Wherever possible they should seek to assure the invulnerability of their retaliatory force by measures which are manifestly defensive.

III

As originally conceived, inspection against surprise attack was intended to provide tactical warning. It was believed that a sudden blow required such extensive preparations that they could not be hidden. Planes would have to be serviced and perhaps moved to forward bases. Warning radar would be placed on increased alert. A control system on the ground coupled with periodic aerial inspection could not fail to detect these efforts. We would then be able to protect our retaliatory force by making it airborne or increasing its readiness by other measures. Once the advantage of surprise was removed and the possibility of destroying our retaliatory forces eliminated there would remain no incentive for aggression.

Whatever might have been the significance of obtaining tactical warning when airplanes were the backbone of the retaliatory force, the quest for it is extremely dubious in the missile age. The greater the readiness of the retaliatory force the more difficult it is to determine whether there is an intention to use it. And instant readiness is a special characteristic of missile forces. Even the present generation of liquid-fuel missiles is reported to require a countdown of less than an hour. When solid-fuel missiles become operational, the interval between the command and the actual firing will be a matter of minutes. Then, perfect inspection perfectly communicated could add about ten minutes to the warning time.

If the security of a retaliatory force depended on a warning of ten minutes the situation would be unstable regardless of the effectiveness of the inspection system. The narrow margin of survival would make it prey to all kinds of ambiguous alarms and increase the risk of its becoming the catalyst of accidental war. Indeed, a properly designed missile force should not have to rely on tactical warning at all. It is safe to launch airplanes on the basis

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of an unconfirmed warning because a relatively long time-interval is available to determine the accuracy of the information and in that period the planes can be recalled. Missiles, on the other hand, are in transit such a short time and the decision to launch them is so irrevocable that they must be designed to ride out an attack.

Inspection in order to obtain tactical warning may also prove inconsistent with the security of the retaliatory forces. Because of the special characteristics of missiles, the only sure method for obtaining tactical warning against a missile attack is to establish continuous surveillance of the launching sites. But continuous surveillance of the retaliatory forces may help a potential aggressor more than the defender, thus violating one of the cardinal principles of arms control. The defender learns only what he already knows: the instant readiness of the aggressor's force. At best he gains an additional warning time which is so short that his retaliatory force cannot possibly be designed to make use of it.

The aggressor, on the other hand, gains vital strategic information. He will learn the exact location of every missile at every moment—thus nullifying to a considerable extent whatever advantage his opponent may have achieved through mobility. He will know precisely the pattern of operation of the retaliatory force he is planning to destroy. The conclusion is inescapable that inspection to obtain tactical warning may detract from stability rather than add to it.

The Soviet Union's adamant refusal to permit inspection of its retaliatory forces is understandable. The Kremlin undoubtedly has a reasonably accurate notion of where our retaliatory forces are based. We, on the other hand, probably do not know the precise location of many Soviet bases. In these circumstances, a system of constant surveillance may appear to the Soviet leaders as a form of unilateral disarmament, which would improve our capacity for surprise attack without increasing the security of the Soviet Union.

But even from our point of view there is a serious question whether constant surveillance of the retaliatory forces is desirable. The practical difficulties of inspection are complicated by the sheer mass of information that must be reported and the speed with which it must be transmitted and analyzed. Moreover, the moment when surveillance is most needed is also the time when the opponent has most incentive to interrupt it.

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The problem of adequate sanctions is more difficult still. If the penalty for suspected evasion is very rapid and drastic, the inspection system may contribute to the tenseness of relationships; its instabilities will in effect be added to those inherent in the existence of retaliatory forces. On the other hand, if the reaction is slow or weak, no benefit has been derived from the additional warning time.

A country which becomes aware of what it believes to be an imminent attack has four broad choices:

(a) It can await the blow and gear its retaliation to the scale of attack. This can be done only if its retaliatory force is invulnerable.

(b) It can increase the readiness of its own retaliatory force in the hope that, having lost the element of surprise, the aggressor will desist from his course.

(c) It can give the opponent an ultimatum demanding an end to his preparations and a return to a more peaceful posture—perhaps feeding information into the inspection system on its side to reinforce the threat.

(d) It can launch a preëmptive blow.

Of these options the safest course is the one which is least dependent on tactical warning: that of developing a retaliatory force so well protected that it can await the blow. All other measures are likely to make the situation more tense. Increasing one's readiness—whatever the significance of this phrase may be in the missile age—may deter; but it may also cause the opponent to accelerate his preparations and even to transform what may have been merely a threat of surprise attack into a preëmptive blow. In the missile age, an ultimatum is almost bound to bring on what it seeks to avoid. The recipient—unless his forces are highly invulnerable—cannot possibly run the risk of waiting to see whether the threat is serious. And he may be sufficiently doubtful about his ability to demonstrate compliance with the demand to consider a preëmptive attack the only safe course. This raises the question whether a country would not have a powerful incentive *not* to recognize hostile preparations. In certain circumstances, indeed, the best contribution to stability may be to seem not to notice the information supplied by the inspection system.

Even if war is avoided, a pattern of diplomacy may well develop which uses the inspection system for purposes of blackmail. When missile forces are in a high state of readiness it is difficult

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to support a verbal threat with concrete actions that are convincing. But with an inspection system, overt preparations could be demonstrated to the opponent. Inspection can then become a device for blackmail. The blackmailer can take steps he is certain will be detected in order to bring pressure on his opponents, particularly on those which are known to be most reluctant to risk all-out war.

Even if the threatened country does not succumb to the menace, the potential aggressor can use the inspection system to obtain vital strategic information. Whether the threatened country ignores his blackmail or makes counter-preparations, the aggressor will learn the likely pattern of its response. In short, inspection in order to obtain tactical warning is either illusory or dangerous.

IV

Though inspection for the purpose of providing tactical warning does not seem promising and may be dangerous, surveillance could be of great significance in stabilizing the opposing retaliatory forces. This raises two questions: How can inspection reveal the size of a weapons system which is mobile? How can it be reconciled with the unilateral measures to promote invulnerability described earlier?

The answer is that inspection to determine numbers can and should be different from inspection designed to obtain tactical warning. The difficulty with constant surveillance is that it reveals not only the number of missiles but their locations. It contributes to stability by supplying information about the size of the retaliatory force. But it increases vulnerability by revealing the location of the most sensitive targets.

It therefore becomes important to distinguish two kinds of inspection. Most negotiations heretofore have addressed themselves to the problem of inspection in situations in which the opponent is assumed to be interested in hiding something. But a control scheme designed to produce what may be called "negative evidence"—the absence of violation—suffers from a built-in factor of uncertainty. In the nature of things it can never be clear whether the absence of a violation is due to the integrity of the signatories or their skill in evasion. The greater the distrust which has produced the demand for inspection in the first place, the less reassured the parties may be by a control scheme. Lack of evi-

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dence of evasion may not seem proof of compliance so much as a symptom of the inadequacy of the inspection system.

It is different, however, with inspection which seeks to produce "positive evidence"—that is, not what each side may want to hide but what it is eager for its opponent to know. In certain circumstances both sides may desperately wish to make certain that the opponent understands they are *not* preparing an all-out blow. If accidental war is to be avoided, there must be means by which the nuclear powers are able to inform each other rapidly and convincingly that an ambiguous action was not intended to be the prelude to a surprise attack. In the extremely unlikely event that one of our bombers crashed on a training mission and its hydrogen bomb exploded, it would be vital to have some means to convince the Soviet leaders rapidly that a genuine accident had occurred. The same would be true if a nuclear-powered rocket designed to place a satellite into orbit should malfunction and land on the opponent's territory. Similarly, limited wars—even those not sought by any of the major powers—may threaten suddenly to boil over into a final showdown. In these situations, everything may depend on the ability to reassure the opponent clearly and convincingly.[1]

In the contemporary turmoil, many situations are conceivable which could flare up into hostilities not sought by any of the major powers and yet threatening to embroil them—as, for example the revolution in Iraq. It becomes important to provide safeguards to prevent a spread of local incidents into a general conflagration. All-out war must not occur simply because the nuclear powers have not considered how to back away from the precipice.

This suggests that the West and the Communist countries may have a common interest in setting up a control system which will enable them to exchange and verify information, particularly in periods of crisis. A minimum requirement is for a Joint Soviet-Western technical study, to examine the types of accident and miscalculation that can now be imagined. This study should seek to devise means for avoiding them—and, if they should occur nevertheless, to keep them from spreading into a cataclysm.

Schemes that merit attention are the establishment of a communications system to enable the leaders of both countries to

[1] Thomas C. Schelling has discussed this problem brilliantly in "The Strategy of Conflict." Cambridge: Havard University Press, 1960, p. 246–254.

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communicate instantaneously. Joint Western-Soviet offices might be established in Moscow and Washington with their own communications equipment. In addition, special surveillance teams could be set up either under United Nations or joint Western-Soviet control. These teams should be trained to move rapidly to trouble spots to verify information which one side wishes to convey rapidly to its opponents. Both the communications and the special surveillance teams should run frequent exercises designed to guard against the dangers of accidental war and miscalculation revealed by the technical study.

To be sure, in their present state of mind the Soviet leaders are likely to dismiss such a scheme out of hand. And probably it will be ridiculed in the West by those persons who are so horrified by the prospect of nuclear war that they refuse even to consider the possibility that deterrence may fail despite our best efforts. But it is necessary to provide some means for preventing the automatic spread of every conflict into a holocaust. "Positive evidence" inspection can reduce the danger of a war brought about because one side is afraid that its opponent is afraid.

The notion of establishing a control system especially designed for critical periods admittedly sounds strange. But its strangeness is due to the fact that we still have not yet comprehended the revolutionary nature of our present world. The new technology can be mastered only by political innovations as dramatic as those in the field of science. One test of the sincerity of the Soviet leaders with respect to arms control would be their willingness to participate at least in the technical discussions proposed here.

The problem of designing arms-control measures to deal with deliberate surprise attack is more complicated. "Positive evidence" inspection—to verify information voluntarily given—will not by itself provide adequate protection, while "negative evidence" inspection involves all the liabilities of continuous surveillance. Yet, if arms control is to have any meaning, a method of coping with the problem of surprise attack must be devised. This is important not only as a means to stabilize the arms race; it is even more significant for the future of other arms-control negotiations. If the two sides cannot act constructively on the basis of this manifestly common interest, the danger is real that future arms-control negotiations will be reduced to a largely symbolic effort, devoted to ritualistic incantations of general goals and producing agreement only on measures that are meaning-

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less. Too many proposals in the Western plan submitted to the Ten-power Disarmament Conference have precisely this characteristic.

This is a most unpropitious moment for the detailed and dispassionate negotiations which are necessary for a serious effort to deal with surprise attack. But we cannot gear our position to Mr. Khrushchev's erratic moods. We must be clear in our own minds about the elements of a responsible program. When negotiations do prove feasible we can then enter them with confidence instead of preparing our position under the pressure of a deadline.

There are two prerequisites to an effective system to control surprise attacks:

(1) The opposing retaliatory forces should be stabilized at a level which reduces the incentive to attack to a minimum.

(2) The inspection system should be sufficiently reliable to prevent evasions which can upset the strategic balance, yet not so pervasive as to destroy the security of the retaliatory force. How can these objectives be reconciled?

In a subject of such technical complexity it would be rash to offer any proposal as a final solution. But if a scheme does no more than indicate the complexity of the problem, it will have served its purpose. In arms control, simple answers are almost surely wrong and the quest for them is an obstacle to real progress. If we really want to deal with the problem of surprise attack we must be prepared to face complicated situations.

Thus it may be useful to consider a combination of "negative evidence" inspection with what may be termed "inventory" inspection, the purpose of which is to determine the actual strength of the opposing forces.

How would this work in stabilizing retaliatory forces at a level which minimizes the incentive to attack? Under this system, each country possessing nuclear weapons would designate regions where it would agree to station no retaliatory weapons, and another group of areas in which retaliatory weapons up to a certain number would be permitted. The areas stripped of retaliatory weapons would be open to unlimited inspection. Here would be installed "negative evidence" inspection designed to find out the *absence* of retaliatory weapons.

In the regions where retaliatory weapons are stationed only "inventory inspection" would be permitted. Inventory inspection would mean that at some agreed interval, say twice a year, in-

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spectors would have free access to determine the strength of available forces. But they would be barred at other times. During the period of inventory, the retaliatory force would have to be stationary, a fact which could probably be monitored through an adequate combination of ground and aerial inspection. But it could be mobile at other times.

It may be objected that such a system would create an enormous vulnerability during the period of inventory inspection when the precise location of the opposing force would be known. This danger can be overcome by placing the land-based retaliatory force in several different areas separated by territory in which uncontrolled inspection is permitted. The inventory in each area could then be taken at different times. Thus the retaliatory force would continue to be mobile in some regions even while it is being counted in others. Uncontrolled inspection in the territory separating these areas could monitor the shifting of weapons from one region to another.

Such a system should be effective in preserving the equilibrium or at least in keeping evasions within limits that prevent either side from obtaining a decisive advantage. Uncontrolled inspection in the "disarmed" regions would provide also a measure of control over the production of retaliatory weapons particularly if the "armed" areas were located so that they contained a minimum of industry—as they should be. The system could be further strengthened by stationing inspectors at all access points to armed areas. In these circumstances it would seem unlikely that either side would be able to increase its retaliatory force beyond agreed levels on a scale sufficient to be worth the risk of detection, either by means of uncontrolled surveillance or through the system of inventory control. Inventory inspection would be adequate to determine the strength of the retaliatory force within acceptable limits of error. It would not be sufficient to determine its location and thereby compromise its security.

The scheme here described may be a means also to give effect to another common interest of the two sides: to protect as much of the civilian population as possible should deterrence fail by accident or miscalculation. The first objective of a surprise attack must be to destroy the opposing retaliatory force. Even the maddest aggressor would know that an attack on cities which failed to eliminate the defender's capacity for retaliation would merely guarantee a devastating counterblow. Moreover, once the retalia-

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tory force of the opponent is destroyed, the aggressor may have a positive interest in sparing the civilian population. For blackmail purposes, the opponent's civilian population is more useful alive than dead. Thus surprise attack against centers of population is likely only if they are thought to shelter retaliatory weapons. If major population centers are in the "disarmed" areas, the consequences of a failure of deterrence would be much mitigated.

This raises the problem that placing all major population centers in the disarmed areas may defeat the possibility of land-based mobility. Cities are usually also the hub of the road and rail network. Another objection may be that a system which opened all cities to uncontrolled inspection—implicit in disarming them—would be bound to be unacceptable to the Soviet Union. One solution is of course to design land-based retaliatory systems so that they can be moved cross-country without using roads or railways. If this is deemed impractical, each signatory of the agreement suggested here could be given two choices. It could "disarm" its centers of population even if they were located in armed areas. In that case, it would have to admit permanent inspection teams whose task would be to verify that the city sheltered retaliatory weapons only when in transit—and this term should be rigidly defined to exclude any pause of more than an hour or so. Or else a country could refuse to admit inspectors into the population centers in "armed areas" except for inventory, in which case it would have to take its chances in case of war. This would place the population of the cities concerned in the position of inhabitants of fortified towns in conventional warfare.

As in any arms-control scheme, a number of loopholes suggest themselves. One concerns that part of the retaliatory force based at sea. Here the system of inventory control would obviously be impossible and constant surveillance, even if it could be designed, might defeat one of the chief advantages of a sea-based retaliatory force: the uncertainty about its location. One solution that occurs to the author—though more intensive study would undoubtedly reveal others—is to include all port cities and harbors in the regions of unlimited inspection. This would provide a check on new construction—a useful form of surveillance if the system came into being before sea-based forces have become too large. And since ships, whatever their endurance, have to return to port from time to time, an inventory of the total force could probably be obtained in this manner.

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Another lesser difficulty is posed by airplanes. An inventory by region is not possible here because airplanes can be shifted around so easily and are not subject to control while in transit. Thus if each area were inspected in turn, the count could be falsified by shifting planes out of the region being inspected. The solution is to begin the inventory with a count of all airplanes in *all* armed regions. At the beginning of the inventory all planes would be grounded and inspection teams would move into the airfields. After the airplanes are counted, the inventory of missiles would proceed region by region. To prevent the airlifting of missiles out of areas where inventory is about to take place, the inspection teams would remain at the airfields until the inventory in all regions is completed.

It would be idle to pretend that such a system—if it could be negotiated—would guarantee stability for the indefinite future. The problem of a technological breakthrough will always remain with us. Stability in numbers of offensive weapons—which is essentially the purpose of the scheme outlined here—could be made irrelevant by a major advance in defensive weapons and systems. If one side developed a defense against ballistic missiles which it considered very highly effective, it could use even its controlled retaliatory force for blackmail since it might feel safe from a counterblow.

The difficulty of devising a method to obtain a count of weapons already produced suggests the complexity of controlling scientific research. An effort of this nature would have to wait until the two sides gain competence through the operation of simpler control schemes. In the meantime, no alternative exists except to keep up in the technological race and to seek to maintain stability, in addition to arms-control schemes, by an unremitting effort in research and development.

It may be objected that the Soviet Union will never accept so comprehensive a scheme. But surely we cannot fail to make a responsible proposal simply because it may be rejected. If neither negative evidence nor positive evidence nor inventory inspection prove negotiable, Mr. Khrushchev's speech at the United Nations in favor of complete disarmament will stand revealed as a cynical propaganda hoax. If no meaningful scheme involving inspection is acceptable, the melancholy conclusion may be that the requirements of the Soviet domestic system are incompatible with serious arms-control measures.

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V

It is essential to understand that a price must be paid for each step towards arms control. Refusal to recognize or to admit this fact would have the consequence that arms control instead of increasing security would create new weaknesses. To the degree that the risk of surprise attack is reduced the threat of local aggression may be increased. To the extent that the "positive evidence" concept of inspection makes accidental war less likely, it may encourage probing action, and new forms of blackmail.

One of the key sanctions against local aggression is the fear that, whatever the intentions of the side that initiates it, neither side may know how to limit its scope. The Communist bloc has been deterred to some extent from exploiting its local preponderance in certain areas because it is not sure that the resulting war could be limited. The control measures outlined above would remove much of this constraint. One of the chief purposes of the positive evidence type of inspection is, after all, to enable the nuclear powers to control the scope of conflict and to reassure each other in tense situations. Similarly, if inspection of the retaliatory forces proves reliable the result must be the total incredibility of the threat of all-out war. For the purpose of such a control scheme is to deprive all-out war of any rational goal.

Effective control against surprise attack may make limited wars not only more likely, it may cause them to increase in intensity. If communication between the protagonists is assured and if a mechanism exists for verifying that a given act is *not* a prelude to surprise attack, an aggressor may become confident that regardless of the scale of aggression he will always be able to keep matters under control. When both sides have accepted the notion that accidents must not lead to all-out war, and when they have examined means of containing a conflict even in the face of very substantial provocation, an aggressor may be tempted to step up pressure. It would be ironic indeed if the frequency and perhaps the violence of conflicts increased because the powers are *too much* in control of events.

Nevertheless, the benefits of a scheme to prevent surprise attack outweigh the risks. The perils can be met if we are willing to admit them and if we do not treat an agreement on surprise attack as an excuse to relax our efforts. As arms control reduces the possibility of surprise attack, greater stress must be placed on local defense. The possibility of Communist pressure will not be ended

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but it will be channeled into an arena of conflict where the alternatives are less stark and the risks less dreadful.

Moreover, it would be a mistake to look at the problem only strategically. A control system against surprise attack could not fail to have profound political and psychological consequences. If both sides can coöperate to the extent envisaged here, the solution of many other issues will become much easier. For example, the regions of unlimited inspection could be so arranged as to provide buffers against local aggression. Inventory inspection might be a device to determine reduction to agreed force levels. Positive inspection could be applied to the reduction of nuclear stockpiles.

But we must not delude ourselves. The prerequisite is a Soviet decision to allow meaningful inspection. If Mr. Khrushchev is serious about his disarmament proposal, the best first step is to agree to the kind of inspection described here.

VI

No aspect of American policy has received less systematic attention than arms control. Substantial intellectual as well as material resources have been devoted to the study of strategy. Yet arms control, which is its reverse side, has lacked a focus of attention. As a result, it has been difficult to achieve agreement about desirable goals and, even more, to develop a dynamic program. Before there can be a successful negotiation on arms control we must get our intellectual house in order.

The need is all the more urgent because the rate of technological change has continually outstripped the pace of negotiations. Whatever may have been the possibilities of controlling nuclear weapons when the Baruch-Lilienthal plan was first formulated, so many weapons have been produced in the interval, and the stockpiles have grown so large, that complete abolition would be impossible to inspect. Similarly, in the early stages of the missile age it might have been possible to arrest the proliferation of rockets, either by a ban on testing or through a severe limitation on production, or both. But neither side sufficiently understood the implications of missile technology for this proposal ever to be seriously advanced. Today, measures to control the missile race are infinitely more complicated.

Two conclusions follow: First, arms control schemes should be developed with a clear understanding that their rate of obsolescence is as rapid as the rate of technological change. They must

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therefore have a built-in mechanism for adaptation. Second, there is a critical point in the development of any weapon after which arms control becomes impossible or at least extremely intricate. After this point is passed, it will seem to both sides—and probably correctly—that they will be more secure through unilateral efforts than through any control system that they are able to devise, agree on and inspect. This suggests the crucial importance of controlling new weapons in the very early stages of development. From this point of view, the adamant Soviet refusal even to discuss control of earth satellites armed with nuclear weapons is not encouraging.

Understanding of the purpose of arms control is made all the more difficult by the divisions within our military establishment about the nature of security. For without an agreed strategic doctrine we will possess no criteria to determine whether a given scheme would add to stability or detract from it. The view about the significance of local defense determines the conclusions about the feasibility of demilitarized zones. The interpretations of vulnerability influence the schemes for the prevention of surprise attack. Since we have failed to resolve these issues in our own military establishment or within the Western Alliance, it is not surprising that the proposals in the field of arms control have been so tentative. And the situation has not been helped by the attitudes of some of the most passionate and vocal defenders of arms control who advance the deceptively simple proposition that only the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction can maintain the peace and who resist efforts for limited measures as an attempt to defeat their cherished objective.

The failure to achieve an arms-control agreement is not, of course, entirely or even largely the fault of the United States. Soviet proposals so far have been consistent only with one of two interpretations: either the Soviet leaders have as much difficulty in understanding the problem as we do, or else they are using the negotiations in a deliberate effort to demoralize the free world and to induce it to disarm unilaterally. It is discouraging that almost every Soviet proposal seems more designed to exploit the weariness of the West than to slow down the arms race. Our recognition of the importance of the problem and our eagerness to find a solution must not blind us to the cynicism of much of the Soviet performance.

But our judgment about the Soviet approach does not excuse

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the uncertainty of our response. Perhaps no serious negotiation is possible at all. But we will be able to determine this only by becoming clear in our own minds about the purpose of arms control and by devising responsible schemes for attaining it. If the Soviet Union rejects proposals which are designed to increase its security together with ours—and this is the essence of any responsible program—it will have given clear proof that there is no alternative to the arms race.

Before we can advance these proposals, we have to end the confusion in our own minds as to our purposes. It is said that we must engage in arms control to free resources for the *real* competition which is in the field of economics. It is argued that arms control may reduce the burden of taxation. Arms control is advocated as a means of speeding up the evolution of the Soviet system.

Almost all these arguments are essentially irrelevant. The Soviet leaders can hardly be attracted by schemes whose primary purpose is announced to be the transformation of their system. The argument about freeing resources for economic competition begs the principal question which is, after all, precisely whether it is possible to develop arms-control measures which achieve this end. It is not at all certain that arms control will in fact free resources, particularly in its early phases. Inspection is expensive. Additional funds for research are essential. A recasting of our military establishment may have to accompany arms control. To justify arms control as a device to save money may cause us to be attracted to the wrong schemes for the wrong reasons.

If we are to make progress in the field of arms control, the military establishment must come to understand that in the present state of technology an arms race is the most unstable of all forms of security, and that properly conceived arms control may increase the security of *all* countries. And many enthusiasts for arms control must realize that ardor is no substitute for precision. A great deal depends on the ability to be concrete. In the next few years we may have perhaps our last opportunity to stabilize the arms race. Perhaps Soviet obduracy will foil our most earnest efforts. But it would be unforgivable if we failed because we have refused to face either the importance or the complexity of the challenge.

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THE NEW GOSPEL ACCORDING TO KHRUSHCHEV

By Bertram D. Wolfe

WHEN Samuel Butler wanted to write an "Apology for the Devil" he bade us remember: "We have heard only one side; God has written all the books." It is doubtful that there are no servants of the Devil among scribes, but the absolute ruler of a totalitarian state is less ambivalent about the Antagonist and more attentive to his monopoly over books. In Russia one can indeed read only one side. If the man at the top is too busy to "write all the books," he is not too busy to prescribe how they shall be written. To a French delegation in 1956, Khrushchev said: "Historians are dangerous people. They are capable of upsetting everything. They must be directed."

Others may question History, puzzling over her dark answers. But where there is foreknowledge of History's duty and path, where there is an infallible doctrine expounded and applied by an infallible interpreter, what questions shall we ask? History is to obey the "science of society," not alter it nor mock it by waywardness. History is to be fulfilled, not puzzled over; made, not learned. One does not ask her; one tells her. Marxism, says the new "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" (Moscow, 1959), "enables us to know the present and foresee the future." If the present is so clear, the future foreknown, shall we permit ourselves to be puzzled by what is already past? To banish doubt, past events must be arranged to show that this or that mistake was never made by the Infallible Ones, or that it was made by the Antagonist, only to be uncovered and overcome by the Infallible Ones. Or that what look to the blind like errors were really strokes of genius. In short, the past must be so written as to show that it was pregnant with the present and the future, certain with the future's certainties. Nor is this to be limited to Russia's past, for the new history proclaims "the inevitability of the repetition of the basic features of the Russian Revolution on an international scale."

To be sure, some of these liberties with the past may be taken by historians in any land, but it can be done thoroughly, systematically, persistently and completely only where there is no free competition in the market place of ideas, where there is but

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one permissible version at any given moment. That is one of the manifest advantages of totalitarianism.

On the face of it, this monopoly of historiography seems to make everything very simple. Only one right and wrong, only one black and one white with no shades of gray, only one hero, assisted by his faithful band, only one villain, with his aides, abettors, accomplices and paymasters, only one possible outcome. No conflicting testimony to consider. No archives to hunt for, decipher, weigh, puzzle over. That sort of thing, said Stalin ominously to the editors of one of his journals in 1931, that is for "archive rats."

Since there is only one permissible text to publish and to con by rote, this would also seem very economical. Yet the mortality among these official, single and certain texts has proved frightfully high. Party histories have succeeded each other as if they were being consumed by a giant chain smoker who lights the first page of the new work with the last of the old. To mention only those that, having been in their moment official, were printed in huge editions and translated into many tongues, there was Zinoviev's "History" (1923); Yaroslavsky's various efforts at intervals between 1926 and 1937; Volosevich's (published in 1927, condemned by Stalin in 1931); Bubnov's (1931); Popov's (1930, at least 16 editions before it was scrapped in 1935).

In despair at the transitoriness of all these individual efforts to celebrate the power and glory of the party and its leaders, Stalin ordered his lieutenant, W. Knorin, to assemble a "collective" of Red Professors to write the definitive party history. Written by five of these with Ponamarev as their "group leader" (*rukovoditel*) and Knorin as political and editorial overseer, it appeared in 1935—and proved as mortal as its predecessors. Though all these histories except Zinoviev's were written by Stalinists to serve his purposes and celebrate his deeds while they execrated his rivals, each was short-lived because with every change of line and every change in the magnitude of the colossus, the past had to be retroactively altered once more.

Finally, after the blood purges had reëdited the age of Lenin by turning all his close associates into traitors, save only one, the survivor determined to fix the past himself, as he fixed music, linguistics, genetics, philosophy, legal theory, economics, Marxism, Leninism and all else besides—especially his own place in history.

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Thus was born the first party history that lived long enough to grow up and circumnavigate the globe, "the book that," according to *Pravda,* "has sold more copies than any other in modern times, the work of a genius, 'The Short History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,' by Joseph Stalin."[1]

At this point, party history was "stabilized." No new history appeared for 15 years. All works in the field, and in many other fields of political, economic and philosophical writing, became glosses and exegeses derived in whole or part from the "Short Course." There was even a secret Politburo decision that no one was to be permitted to remember anything new about Lenin or publish any memoir concerning him, and countless already published memoirs were burned or pulped.[2]

Stalin's "Short Course," though virtually unreadable, could be memorized by the faithful, and indeed, as a life insurance policy, had to be. As Leonard Schapiro has written in his own not so official history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Stalin's book performed the function of insuring that no Communist "need ever be at a loss for the official answer to every problem. No one understood better than Stalin that the true object of propaganda is neither to convince nor even to persuade, but to produce a uniform pattern of public utterance in which the first trace of unorthodox thought immediately reveals itself as a jarring dissonance."[3]

Now the savings involved in having only a single version of the past seemed to make themselves felt. The dullest of all best sellers became the greatest of all best sellers—with the exception of the Bible. By 1953, 15 years after its publication, it was still the definitive "work of genius" and had been printed in editions of more than 50,000,000 copies in the Soviet Union, and in all the important languages of the Empire and the world.

But 15 years is a long time for eternal truths to endure. In March 1953, the author died. In July, some still duller writers calling themselves *Agitprop* issued 7,500 leaden words of "Theses on Fifty Years of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." They were published in *Pravda* on July 26, 1953. Now the mil-

[1] The book was published in 1938. The *Pravda* quote was published 12 years later on the occasion of its anniversary. Whether Stalin wrote it, or wrote only parts of it, making emendations on every page, it bears the unmistakable imprint of his unique temperament. It will hereafter be referred to as Stalin's "Short Course."

[2] The Politburo decision was adopted on August 5, 1938, but kept secret for 20 years. See *Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika* (The Party Worker's Handbook), 1957, p. 364.

[3] "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union." New York: Random House, 1960, p. 471–2.

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lions who had toiled to learn by heart every formulation in the dull and mendacious pages of the "Short Course" realized with a pang of fear that their "insurance policy" had been cancelled. For, in the "Theses," they perceived that Stalin, who for 15 years had been up in front at the right hand of Lenin—the two of them alone remaking the world—was now no longer *Vozhd* (Leader), no longer co-founder of the party, nor mastermind of the seizure of power, nor creator of the Red Army, nor winner of the civil war.

Indeed, where was he? Lenin was mentioned 83 times in the 7,500 words, Stalin only four. Still worse, the "Theses" gave no clue as to whom it was now necessary to cheer. In its 7,500 words there were only three names: those of Lenin and Stalin aforesaid, and one mention of Plekhanov. All safely dead. To the initiated, this was a sign that a new time of uncertainty had begun and that no living name was mentioned because no successor had yet emerged.[4]

The only thing that was certain in this new time of uncertainty was that the "Short Course," all 50,000,000 copies of it, had to be scrapped, and with it all the works of gloss and exegesis. The greatest book burning or book pulping in history! The system of a single, unitary, official history was not proving so economical after all.

II

From the summer of 1953 to the summer of 1959, the much chronicled Communist Party was without any history, except the 7,500 words of depersonalized, historyless history of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda.

Before a new history could be published, Stalin's ghost had to be wrestled with and its size determined. The dictatorship had to beget its new dictator; infallible doctrine its infallible expounder; authoritarianism its authority; a totally militarized society its supreme commander. The "collective leadership," so unnatural to a dictatorial society where there are no checks on the flow of power to the top, had to be disposed of, one by one or in batches,

[4] Three days after the *Pravda* "Theses" appeared, the present writer prepared a paper for the State Department which said: "No living name is mentioned because a struggle goes on for the succession. He who yesterday praised Beria is a dead duck. He who today praises Malenkov or Molotov or Zhukov may be doomed tomorrow. Thus the ultimate in the depersonalization of history is the blank space, the anonymous 'party and government,' the standardized replaceable parts."

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until one should emerge as the embodiment of the party, and the others disappear as "anti-party."

Further, where power is knowledge and power over everything equivalent to knowledge concerning everything, the emergent authority on all things must have time to lay down the line on all problems, persons and events likely to find their way into history. Only then could a new official history emerge. For the present to be projected into the past, the present has constantly and authoritatively to be determined in all wayward and moot things.

So it was that from July 26, 1953, to June 17, 1959, there was literally no history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union except the 7,500 words of the "Theses" of Agitprop. On June 17, 1959, a new manuscript was given to the press, with instructions to print a first edition of 750,000 copies. Thus was born the Gospel according to Khrushchev.

Not that he claims personal authorship. Khrushchev is free from that pathological greed of credit that made Stalin claim credit for everything. The new history was "prepared," like Knorin's history of 1935, by an "authors' collective"—11 academicians, doctors or masters of "the historical, economic and philosophical sciences."

Where so many histories have perished so swiftly, it was pleasant to find that the *rukovoditel* or leader for the Knorin history, B. N. Ponamarev, has survived the death of his earlier work, and appears as *rukovoditel* once more. And I. I. Mintz, who has written so many legendary pages (legend is to be taken in its literal not its poetic sense) in histories of the civil war, is alive and present, too, though Stalin once denounced his work. Most of the other historians whose works were once official and translated into many tongues, are gone: Zinoviev, Volosevich, Bubnov, Popov, Yaroslavsky, Knorin. Historiography is one of the more hazardous occupations, where natural death is not so natural, for only Yaroslavsky seems to have died without special assistance from party and state.[5]

If Ponamarev is once more *rukovoditel,* there is no longer a general editor to replace Knorin. Rather, there are signs on many pages that Khrushchev and his Agitprop Secretary, Suslov, took

[5] The fate of Knorin was clarified in the latest (April–June 1960) issue of *Soviet Survey.* This old Bolshevik Lett, who joined Lenin's party around 1912 or a little earlier, was arrested in 1937, accused of nationalist deviation, horribly tortured and forced to confess that he had been a Tsarist agent and then an agent of the Gestapo. He was shot within a year of his "confession."

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personal care of the political overseer's task. For what we now have is quite manifestly intended to be the official history for the age of Khrushchev.

III

In its day, it had seemed to me that Stalin's "Short Course" was the *nec plus ultra* of dullness. Surely, the history of Russia in the twentieth century has been a turbulent one: conspiracy, party strife, general strike and uprising in 1905, world war, fall of the Tsar, seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, civil war and intervention, Kronstadt and N.E.P., liquidation of the private peasant as a class, purge of all Lenin's closest lieutenants by one of them, Stalin-Hitler Pact, Second World War, forced Communization of so many occupied countries, struggle for the succession, emergence of Khrushchev. What material for the historian! But if the "Short Course" seemed dull and devoid of actual personages, motives and events, it at least had a kind of fascination by virtue of the malevolence, the pathological boasting, envy, and vengeance, the touch of the demonic on every page. Though in Khrushchev's History, as we shall now call it for short, whole pages are lifted from the "Short Course," what was demonic in Stalin's history is only ruthless and formularized in the latest work.

The Khrushchev history calls itself a "concise account." "Concise" must be more extensive than "short," for it is over twice as long; nor is the additional flood of words altogether accounted for by the fact that an additional 20 years have had to be chronicled. Where formulas of boasting or denigration have not been copied verbatim, the new book is likely to use many more words to recount an episode than the old. Yet its pages seem strangely empty—empty of men, empty of events. In the place of men, there are the Party, the government, the masses and Lenin. In the place of events, there are theses and bureaucratic formulas.

No need to be surprised if the great Bolshevik holdups of 1905–1907 are missing; no party historian has spoken of them. But where are the Moscow Trials which formed the closing section of the "Short Course" like the baleful hellfire which lights up the last scene of Mozart's *Don Juan?* All of Lenin's close associates save only one was tried, confessed, liquidated—surely a chapter in party history by almost any test. But not one word. Twice the party purges of the thirties, in which Nikita Khrushchev played

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a substantial role, are obscurely hinted at, obscurely justified, and as obscurely called in question. On page 463 we learn that the party was strengthened by purge but "mistakes were made in the unfounded expulsion of so-called passive elements." Yet, after the purges, "two-faced and enemy elements remained in the party" and Kirov's murder "showed that a party card may be used as the cover for abominable antisoviet acts." Twenty-one pages later we learn that "many honest Communists and non-party people underwent repressions, being guilty of nothing." But the villains now are Beria and Yezhov. Inexplicably, Yagoda, their predecessor as "flaming sword of the revolution," is missing, both as the first great purger and as the trial victim and confessed traitor. Just as inexplicably, for time is slippery in this history without a fixed chronological framework, Beria, whom Stalin appointed to call off the fury of the Yezhov purges, here precedes Yezhov.[6]

It is the disappearance of such large events and so many persons which makes the pages of this thick history seem so interminable and so empty. A standard feature of earlier histories was a list of Central Committee members elected by each congress, a list of reporters at each congress, and many other such accounts of persons and their posts or their proposals or their deeds. Too bureaucratic to be exciting, yet it peopled the pages of the text. But with each successive history, the lists became shorter. More and more men were silently dropped into a special opening to the Memory Hole which bears the label "and others." Now many of those who still found a place in Stalin's "Short Course," if only to be denounced, have been dissolved in oblivion.

Besides, Khrushchev has names to eliminate from honorific lists whom Stalin delighted to honor as extensions of himself. The indestructible-seeming Molotov has faded like the Cheshire cat leaving behind him only an "anti-party" frown. Kaganovich, able and ruthless lieutenant of Stalin who saw to Khrushchev's advancement by taking him along as assistant on each of his promotions, has ended up the same way. The rotund Malenkov, once Stalin's chief of cadres, a party secretary, a member of the

[6] Even the delicate allusions and sporadic rehabilitations permitted to serious historians ("archive rats") during the "thaw" after 1956 are not for this book. As archives were published and memoirs, long suppressed, were republished with excisions, footnotes were permitted concerning the dates of birth and bureaucratic posts of some of the purged. The climax of refinement came in the formula used in the biographical notes on 12 purged memorialists in Volume II of "Memories of Lenin" (1957), of whom it was said: "In 1937, he became a victim of enemy slander; later rehabilitated." But such refinements are not for this history textbook.

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high military council that ran the Great Patriotic War, main reporter at the Nineteenth Congress, after Stalin's death both General Secretary and Premier—at least for nine days—has also ended up without a past, a bit of rubbish for the "anti-party" dustbin. A historian cannot help but feel that each of these is entitled to more space, if not a better fate.

In such a bureaucratic history, a party congress is an epoch-making event. At the Nineteenth Congress, held when the aging Stalin was three months from death, Molotov made the opening address, Malenkov delivered the main political report, Beria the report on the nationalities problem, Saburov on the Fifth Five Year Plan, Khrushchev, Bulganin and Mikoyan on the revision of the party statutes, and Kaganovich on the revision of its program. Mysteriously now the Congress discusses reports but there are no reporters and no contents. Only N. S. Khrushchev remains as the sole reporter on the party statutes, from which statutes a seven-line quotation constitutes the only words immortal enough to get into the pages of history.

Even those that Stalin execrated have suffered further diminution. He still had need of Trotsky as the Antagonist in the drama of good and evil. And he had to paint Trotsky as saboteur of each of Trotsky's chief actions, since one of the aims of the "Short Course" was to replace in men's minds that unity in duality, Lenin-Trotsky, by a new unity in duality, Lenin-Stalin. Thus Trotsky's name was still bound to large events, if only by a minus sign.

Though Khrushchev's history copies some of these pages from the "Short Course," Nikita Sergeevich does not have the same need of Trotsky to play anti-Christ to his Savior; hence the baleful glare that lengthened his shadow through the "Short Course" is subdued to the dingy light that is common to these pages. The October Revolution takes place without the Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet and Military Revolutionary Committee, who directed the operations of the seizure of power and conceived its strategy. The Civil War is fought and the Red Army built without him. The Kronstadt mutiny is gloriously crushed without either his or Tukhashevsky's intervention. Voroshilov has retroactively been appointed director of the attack on Kronstadt, while Marshal Tukhashevsky, who seemed on the way to rehabilitation until Zhukov fell, has simply disappeared from history.

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If the climax of Stalin's "Short Course" was the "Liquidation of the Remnants of the Bukharin-Trotsky Gang of Spies, Wreckers and Traitors to the Country" with which its last chapter closes, the new history has no climax. It just stops, because the Twenty-First Congress is over and the Twenty-Second has not yet been convened, nor the Paris Summit Conference been held. It is less likely to last its 15 years because history will keep adding to its bureaucratic sum, and has already subtracted two of the leaders designated by the Twenty-First Congress (Belyaev and Kirichenko).

The indictment of the "anti-party group" is stern and ruthless, indeed inexorable, but it has the formularistic and bureaucratic flavor with which the readers of newspaper accounts are familiar. The charges that Khrushchev first levelled against Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich are repeated unchanged. Shepilov is still fixed forever as "inclining to them," and Bulganin is still a year late in being "factually" in their camp, while Zhukov, as the cult of a new personality in the Soviet Union grows, is still charged with encouraging "the cult of the personality of himself."

IV

We cannot close our examination of the Khrushchev history without some consideration of this "cult of the personality," the coining of which formula seems to have been the biggest event in party history since the publication and scrapping of the "Short Course." Around this formula was fought the struggle with Stalin's ghost to determine afresh his place in history. And the extent to which the formula shall be a self-denying ordinance for Stalin's successor determines the content and color of the closing chapters of the new history.

On the one hand, there was need to write Stalin smaller than in the "Short Course," lest all his successors remain too dwarfed for any of them to succeed him. Moreover, his lieutenants, not without cause, so feared each other, and the party so feared the inevitable struggle among them, that it was necessary to give assurance "that henceforth such occurrences should never again take place in the party and the country." This was promised by a resolution of the Twentieth Congress and is repeated in the new history. In so far as it implies the rejection of the pathological extremes of Stalin's vengeful reign, it may be taken seriously.

On the other hand, Stalin's successor could not destroy the link

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which puts him in the line of apostolic succession. For what else but the apostolic succession from Lenin, who seized power, to Stalin, who usurped it by taking over and perfecting Lenin's machine, what other "legitimacy" and claim to rule over a great empire has the present First Secretary?

The inheritance includes many things for which this history gives Stalin great credit:

1. The annihilation of all rival parties, such as Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries and Kadets. (Hence the history repeats the absurdities of the frameup trials of the Mensheviks, the Industrial Party, the Toiling Peasant Party).
2. The annihilation of all anti-Stalinist Communist groups (Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites, for whom there can be no rehabilitation).
3. Forced industrialization and the primacy of heavy industry over production for consumption.
4. The annihilation of the peasantry and the forced collectivization of agriculture.
5. The party penetration and control of all organizations and the atomization of the individual. (This is a heritage from Lenin perfected by Stalin and is inseparable from totalitarianism.)
6. Stalin's conquests of the Baltic Republics, half of Poland, part of East Prussia, Finland and Rumania, and Tannu Tuva.
7. The "liberation" of the rest of Poland, of Hungary (two "liberations"), of East Germany *and* Berlin, of the Balkan lands including Jugoslavia, of China, North Korea and Vietnam.
8. The "struggle for peace" and the enlargement of the "peace camp" which permits of, nay requires, the "liberation" of further parts of the non-Communist world but not the "reënslavement" of any part that has been liberated. (The book makes clear that "peaceful coexistence" is as old as Lenin and Stalin and not to be interpreted any differently than it was by them.)

This is a large balance sheet. In it Stalin's crimes against the Russian people, against the Russian peasantry, against allies and neighbors and occupied countries, are all transformed into virtues listed on the credit side of the ledger. His crimes against other socialist and democratic parties and opposition Communists are listed as virtues, too, with only the reservation that he dealt too harshly with "good Communists" (which seems to mean Stalinists) when he liquidated them. Even then, when the vengeful guillotine is turned on loyal Stalinists, the history does not cry

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"Crime!" but mumbles "Error" or "harmful consequence of the cult of the personality."

The final verdict reads: "Under the leadership of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, in which J. V. Stalin played a leading role, the Soviet Union has achieved enormous, world-wide successes. J. V. Stalin did much that was beneficial to the Soviet Union, to the C.P.S.U., and to the whole international workers movement."

Thus Khrushchev's tremendous indictment of Stalin's cruelty and paranoia in his secret speech dwindles into a bureaucratic formula for much praise and a little halting blame, now that Khrushchev is secure in the possession of his heritage.

What, then, is happening to the size of the "personality" of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev?

To get a perspective, we must bear in mind that this is not the final masterpiece of Khrushchev historiography but only a first attempt, analogous rather to the early efforts of a Yaroslavsky than to the final *chef d'oeuvre*—the "Short Course." Moreover, Khrushchev has difficulties that Stalin did not have. It is not possible for a man who joined the party only after it had won power to picture himself as one of the party's co-founders. Hence the book's only living hero (the dead heroes being Lenin and Stalin) does not enter into its 745 pages until page 314, then modestly enough as one of an alphabetical list of Lenin's "comrades-in-arms and disciples hardened in the civil war . . . on whose backs lay the burden of liquidating the consequences of the war and constructing a socialist society." The list contains 23 names, in discreet alphabetical order, Stalinists all, and the impartial alphabet put Khrushchev (in Russian it begins with an X) in the twentieth place and Stalin himself in the eighteenth.

Not until page 608, with the Nineteenth Congress, does Khrushchev begin seriously to employ the technique of self-enlargement learned from the master. Here, as we have seen, Molotov who delivered the opening address, Malenkov who delivered the main report, Beria, Kaganovich and Saburov who reported too, all become unpersons, while Khrushchev holds the vast stage alone.

By the Twentieth Congress, Khrushchev had gotten such a hold of the party machine that he did in actual fact hold the stage alone and make all the reports. The proceedings left no doubt that the First Secretary was more equal than the others,

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who were permitted to share in but not equal his applause. The order of business was: opening address, Khrushchev; report of the Presidium and Central Committee (covering everything), Khrushchev; chairman of the committee to draw up a resolution on the report, Khrushchev; chairman of the new Bureau on Party Affairs of the Russian Republic, Khrushchev; secret report on the cult of personality, Khrushchev. Only Bulganin was permitted a sub-report, a gloss on the First Secretary's remarks on the Sixth Five Year Plan.

As for the Twenty-First Congress, which makes up the final chapter of this book, it had only one order of business: a report on the control figures for the Seven Year Plan, by Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. Such is the fitting bureaucratic climax, or anti-climax, to the strange transformation of so many clashes of arms and deeds of blood into bureaucratic formulas.

In the closing chapter, Khrushchev is cited and his "ideas" as expressed in reports are summarized 14 times in a scant 26 pages. Actually, this is a little higher score than the citations from Stalin in the closing chapter of the "Short Course." Stalin's closing chapter ends with a quote from Stalin; Khrushchev's with a quote from Khrushchev. The First Secretary and once "best disciple of Joseph Stalin" has learned his trade.

In each case the closing chapter is followed by a brief coda called "Conclusion." In the "Short Course," Stalin jostles Lenin here for first place. Whether it be good sense or greater need, in the conclusion to the new history Lenin and the party are given first place. Yet even here, Khrushchev is quoted four times. In the "Short Course," the last words are a quote from Stalin. In the new history, Khrushchev bows out three pages before the end, while the last two sentences are eight words from Lenin on the party as "the intelligence, honor and conscience of our party" followed by 12 from Marx on Communism's promise: "From each according to his means, to each according to his needs."

Such is the nature of the party history in which the two new features, which were lacking in the "Short Course," are the "liquidation of the harmful consequences of the cult of personality," and . . . the recording of the substantial beginnings of a new cult.

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THE UNSTABLE STATES OF GERMANY

By Flora Lewis

THE revival of a unified German nation has been receding across the horizon for so many years now that the prospect has come to be taken as a mirage. It is demonstrably true that no charted road exists to reach it. No one, in or outside Germany, pretends seriously to believe any longer that an effective formula for reunification is about to materialize.

Nevertheless, the tensions set up by the problem remain acute. The major power dispute over Berlin is their dramatic reflection. The painful search for a way to reduce the explosive potential of the East-West conflict is blocked again by the inability to reach a common decision on Germany. Nothing, it seems, can be done towards satisfying the ambitions of one side without injuring the interests of the other so grieviously that war could easily result. In this distressing situation, intolerable to orderly minds eager to clean up unfinished business and get on with the world's new problems, the temptation has grown to see a reasonably durable solution in stalemate.

The arguments in favor of trying to settle down permanently at the impasse are of two major types. The first is that partition of Germany is desirable for her neighbors, that it acts as a governor on the car of an habitual speeder, that it restrains the frightening Teutonic momentum. In this view, it is as well to keep the Germans divided, despite the trouble that results, because it makes them more manageable. The second and concomitant argument is that partition not only exists but can and will last because the Germans are coming to accept it. Taken together, the two lines of argument are presented as the stuff of miracle —a solution to the German problem. It is simply a matter of acknowledging that what is must needs be, and that the worst of the complications will automatically sort themselves out.

Since no one can offer a feasible alternative now, there is a tendency to consider rejection of this apparent way out as sheer willfulness, illogical, stubborn and downright dangerous. But from inside Germany—either part of it— the situation looks drastically different. There, the dangerous illusion seems much more to be the supposition that European stability can rest on a partitioned Germany. Even the glossary reveals the sharp distinc-

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tion in outlooks. No one here speaks of the "two Germanys" or the "two German states," and it is not just because of the legal question of recognition. The common phrase is "the parts of Germany" and that is an accurate reflection of the way people think and feel about it.

The most evident facts apply to the second line of argument, so it is best to begin with the prospect of making partition acceptable to Germans.

The surface calm, even lassitude, with which most West Germans approach the question of reunification has led some observers to suppose they are not really eager for it. There is little of the frothy ferment that used to be taken as proof of a real irredentist cause, as contrasted with saloon or debating society ardors. People do not storm the halls of officialdom nor riot in the streets to press nationalist demands. They go on with their daily lives as though they were reasonably satisfied with their lot. Those who are unbearably dissatisfied, in East or West, effect a private kind of reunification by moving with more or less stealth across the border.

But although they are seldom spectacular, there have been a multitude of signs that German nationalism is reviving. The dirty rash of anti-Semitic incidents at the beginning of the year was basically a nationalist, not a religious or racial outbreak. More respectable, and far more widespread, was the indignant reaction to the outpourings of criticism against Germany after the clumsy Spanish bases affair. Many responsible Germans, who sternly disapproved of the attempt to bypass NATO, were none the less vocally angered at the public scolding their country got. A few years ago, the general reaction here to that sort of drubbing was injured regret. This time, it was not pained sorrow but downright resentment. Even opposition Socialists, who have nothing against blasts at Konrad Adenauer's government, fumed and said, "How long do we have to be the whipping boy?"

Along with the apartment blocks and factory chimneys, the pride of nationality has been building up again. It is not necessarily chauvinist, any more than factories are necessarily munitions plants although conversion is often a possibility. It shows up in a thousand little ways, in the conversation of businessmen, the passions of sports fans, the formality of dignitaries. And it shows up in larger ways when the occasion arises.

No doubt some such resurgence was inevitable. Every commu-

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nity feels the need to respect itself and to be accorded respect by others. The point is that the renewed patriotism is not West German but plain *German,* "all-German," to use the political phrase that distinguishes from either West or East. As the West German press has pointed out, no one says, "I am a *Bundesrepublikaner.*" The answer to the question of nationality is always simply given as German, although citizenship may have to be specified as Federal Republic or German Democratic Republic (D.D.R).

Although Communist East German officials insist that two separate and distinct German states be recognized, they do not for a moment suggest that two German countries do now, or are likely to, exist. It is not just semantics. To indicate the difference, the existence of two English-speaking countries side by side in North America can be cited. But even East German officials reject emphatically the notion that two parts of Germany could ever evolve into two separate lands with a similar ethnic heritage, like the United States and Canada.

Regardless of the logic of power politics, to its inhabitants Germany still means an ethnic, cultural, psychological unit that must sooner or later regain its physical integrity or lose identity altogether, like a disjointed machine that can only be sent to the scrap heap and the melting pot if it is not reassembled. This is a matter of emotions, not of hard military fact, but emotions can be stony political facts.

More and more in West Germany one hears references to the century and a quarter of Poland's partition. The implication is that frustration of nationhood can last a long time, but the nation will reëmerge. A current cabaret joke is a play on the slogan of another historical grievance, for it is becoming fashionable to remember the examples of patience rewarded. It was a French slogan in the years (1870–1914) when recovery of the last provinces of Alsace and Lorraine seemed impossible, and it went, "Never speak of it, always think of it." The joke, taunting the politicians for their inability to do anything about Germany's grievance now, offered as the best formula for handling the reunification issue these days, is "Always speak of it, never think of it."

And the politicians, of course, do continuously speak of it. Their words reflect their unanimous judgment that they are promising the voting public something it really wants. West German politicians are not unanimous on many things, but on this question they take the same reading of their compatriots' desires.

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The Socialists and the Free Democrats, who urge an attempt at negotiating with East Germany, do so on the ground that this will speed reunification. Adenauer, who refuses to treat with Pankow and enjoins his allies to do likewise, does so on the grounds that any form of recognition would confirm partition.

There have been charges that Adenauer, particularly, is not over-eager for reunification, and only makes obeisance to the idea because that is a requirement of domestic politics. Certainly, the Chancellor has shown that his order of priorities puts defence against Communism through the consolidation of Europe first. He argues that this is essential because of the danger that his countrymen might otherwise be lured to satisfy their appetite for nationhood at the cost of freedom. Whatever the merit of charge and riposte, both are based on the assessment that the idea of reunification *demands* obeisance.

There are but 75 years of tradition to back up the existence of a real and urgent national feeling that cannot be reconciled to partition, and what precedents exist for its expression were mostly explosions of violence that must be ruled out for the future. But there is no evidence that Germany's historically late achievement of nationhood has made the urge less vigorous. Nor is there any tradition for the existing boundary between East and West Germany. It is an arbitrary line, without roots in sentiment, custom or history. Far from revalidating the dusty maps of the old German states, it slices Prussia in half. With minor variations, it follows unhallowed inner boundaries of the Weimar Republic, which Hitler preserved as the delineation of administrative units.

The line was not originally intended, of course, to become a modified substitute for the Morgenthau plan of breaking up Germany into its antique components. It was drawn during World War II primarily as a military convenience and as a handy way of forcing complete government reorganization after the war. By temporarily splitting administration into pieces, it was easier to insist that rebuilding must proceed from the bottom up. In pointed contrast to the map-making at Versailles after World War I, demarcation did not bother to take much account of local sentiment because it was not expected to last. There could be no clearer indication that the wartime allies planned on a single German entity than the American decision to pull back from Thuringia and Saxony in return for a share in the occupation of Berlin. It would be difficult to imagine that Washington could

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have agreed to such a one-sided deal if it had considered the official proclamation of central four-power authority as mere window-dressing for an unavowed accord on dismemberment.

Regional loyalties and peculiarities do still exist, of course, but they have little to do with the East-West border. Brandenburgers, in the East, have more characteristics in common with the people of Lower Saxony, in the West, than with those of Saxony, in the East. In East Germany, Saxons and Mecklenburgers share a mutual disregard. Hessians, in the West, and Thuringians, in the East, feel much closer than the people of either region do towards Bavarians or North Germans on either side of the line.

But even the intense old regional ties are being diluted. In part, this is due to modern communications, in part to uprooting by war, in part to the fact that the nineteenth century is definitely over and people are aware of it. Bavarian separatism, for example, which was strong and wild enough to inspire more than one attempted putsch after the First World War, has simmered down to operetta pitch. They make wisecracks in Munich about being "German Bavarians," as though the first word were a mere adjective and the second the all-important noun, and people laugh as they would upon introduction to an "American Texan." But they can laugh now because the serious issues of patriotism have moved to a broader area. It is not surprising. Provincialism has never superseded nationalism wherever it has flared in the world. Where feelings of cultural community have given way, it has only been to a larger unit, not to a smaller one.

In any event, Bavarians, Rhinelanders and the rest are no longer nearly so exclusively Bavarian or Rhenish as they used to be. Assimilation of refugees from both East Germany and the lands beyond the Oder-Neisse has worked well enough that the admixture is not immediately apparent to a visitor. But the influx to West Germany has passed the 13,000,000 mark now—over one in every four of the West German population. They are not evenly distributed, with the heaviest concentrations of newcomers in Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony (more than one in every three of the population), but there is scarcely a corner of the country they have not reached.

These people, often differing in religion from the populations they have joined, do not become Bavarians or Rhinelanders because they have gone to live in those regions. If they become any the less Silesian or East Prussian in the displacement, it is only to

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become more unqualifiedly German. East Germany has absorbed nearly 4,000,000 expellees, and the situation is no different there. The enormous postwar population movements, by disrupting local patterns, have increased the awareness of national pattern.

The refugees are an extremely important factor in German life. The decline of the political party organized to represent them is a totally misleading index of their influence. Rather, the refugee party is failing because its would-be constituents do not see overriding distinctions between their interests and those of other West Germans, so they turn to vote for the larger parties. This does not only mean that they share the indigenous West German's concern for prices, profits, pensions and the like. It also means they are satisfied that their compatriots share sufficiently their concern for the relatives and the homelands they have left. They do not require special parliamentary voices.

The 3,000,000 who came from East Germany all have immediate personal and family ties to the East, and they are constantly renewing their connections through correspondence and the exchange of visits. Each holiday, each family festivity, is a reminder that an artificial barrier divides them. There is some tendency to drift apart, of course, and sometimes angry ruptures. But the greater tendency is to remember.

The expellees from beyond the Oder-Neisse and from other parts of Eastern Europe present a special problem. They are aware that reunification is a precondition even to consideration of their ambitions to recover some of what they lost, but reunification of itself is not their goal. There is not space here for an analysis of their strength and attitudes. Briefly, their aims are controversial and a great many Germans would be content to see them abandoned. There are important currents of opinion in West Germany favoring acceptance of the Oder-Neisse border, if that could be the border of a united Germany. It is impossible to measure exactly the extent of this view, but the point lies in the contrast. There are no opinions expressed favoring the Elbe border of partition.

Because a chance of reunification must come first, however, the debate on the Oder-Neisse has never been systematically taken up. The expellees have built a tight, non-partisan or rather multiparty organization with 2.3 million paying members devoted to keeping their cause alive. They constitute a possibly volatile factor, but if they have been given no grounds for encouragement,

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neither has anything been done to prepare them for defeat. Their leadership remains alert and vocal, sometimes painfully shrill.

It is primarily, though not exclusively, from this group that one hears the old *Lebensraum* argument from time to time, nowadays, however, in terms of economics rather than of population density. Super-prosperity in West Germany and the European Common Market have blunted the idea, but they have not destroyed it. It is surprising, in the face of a sustained boom since reconstruction began in 1950, to find businessmen insisting that West Germany is not economically viable under normal business conditions. One cannot count on the extraordinarily favorable business climate of the last decade, they say, and they speak warmly of how much more depression-resistant would be a German economy that encompassed the entire nation.

Whether or not the view is sound, it is deeply held. In the meantime, despite many handicaps, trade between East and West Germany is steadily increasing. In 1958, it amounted to 1.66 billion marks ($415,000,000), approximately balanced with a slight excess of East German exports. In 1959, it reached 2 billion marks ($500,000,000), with a slight excess in favor of West Germany. At this year's Leipzig fair, the major East German trade event, there were 1,500 West German exhibitors.

The delayed but now intense forward spurt of the East German economy is narrowing the gap that developed when West Germany had cleared out the ruins and plunged back to work. There is still an obvious gap, and no reason to believe the East Germans can achieve their planned goal of catching up with the Federal Republic on living standards by 1965. But East Germany is no longer a severely depressed area that would be all drain and no contribution to a reunified Germany.

On the contrary, the East Germans are giving their Western competitors a run for their money in a few markets, and trying hard to push into others. Their greatest success has been in Egypt, where they exported the equivalent of 93,000,000 marks in 1957, and 100,000,000 in 1958, against exports of the much larger West German economy of 266,200,000 marks in 1957, and 275,000,000 marks in 1958. They have penetrated, though to a small extent so far, into the markets of such places as Burma, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ghana, the Sudan, Guinea. To West Germans, this is not an argument for partition but against it—promising far greater successes for a joint effort, just as a joint winter Olympic team

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brought Germany third place while with separate entries both the East and West teams would have been far down the list.

It is evident that the longer partition continues, and the more East German economic life develops, the more bewildering will be the technical problems of fitting the economies back together. As a Western expert put it, different price structures, accounting techniques and the like will make it as hard as integrating the Common Market. But no one in Germany seems to worry about economic rivalry as a divisive element—on the contrary, the emergence of industry in the formerly agricultural East is considered to offer a promising new market if only it could be opened.

There are certain rival industries—shipbuilding, steel and chemicals are the main examples. East German industrial development was shaped to face eastwards, and East Germany has become the largest single source of Soviet imports. But businessmen and economists who consider the problem do not imagine that reunification is likely to be the result of shifting the cold war boundary some hundred or more miles eastward. The premise is that East Germany would bring into a reconstituted national unit the eastern markets it has won, and even open them to West German industrialists. This is the purely marks-and-pfennigs view that does not take into account the bitter conflicts of economic systems. But the businessmen consider economic systems to be a question of ideology, not business, and do what they can to make trade ignore, not follow, the flag.

When East Germany agonized in poverty, it was thought that West Germany's higher living standards provided the main attraction for reunification. From this premise, it was deduced that the urge to reunify must slacken as the gap narrows. But the evidence contradicts this reasoning. West German prosperity has been a major impulse for the population flight from the East, which is slackening. But the desire for unity rests on something else. A typical popular comment to be heard in East Germany now is, "It would be better to reunify under West Germany, because they live better over there. But if we can't do that, then we'll have to reunify under this system, or some compromise. One way or another, though, we have to get back together or we won't survive." This is, of course, an emotion on which the Communist régime is counting, and it obviously ranks high when they list their assets.

Only one development tends against an undiminished German demand for reunification which is likely to grow livelier as Ger-

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man power grows and self-confidence returns. The consolidation of Western Europe does draw off some of the feelings of national frustration. Economically, a European unit offers the larger internal market that partition denies. Psychologically, a European loyalty provides some compensation for the sense of truncation.

Chancellor Adenauer is in a hurry to create the larger unit and the larger loyalty, because he fears what his countrymen would answer if they were offered a choice between Europe and German unity on terms less than certain Communist domination. But the political constellation in West Germany is far from fixed, and future governments are not so likely to maintain Adenauer's priorities, nor his patience with partition. Much more probable would be renewed efforts to find a way out either through neutrality or push.

A certain thinning out of forces, which was once suggested as a way to ease the German problem, seems to be coming willy-nilly as a result of troop reductions and withdrawals. But it need not bring disarmament, and could bring a situation where German arms replace foreign ones. If both sides remained fully committed to its allies, hostility would remain undiminished with increased risk of adventures. If the alliances were loosened, there could be a growth of sentiment for armed German neutrality. Neither possibility makes the present division of the country look stable.

In assessing likely German developments, another factor is the possibility that some progress will be made towards general disarmament. The major powers, in reducing their arms, would of course insist on proportionate reductions of German arms; but the effect of big-power disarmament would none the less be to increase Germany's power status. The less that atomic weapons, missiles and great armies are allowed to matter, the more population, economic potential and national stamina are bound to matter.

Nor, if partition looks unsteady from the West, does it look any more enduring from the East. It has become trite to say that both sides are ready for reunification if it will bring them the whole country. But there is reason to believe that neither Moscow nor Pankow expects partition to last indefinitely. Though he carved it up, Stalin did not hesitate to say he fully expected a single German nation to reëmerge. Khrushchev, though he often tosses off contradictory remarks, has said that "if reunification comes, it would be only reasonable that it should be under Communism, since the whole world will eventually be Communist anyway."

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There can be no certain answer now to the question of whether Khrushchev really fears a reunited Germany, and is therefore firmly against it unless it happens to drop in his lap wrapped in a red banner; or whether he is cannily using an historical argument to veil his determination to hold tight to a Communist conquest until he is sure that a slightly looser grip will bring a bigger prize.

East German Communists clearly believe the second premise. They could be fooling themselves, but they seem to be preparing an intensive campaign for reunification, to be launched when they feel economically able to invite comparisons. The thesis is that when the economic differential is narrowed to the point of little significance, the offer of nationhood at the cost of Western ties and Western democracy could attract an important number of impatient West Germans.

No one can say now what the results would be. It would depend on several other factors at the critical moment—the level and prospects for economic activity in West Germany, the extent to which West European consolidation had progressed, West Germany's relative power position, and West Germans' assessment of America's will and ability to provide support.

All the evidence indicates, however, that Germans on both sides will not cease to look for a way to fusion, controlled or explosive, with or without allied help. The world power balance of the moment makes it possible to enforce German partition, impossible to replace it with union. The argument of "realism," that the West should therefore endorse partition in a major-power agreement that would amount to an allied guarantee of the existing border, is based on the assumption that the big powers will indefinitely wish and be able to maintain these borders.

But the German urge to nationhood is just as real as the power balance, if less tangible, and it would be unrealistic to ignore it. The likelihood of a change in German demands seems more remote than the possibility that power relations may be modified.

What now exists cannot now be changed, but it is far too unstable to be considered a solution. It is necessary to remember that it is and will remain a problem, and pressures for a real solution will not subside. If that is forgotten in the temptation to relax in the shadow of apparently immovable barriers, the Germans are likely to take us unawares one day with a desperate effort of their own, regardless of the lessons from a past which they shrink even now from contemplating.

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SUEZ SCENARIO: A LAMENTABLE TALE

By Herbert Feis

FULL CIRCLE. THE MEMOIRS OF ANTHONY EDEN. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960, 676 p.

FEW differences have so estranged the American and British Governments as the one that resulted from the seizure of the Suez Canal. None has been revived more resentfully than by Anthony Eden, then Prime Minister of Britain, in his memoirs. This is the provocation to inspect the slithering course of consultation between the two Governments during this experience.

Eden, two years before, had prevailed upon his colleagues, even upon his imposing senior, Winston Churchill, to assent to the evacuation of the British base in the Canal Zone. In the agreement with President Nasser signed at that time, the two governments had confirmed their recognition that the canal was a waterway of international importance, and avowed their wish to uphold the International Convention of 1888 which provided that "the Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war without distinction of flag."

Even as the British were getting out of Egypt, and the French from Tunis and Morocco, Nasser had striven with slanderous bluster to get all the Arab nations and tribes from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf to follow his call. He had used every means and method in an effort to destroy the state of Israel. Funds needed for improvement of Egyptian life were devoted to purchase of weapons from the Communist countries.

At the same time Nasser had sought financial aid for the construction of a great dam at Aswan on the Nile. The American and British Governments had joined with the World Bank in a loan program. To this they had attached three restrictive conditions. One was that Egypt should reach a fair agreement with the Sudan about Nile water rights; another was that Egypt should accord this project priority upon its financial resources; the third was that Egypt should not accept aid from Communist sources.

Nasser had not liked these terms. He was encouraged by the Soviet Government to resist them. By Nasser's account, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Shepilov, while visiting Egypt in June 1956, "expressed his readiness to help Egypt in all fields

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in which he asked for assistance to the extent of granting long-term loans. He said that everything in which they coöperated would be without restrictions or conditions; all we had to do was ask them . . ."

The inclination of the British and French Governments to contribute to this project had sagged. They had decided to drop the offer by "mid-July," and probably informed the American Government of this decision.

John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, was arriving at the same conclusion, for a somewhat different compound of reasons, of which one was the idea of teaching a lesson not only to Egypt but also to other governments who were courting Soviet favor while seeking our aid. On July 19, he abruptly informed the Egyptian Ambassador in Washington that the American Government had changed its mind, and announced that it would not aid the project. The news reached Nasser while he was visiting Tito on the island of Brioni, with Nehru as a fellow guest. Eden can hardly be wrong in his impression that the blow, struck in this way and at this time, was "wounding" to Nasser's pride.

The riposte left the West agape. Nasser dissolved the Suez Canal Company (whose concession was to run for another 12 years) and created a government company to manage the canal as an Egyptian waterway. In a frenzied and vulgar speech he told an Alexandrian mob that the American and British Governments were setting a trap in order to dominate Egyptian independence and economy. He scornfully charged that they were trying to force Egypt to obey them and to make peace with Israel, the "stooge of imperialism;" and of seeking to destroy Arab nationalism which "has been set on fire from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf."

II

Eden had revolted against the subservience of his country and France to Mussolini and Hitler. He was now swayed by the belief that they must not behave the same way again. Eden tells that at once "The [British] Government determined that our essential interests in this area must be safeguarded, if necessary by military action, and that the needful preparations must be made. Failure to keep the canal international would inevitably lead to the loss one by one of our interests and assets in the Middle East, and even if Her Majesty's Government had to act alone

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they could not stop short of using force to protect their position. *This was our recorded opinion, which I still hold.*" (italics added) If it should come to that, Eden relates, "We expected that the United States would at least be neutral."

Correspondingly, Eden told President Eisenhower that he and his Cabinet colleagues and Chiefs of Staff believed "that we cannot afford to allow Nasser to seize control of the canal in this way, in defiance of international agreements;" that they did not think economic pressure alone would suffice to get Nasser to undo his action and place the management of the canal in international custody; that they believed the maximum political pressure should first be brought to bear on Egypt; and that they were convinced Britain must be ready in the last resort to use force to bring Nasser to his senses and were prepared to do so. The State Department characterized Nasser's discourse as a "compound of intemperate, inaccurate and misleading statements."

Dulles being in Peru, the President asked Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State, to hurry over to London for talks with the British and French officials. While he was on his way, Nasser in another impassioned speech remarked, "The uproar which we have anticipated has been taking place in London and Paris. It is backed only by imperialist methods, by the habits of bloodsucking and usurping rights, and by interference in the affairs of other countries."

Murphy's hurried report of the angered state of mind of the French and British Governments caused Dulles himself to hustle over to London. There at his first meeting with the British and French Foreign Secretaries, he summed up his views in five points, three of which, as reported by Eden, were:

"It was intolerable that the canal should be under domination of any single country without any international control.

"We should mobilize world opinion in favor of international operation of the canal.

"Force was the last method to be tried, but the United States did not exclude the use of force if all other methods failed."

Several of his ensuing statements could be taken to mean that he was hardly less wrought up than his French and British associates. According to Eden, Dulles told him that Nasser must be made to disgorge; and also that the American Government understood the purpose of British military preparations and thought they had had a good effect.

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The three agreed that there was little chance of achieving this through the Security Council of the United Nations. The French and British Governments wished to engage immediately upon an "activist" policy, to concert economic and political measures. Dulles hung back. His wish to gain time in which to cool down the French and British ardor prevailed.

Three days of talks eventuated merely in an outline of a desired arrangement for an international system of management of the canal which differed but little from one Dulles had composed on the plane while flying to London. A conference of all countries with substantial interests in the canal was to be convoked to devise and inaugurate such a system. But how was Nasser to be persuaded or compelled to acquiesce in it?

Eden and Pineau, the French Foreign Minister, made clear in public utterances that they were not renouncing the ultimate use of military measures if necessary to compel Nasser to do so. But in the address which Dulles gave after his return from London, he took refuge in vague optimism. "Now, I have been asked, 'What will we do if the conference fails?' My answer is that we are not thinking in terms of the conference's failing. But I can say this: We have given no commitments at any time as to what the United States would do in that unhappy contingency." In conclusion he remarked, "I repeat . . . the conference will not fail but will succeed. And I believe that by the conference method we will invoke moral forces which are bound to prevail."

The British, French and American Governments proceeded to agree on the essentials of the proposal they were going to submit to the conference. It visualized the establishment of an International Authority that was to have power to control and administer the canal, determine its tolls, run its finances, construct its works.

During these ten days Eden's political opponents and critics became aroused at his public utterances and the continuing movements of British and French forces into the Eastern Mediterranean. They began to allege that he was seeking to drag the British Commonwealth into an adventure to protect or restore colonial interests. The Shadow Cabinet of the Labor Party declared that the use of force would be justified only if called for by the United Nations. Whether recognized or not, that was equivalent to debarring it.

Dulles continued to be the leading formulator and advocate

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of the plan for an International Authority during the conference in London (August 16–23) of all interested governments. He visualized a treaty with Egypt that would provide for Egyptian coöperation with the Authority, compatible with Egyptian sovereignty and a fair financial return to Egypt.

This proposal was denounced by Shepilov as an affront to Egyptian sovereignty, heedless of Egyptian national interests and contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter. He warned that any attempt to impose it on Egypt by force would bring about a conflict that would not be limited to the area of the Suez Canal, and that could flare over the whole area of the Near and Middle East and maybe beyond.

Dulles proceeded as though unperturbed by this indication that Soviet opposition was likely to doom his proposal to futility. "I suggest," he said in the course of discussion in London, "that any expression of our views ought not to be based on speculation as to what the Government of Egypt will or will not agree to."

Eighteen of the nations present at the London Conference approved on August 23 declaratory proposals to be put before Nasser. The British and American Governments may not have construed their meaning in the same way and with the same intent. Selwyn Lloyd made it clear that the British Government thought them satisfactory because the contemplated treaty would bring about genuine international control of the canal and provide effective sanctions for violations. But the President and Dulles did not regard themselves as committed to so positive a version.

At a press conference on August 31, shortly before the small group headed by the Prime Minister of Australia, Gordon Menzies, left for Cairo to put the proposals up to Nasser, Eisenhower gave out a soothing interpretation of what was to be required of the Egyptian Government. When asked how he regarded the current French movement of ships and troops to Cyprus, the President answered, "While I am not going to comment on the action of any other government, for ourselves we are determined to exhaust every possible, every feasible method of peaceful settlement, and we believe it can be done . . . I am very hopeful that this particular proposal will be accepted, but in any event, not to give up, even if we run into obstacles."[1]

[1] *New York Times,* September 1, 1956. Eden, in his "Memoirs," page 524, refers to this statement and quotes part of it, but curiously he writes that it was made while Menzies was in the midst of his talks with Nasser—which started only on September 3.

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Nasser, on September 2, referring to this statement, said he had the impression now that the President's general point of view was "that of Egypt's," and that the President's explanation had "lifted the worry we had about the American stand on international justice."

Eden avers—in an account which he intimates is derived from Menzies' reports—that Nasser was at first impressed by Menzies' warning that if he did not acquiesce in the London plan its sponsors would use coercive measures, but that, incited by the President's statement, he abruptly concluded it was safe to turn it down. This may not be so. But I think it is clear that the evidence that the American Government would not join the British and French Governments in any kind of concerted pressure doomed to futility all subsequent effort to get Nasser to yield.

As soon as it became evident (on September 6) that Nasser was going to be recalcitrant, Eden once again tried to impress the President with the scope of the conceived consequences of allowing Nasser to continue unscathed. The Prime Minister believed that the seizure of the canal was an opening move in a planned campaign to expel all Western influences and interests from Arab countries; and that if Nasser was able to defy the 18 countries in regard to the canal he would be able to bring about revolutions in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Iraq, making them Egyptian if not Russian satellites, and deny oil to Western Europe. While he was aware of the burdens and risks of military intervention, he thought that "If the only alternative is to allow Nasser's plans quietly to develop until this country and Western Europe are held in ransom by Egypt acting at Russia's behest, it seems to us our duty is plain."

Three days later, in a letter to Menzies, Nasser bluntly rejected the 18-power plan. He dismissed it as unfriendly to Egypt, a trespass upon Egyptian sovereignty, and "collective domination." However, he again offered to reaffirm the pledges contained in the 1888 Convention, and he averred that by so doing he would insulate the canal from national politics. Egypt intended, he said, to allow freedom of passage through the canal, assure its secure use without discrimination and with just and equitable tolls.

Dulles on the next day said that he was disappointed. But he hinted that the American Government was about to give up the demand that the Egyptian Government enter into a treaty which

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would formally establish the international character of the régime of the canal. He was ready with an alternative: that ". . . the users [of the canal] should club together, hire the pilots, organize navigation and themselves manage the canal."

Eden had misgivings about the legal foundations and practicality of this notion, and the French Government had even stronger ones. Still Eden and his colleagues decided to see what could be made of it. For this decision he gives a combination of reasons. Among them was the thought that since the project as explained by Dulles contemplated that the Users' Club would collect almost all tolls paid for passage through the canal it "would provide a method of denying Egypt any profit from her act of nationalization until a settlement was reached."

The barrage of contrasting public statements continued in the following days; in one of these (on the 11th) the President, after reaffirming that the American Government would not join in the use of force, told the press that thus far he had not given thought even to economic sanctions.

When Eden informed the House of Commons of the conception of the Users' Club, incredulous laughter was heard on both sides of the House.

Dulles, as soon as the Conference of Users met on September 19, sought to assuage Nasser's opposition by denaturing the plan. He disavowed any intention of coercing Egypt, and admitted that "The extent of its [the Users' Association's] practical utility will of course depend much, though not wholly, upon Egypt's attitude." And he explained that "membership in the Association would not involve the assumption by any member of any obligation." Each would remain free to take such action in regard to its ships and payment of dues as it saw fit. This was exasperating diplomacy, for it avowed fixed purposes while discount-enhancing the measures needed to effect them.

The declaration which the conferees issued at the end of their discussions included a statement of purposes of the Users' Club —among them "To receive, hold and disburse the revenues accruing from dues and other sums which any user of the Canal may pay to the S.C.U.A. . . ." But it did *not* explain how the S.C.U.A. would proceed to carry out its designated activities, stipulating only that "The members shall consult together in a Council in which each member is represented."

The diplomatic correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*

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wrote on the next day, "The picture of the S.C.U.A. painted in this Declaration and the final statement of the London Conference were more vague and shadowy than a Whistler nocturne."

However, Eden relates that the American delegation gave assurances that once the Users' Association was established it would seek and get the voluntary consent of American shipowners to pay their canal tolls to the Users' Club and the Users' Club only, and quotes an extract from a letter from Dulles to Lloyd to that effect.

III

Dulles (according to the biographer of his actions in office, John Robinson Beal, who wrote his account after personal talks with the Secretary of State), while in London for the Conference of the Users' Association, had tried to dissuade Eden from bringing the issue before the Security Council. He had urged Eden "to play it [the situation] so that Nasser would be the one to take hostile and obstructive actions against the users before attempting to carry the Suez dispute to the United Nations."[2] If that is true, it indicates that by this time Dulles was in effect disposed to drop the contest against Nasser.

In any case the British and French Governments would not be put off. On September 23, they asked the President of the Security Council to place the dispute on its program. In the ten-day interval before the Council began to consider it, Eden received another letter from Bulganin, objecting to every step which had been proposed or taken to cause Nasser to compromise. So on October 1 he again appealed to Eisenhower for support, saying that he thought that the wider dangers of the Middle East situation could be summed up in one word, Russia, since Nasser was now in Russian hands; and he emphasized the accumulating evidence of Egyptian plots in Libya, Saudi Arabia and Iraq which might explode at any moment "unless we can prove to the Middle East that Nasser is losing." "I feel sure," he concluded, "that anything you can say or do to show firmness to Nasser at this time will help the peace by giving the Russians pause."

The American response was as disappointing as the earlier ones, and even more divisive. Dulles on October 2 spoke as though he were out to please Nasser rather than arrest him; he remarked that the United States had a different approach to the Suez dis-

[2] "John Foster Dulles: A Biography." New York: Harper, 1957, p. 269.

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pute, and that "any areas encroaching in some form or manner on the problem of so-called colonialism find the United States playing a somewhat independent role."

The Security Council on the 13th approved unanimously the first part of the Anglo-French resolution. This laid down the principles which would be observed in any settlement—coinciding generally with those that had been originated by Dulles. But the Soviet Government vetoed the second part of the resolution which called upon Egypt to propose a system in accord with these principles, and to negotiate a treaty which would give effect to them.

Eden's impression was that "These discussions [in the Security Council] bowed out the practical proposals of the eighteen powers, which were our minimum requirement for the security of the Canal." But Dulles, according to Beal, left New York on the night of October 13 after this meeting of the Security Council believing that a satisfactory settlement with Egypt could be reached by negotiations soon to be begun, guided by the endorsed principles.

But the British and French Governments were not going to be beguiled any longer by evanescent formulas and vain assurances. Eden, in telling why, recalls his resignation 20 years ago because he would not commend an agreement with Mussolini and his later comment that "Drift is the demon of democracy."

IV

Eden spent October 16 in Paris, conferring with Guy Mollet and Christian Pineau, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of France. He relates that they reviewed the state of negotiations about the future of the canal and the Users' Association, and also that "we had to pool our information and consider the action we must take in the light of developments in the Middle East itself, and, in particular, the growing menace of hostility by Egypt against Israel." But he does not tell what "information" they may have had about Israeli intentions.

The American officials, when they became engaged in the resultant controversy, were almost sure that Eden and Mollet had advance, though perhaps not conclusive, knowledge. That this is so is hinted, I think, in Eden's oblique comment, "Unless Israel was prepared just to sit and wait until it suited her enemies to strangle and finally destroy her, it was clear that before long

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she would have to take some counter-action," and that "if there were to be a break-out it was better from our point of view that it should be against Egypt [rather than Jordan]. On the other hand, if the break-out were against Egypt, then there would be other worries, for example, the safety of the Canal. We discussed these matters in all their political and military aspects. In common prudence we had to consider what our action should be."

On the 25th, the British Government learned that Israel was about to mobilize. According to Eden, then and then only the British and French decided what they would do in the event of war between Israel and Egypt. They would at once call on both combatants to stop hostilities and withdraw their forces to a distance from either bank of the canal; and if either failed to comply within a definite period, the British and French forces would intervene ". . . as a temporary measure to separate the combatants. To assure this being effective, they would have to occupy key positions at Port Said, Ismalia and Suez." That meant in effect, though Eden did not say it, that Anglo-French forces would temporarily control the Canal and their Governments would be able to negotiate with Nasser from that situation.

Eden avers that the British Government was at this juncture guided by two purposes: to safeguard free passage through the canal, and to arrest the spread of fighting in the Middle East (particularly by discouraging the entry of Syria and Jordan). It is not imprudent to surmise that his ulterior hopes went further: to wrest control of the canal away from Nasser, to end his upsetting activities in the region and if possible to break his power.

While the British and French Governments were thus determining how to turn any Israeli initiative to advantage, the American Government tried to avert the crisis. Eisenhower urged Ben-Gurion not to take any action that would endanger the peace; he informed the Arab countries of his anxiety and asked them to restrain themselves. He sought also immediate consultations with the British and French Governments.

As these were getting under way, Israeli troops crossed the frontier (on the 29th) and penetrated fast and far into Egyptian territory. The British and French Governments forthwith issued their call upon both to cease fighting at once and withdraw from the canal area.

Dulles was more aroused by Israel's incursion than he had

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been by Egypt's attacks on Israel and Nasser's manœuvres. He made known that he was going to do his utmost to have the Security Council brand Israel as an aggressor. The American representative on the Security Council, Henry Cabot Lodge, exhorted it to order Israel to desist and withdraw from Egypt. "Nothing less," he declared, "will suffice." Eden exerted himself to stay the American action. In two messages to Eisenhower in the course of the 30th he explained his reasons for believing that decisive action was essential, and professed the belief that there was "a chance that both sides [Israel and Egypt] will accept [the Anglo-French ultimatum]." "In any case," he said, "it would help this result very much if you found it possible to support what we have done at least in general terms."

This unconvincing appeal reflected a continuing misjudgment of the views and reckonings of the President and Dulles. That was made the more manifest by the energy with which Lodge pressed the resolution in the Security Council that Israel and Egypt should be called upon to stop fighting; that Israeli forces should be withdrawn from Egypt at once; that all members should refrain from aiding Israel.

When the American resolution was put to the vote in the Security Council, seven of its eleven members voted in favor—two of these were the United States and the Soviet Union. Great Britain and France voted against it on the score that navigation on the canal was still imperiled and that the demand that Israel withdraw—without having any of its just grievances remedied—was harsh.

Within the next two days, while the Israeli forces sped through the Gaza Strip and through the Sinai Peninsula and the British and French began attacks against the Egyptian air force and airfields to clear the way for air- and ship-borne forces, the American Government moved fast to bring the situation before the General Assembly. And the debate in the House of Commons grew excited and disorderly, finding expression in such statements as those of Hugh Gaitskell, who called the Suez intervention "an act of disastrous folly whose tragic consequences we shall regret for years." The Labor opposition had found a cause in which its diverse elements could unite—the pacifists, the United Nations enthusiasts, the anti-imperialists and the friends of the American alliance inside and outside the party.

Eisenhower let it be known he "was not consulted in any way

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about any phase of these actions. Nor were we informed of them in advance." And Dulles, on November 1, in the General Assembly condemned their conjoined action and submitted a resolution similar to that which had been before the Security Council. The Assembly adopted it by overwhelming vote. But the British and French Governments declared that they would not accede to it. Let Egypt and Israel, they declared, both accept a United Nations force to keep the peace between them; let the United Nations constitute and maintain such a force until an Arab-Israeli peace settlement is reached and until satisfactory arrangements had been made in regard to the Suez Canal, both to be guaranteed by the United Nations. Then but only then would they "willingly" stop military action. For this was the only route to a lastingly peaceful and just disposition of the troubles in the area. To Eden, this was the great, perhaps the last, chance "to snatch opportunity out of trouble."

These proposals may have been a retreat from the original British-French intentions. But the American Government only became more rigid in its attitude.

On the next day the United States representative to the Assembly said that the call for a "cease-fire" must not be subject to the British-French stipulations. "There must be an immediate and unconditional cessation of the fighting. . ." The Israeli Government queried the Secretary General: Did Egypt still maintain it was at war with Israel; would it begin to negotiate a peace with Israel; would it end the economic boycott and blockade and recall the fedayeen gangs under its control? The Secretary General could not answer. In the early hours of the next morning Dulles, the contriver, was suddenly, and it turned out, mortally stricken.

The British-French plans were to have the first brigade of parachute troops jump early the next morning (November 5). Eden briefly considered the postponement of that action—but found that he could not do so without confusion of military arrangements. The order stood.

Eden justified the decision to Eisenhower, "If we draw back now chaos will not be avoided. . . we cannot have a military vacuum while a United Nations force is being constituted and is being transported to the spot. That is why we feel we must go on to hold the position until we can hand it over to the United Nations." The parachutists were dropped on the 5th and the first

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contingent of Marine Commandos went ashore at Port Said in the early morning of the 6th.

Eden was not, however, able to stave off the combined pressures. For the Soviet Government, despite the brutal way in which it was suppressing the rebellion in Hungary, became boldly threatening. Shepilov urged the Security Council to resolve that Israel, the United Kingdom and France must cease fire in 12 hours and withdraw in three days, and if they refused, all members of the Security Council should send "naval and air forces, military units, instructors, material and other aid" to Egypt. And Bulganin sent another round of notes to Eden, Mollet and Ben-Gurion which concluded "We [the Soviet Government] are fully determined to crush the aggressors by the use of force and to restore peace in the East. We hope that at this crucial moment you will show due common sense and draw the appropriate conclusions."

To Eisenhower, Bulganin proposed that the United States, having a strong navy in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Soviet Union, having a strong navy and air force, should use these at once "according to a decision of the United Nations" to end the aggression. Lodge, before the Security Council, dismissed this proposal as setting a "new record of cynicism and indifference" in view of what the Soviet Union was doing in Hungary and called it "unthinkable since it would convert Egypt into a still larger battlefield." Eisenhower called Bulganin's letter "an obvious attempt to divert world attention from the Hungarian tragedy." He stressed his seriousness by having the American Ambassador in Moscow, Charles Bohlen, tell the Soviet Government that the United States Government would oppose Soviet interference by force.

Eden caustically attributes the issuance of these threats to the American attitude, which he believes emboldened the Russians "oblivious of Hungary. . . [to feel] they could snarl with the pack." This remains a matter of surmise. My own best guess is that even if the American Government had remained aloof, the Soviet Government would have striven hard and gone far to balk the Anglo-French venture; and that only if the American Government had given notice that it would join the British and French might Moscow have kept out of their way.

Eden, painfully sick, and near the end of his working strength, learned the morning of November 6—Election Day in the United

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States—of still another cause for worry. The Chancellor of the Exchequer warned him that withdrawals and sales of pound sterling were threatening disaster to the whole British economic position.

Around noon Eden gave in. He secured Mollet's reluctant assent to an immediate announcement of their decision for a "cease-fire." Eden thought this action would appease the American Government and cause it to acquiesce in an arrangement whereby the United Kingdom-French forces would be allowed to remain in location for a brief but indefinite time longer, during which, presumably, Nasser might be constrained to agree to negotiate about the status of the canal and to end his most disturbing activities. In Eden's words, "I did not foresee that the United States Government would harden against us on almost every point and become harsher after the cease-fire than before."

But Dulles and the President were bent on getting all foreign forces out of Egypt, and the United Nations force in, with utmost expedition—in order, as Eden surmises, to give the Soviet Government no pretext for intervention in some form or other, at the request of Nasser or its own initiative. With similar rigor the President insisted in his correspondence with Ben-Gurion upon swift withdrawal of Israeli forces. That beleaguered country had to be content with a general assurance that after all foreign forces were out of Egypt "new and energetic steps should be taken within the framework of the United Nations to solve the basic problems which have given rise to the present difficulty."

V

What of Eden's persisting belief that with more foresight and fairness—especially by the United States—his desired aims might, even at this late stage, have been safely achieved? It is dubious. Even if the Soviet Union had not intervened, it is probable that the Egyptians and Arab supporters would have engaged in the same sort of prolonged hostile action that led to British withdrawal from the Canal Zone. And if the Soviet Government had intervened?

Eden may fairly reproach the American Government—particularly Dulles—with having misled him in the crucial first period of this conflict, and by its wavering and leniency, with lessening the chance of obtaining Nasser's consent to international supervision or direction of the canal. He may also with reason conclude

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that the bold and indignant British-French action, in conjunction with Israel, has made Nasser careful ever since not to use his control of the canal for national purposes (except in his closure of it to all ships and cargo of and for Israel), and brought about at long last the creation of an emergency United Nations force to keep peace in the region. But Eisenhower and Dulles, by their ultimate action, saved Britain and France from a severe ordeal, preserved British interests in Middle Eastern oil, spared the British connection with India great strain, and, perhaps, averted a war, the range of which it might not have been easy to confine.

But none of the situations which Eden had striven to master has yet yielded to time or reason. The Suez Canal, the Egyptian-Israeli antagonism, the instability in the Arab lands, the masked designs of the Soviet Union—all disturb our days. Having refused to support Eden when he wanted stiffly to confront Nasser over the seizure of the Canal, the American Government is now being compelled to deal with the consequences of Nasser's actions—as master of that international waterway.

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THE STATE OF PHILIPPINE DEMOCRACY

By Raul S. Manglapus

LAST November, more than five million Filipinos went to the polls to vote on candidates for a variety of national and local offices. The fact itself was not news in the Philippines or abroad; Filipinos have been voting since 1906. Since 1940, however, there has been a growing truth about Philippine elections which could be news but which not even all Filipinos have come to realize: the process of elections in the Philippines is the most difficult in the world. The reason for this is to be found in a unique combination of things—a territory more challenging and a political system more demanding than those of any other working democracy today.

The Republic of the Philippines is broken up into more than 7,000 islands, of which some 400 are inhabited by the 24,000,000 souls that make up its population. While there is adequate inter-island water and air transportation, land transportation in many provinces, particularly those in the Visayas and Mindanao group of islands, is far from satisfactory. Many communities in the Visayan islands of Leyte, Samar, Panay and Palawan and on the coast of the big, rich island of Mindanao can be reached only by perilous water transport. Manila newspapers, the only daily publications of national circulation, hardly ever reach these municipalities. Their isolation, once almost absolute, has lately been somewhat relieved with the increase of transistor radios distributed by government and private agencies.

Upon this rugged physical foundation there has been built a constitutional structure patterned on that of the United States. The offices and terms of office are similar except that in the Philippines members of the lower house are elected for four-year terms coinciding with those of the President and Vice President. Also, senators, of whom there are 24, are elected at large which means that the entire electorate votes for eight candidates every two years. The selection of provincial and municipal officials coincides with the senatorial elections in mid-Presidential term.

By the standards of parliamentary government, this is complex enough, but it is only the beginning of the demands made upon the electorate. Each choice for each position must be written on the ballot. Party tickets are not allowed to be posted in the polling

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booth, either for national or local offices. A list of all senatorial candidates, arranged alphabetically and without party identification, is all that is permitted. In the last elections, which were in mid-Presidential term, the voter who wished to choose a full ticket had to write in the names of eight candidates for senator, one for provincial governor, one for provincial vice governor, three for members of the provincial board, one for municipal mayor, one for vice mayor and ten for municipal council—a total of 25 names.

To aid the voter's memory, each party distributes sample ballots in the last days of the campaign and on election day. In this crucial period, the campaign shifts from the "battle of issues" to the "battle of the sample ballot." The ability to carry these sample ballots to the *barrios* or villages where the bulk of the votes is found is, of course, of decisive importance in a national candidate's bid for victory.

It is not difficult to imagine the weight of the party machine in such a test of strength. The two established parties are protected by a singular electoral statute which in effect provides them exclusively with government-paid poll-watchers, who form the ready-made base for a political machine. By virtue of this privilege, the two major parties have access to the smallest, most remote village free of charge. But in the highly centralized political structure of the Philippines, the advantage enjoyed by the party in power in such an electoral system requires in every instance an almost superhuman effort if it is to be overhauled.

In every election the opposition has had to call for a national crusade rallied behind a figure preëminently successful at capturing the imagination of the people. In 1953, the opposition Nationalist Party was almost ready, it seemed, to officiate at the interment of a graft-ridden Liberal administration; it nevertheless found it necessary to "steal" from the Liberals their Secretary of Defense, Ramon Magsaysay, who had just set his countrymen's hearts afire by breaking the back of the Communist rebellion. With Magsaysay as their presidential candidate against an ailing opponent (the incumbent President Quirino), and with the aid of a massive citizens' non-partisan drive (the Magsaysay-for-President Movement), the *Nacionalistas* succeeded in overcoming the majority advantage and returning to power.

To the Britisher, the Frenchman, the Indian or the Australian, who under the parliamentary system has never experienced having to vote for a candidate on a nation-wide basis; to the Vietna-

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mese, the Indonesian or the Malayan, whose electoral system is apt to be so simplified that in some instances he has merely to deposit in a basket a ball whose color corresponds to that of his favorite party; to the American, unaccustomed to voting for senatorial candidates at large and secure in the decentralized *ambiance* of his constitutional system—to all these the workings of the Philippine political and electoral system must be quite shocking. To them, the hope of any independent candidate or group of candidates being able to challenge such a system successfully must appear absurd. But to the Filipino, who is unaccustomed to any other electoral system but his own, and yet is unwilling to admit the inevitability of the merry-go-round of the established parties, such an idea could conceivably occur.

In 1959, indeed, a group of young politicians, belonging to the two established parties and the new Progressive Party, joined in a Grand Alliance and challenged the system. They presented eight candidates for senator and a number of aspirants for local positions. They were in effect putting the electorate to the most difficult test of maturity and independence to which any democratic nation could be subjected today.

The results, in terms of a quick victory, were not sensational. A few local candidates won but no senate seats were gained. Viewed nationally, however, the showing of the senate ticket was revealing and refreshing. Machineless, fundless and almost completely watcherless, the top aspirants of the group obtained 1,700,000 votes, or about a third of the number of registered voters who actually cast their ballot. They were less than 200,000 votes behind the man who won in eighth position.

A parallel movement on the local level, the Citizens' League for Good Government of Quezon City (the official, though partial, capital of the Philippines, on the outskirts of Manila), was even more successful. The League presented six candidates for the ten-man city council. Among them were a former Secretary of Justice in the Magsaysay and Garcia cabinets, one former and one incumbent university president, a former ambassador and an Annapolis-trained former naval officer. All six came in on top and are now in control of a superbly functioning city government.

The test was difficult, but it was passed. It was a somewhat more sophisticated test than that to which most peoples in this part of Asia are subjected. This should be cause for elation for our people and for anyone else who may feel a sense of participation

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in the development of our democracy. It is consoling that, while we can afford to worry about such problems as decentralization and the facilitation of a freer evolution of the two-party system, the problem for others around us is a far more elementary and agonizing one—the decision, in the face of exasperating political and economic crises, whether or not to stay within the barest framework of constitutional democracy.

II

This distinctive position enjoyed by the Philippines in Southeast Asia could not have come about by accident. Neither is it a recent twentieth-century phenomenon. The first national revolution in colonial Asia was launched by the Filipinos against Spain in 1896. Whether this was primarily because Spanish colonial policy was one of the very harshest, historians cannot agree. But one thing cannot be disputed: in 1896, only the Filipinos, of all colonial subjects in Asia, found themselves sufficiently a nation to assert their right to independence in a full-dress revolution.

There had been, of course, many regional uprisings. Ilocanos in Northern Luzon, Pampango and Tagalogs in Central Luzon, Boholanos in the Visayas, all afire with the impatience of the Malay but not yet quite a nation, these had been separately challenging Spanish rule since the sixteenth century. There also were frustrated rebellions against the British, the French and the Dutch in other Asian lands. But what was it that hastened the maturing of Philippine nationalism so that fully 50 years ahead of all others in Asia it erupted into a successful revolution and a constitutional republic?

For this the Spaniards themselves would, paradoxically but perhaps not without reason, now like to take credit. They have argued that in 1893 the Philippines was the most economically advanced and most Westernized country in Asia. Even Filipino economic historians would admit a basic truth in this. The operations of foreign merchants (mostly British and American), which the Spaniards allowed in the country in the nineteenth century, put ready cash into the hands of the Filipinos. One of the important results was that there arose a Filipino middle class which began to demand educational and political reforms and finally provided the intellectual leadership for the revolution.

But middle-class leaders must have a nation to lead. If economics must be credited for stimulating the formation of a middle

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class, where lies the credit for spreading the formation of the nation? As Arnold Toynbee has noted, "The Philippines are unique in having a North American as well as a Spanish chapter in their history—unique and also lucky, because Spain and the United States are complementary to one another as representatives of different elements in the Western Christian civilization." He credits Spanish Christianity for hastening the fusion of Filipino nationhood, and, moving further into the twentieth century, credits our American experience with contributing to what he calls "Filipino optimism." He does not find it necessary to mention that when the Americans arrived, the Philippines were in the act of inaugurating a full-dress republic, founded on a constitution duly enacted by convention.

If mention of this is unnecessary in an analysis of Filipino nationhood, the allusion does help us to start off on the right foot in evaluating Philippine-American relations. The Spanish Army, cornered in the Walled City of Intramuros for the most part by the Filipino Army, chose, in order to save its pride, to surrender to the American General. This is an essential bit of history that the fair-minded American of today should consider in pondering the beginnings of Philippine-American intimacy. Another is the fact that two years later ambassadors of the Philippine Republic pleaded in vain for recognition by the world powers, including the United States, and pleaded just as vainly to prevent the signing of the Treaty of Paris which transferred Philippine territory to the United States for $20,000,000.

But the American of the late nineteenth century, no less fair-minded, we must presume, than his mid-twentieth-century counterpart, had obviously a much more limited choice of alternatives in the field of big-power-small-power relations. Assuming President McKinley's justification of "protection" to be valid, assuming the presence of a colony-hungry German navy outside Manila Bay, what action was available to effect this protection? President Eisenhower today can invoke "aid" to build the country economically, "mutual security pacts" to protect it from preying imperialists. But McKinley, living in a less progressive age and caught in the fever of empire that had contaminated his own nation, had a much poorer alternative: outright occupation.

Against this setting fashioned by the play of nineteenth century forces the performance of both Filipinos and Americans must now be judged.

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III

No one, not even the "political transmission" writers of the Communist Party, dare suggest to the Filipinos today that their experience with the United States did not bring with it a substantial measure of training in the art of republican democracy. The constitutional forms and establishments which the political orator would now swear to defend with his life are mostly copies of American institutions, not suddenly adopted on the eve of independence but introduced early in the occupation and absorbed, at times painfully, over a period of almost 50 years.

When the Philippines became a republic in 1946, her democracy was a going concern. The middle class that had gotten its start in the last century of Spanish rule had considerably expanded, a strong civil service (later to be weakened by patronage incursions) was ready to provide administrative continuity, a respected group of elders headed an independent judiciary, and the country had behind it a tradition in the separation of powers. It had just gone through an intense ten-year period of training in outright presidential democracy in the transitional "Commonwealth," which was interrupted by the Japanese occupation. For 40 years it had been prepared for the presidential system which was later to give it a stability enjoyed by few others in Asia. At its inception, the Second Philippine Republic, still the first in colonial Asia, enjoyed an advantage quite unique in this area: it knew where it was going. And this is why even the most acid critic of America would now grant that her administration of Philippine affairs was "benevolent."

But it is in the economic field that our American experience is today stripped bare and subjected to the most meticulous and merciless scrutiny. Granted all the personal liberty, the early suffrage, the universal education, the political stability—of what use is all this when the masses of our people were maintained in their historical status of "hewers of wood and drawers of water"? Did not the United States merely perpetuate our colonial economy, keeping us as providers of the raw materials for her giant industries, enriching a few sugar barons and coconut exporters but subjecting the millions to continued serfdom?

Charges such as these are not infrequently to be read in the press or heard on the floor of our Congress, openly or in thinly veiled insinuations, particularly in debates on attracting foreign

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capital. Spoken in a period of intense reëxamination of our economy and feverish planning for industrialization, they are not to be dismissed as leftist demagoguery.

The Payne-Aldrich Tariff Law of 1906 was the cornerstone of Philippine-American economic relations. More than that, it set the pattern for Philippine economic development. For the free-trade relationship which it established naturally encouraged the cultivation of technical crops for absorption in the American market. With the high income from the export of sugar, copra, hemp, lumber and minerals, the Filipinos were able to import all their consumer requirements free of tariff from the United States. The result was, of course, a continuation of the agricultural economy of the Spanish era. Anyone who dared put up an industry for consumer products had to compete with the quality, tariff-free, mass-produced imports from America. And American investors found no incentive for putting capital into an area where they could readily and with less risk sell goods manufactured at home.

The Payne-Aldrich Law has been defended on the ground that it was enacted at a time when no one, not even the Filipinos themselves, could definitely tell whether the Philippines was headed for ultimate statehood, "dominion status" or independence. It is pointed out that some American states, like Montana, remain largely unindustrialized suppliers of agricultural and mineral products for general or industrial consumption in other States of the Union. There is something to be said for this defense. As late as 1941, some Filipino political and economic leaders (who would now consider themselves ardent nationalists) were agitating for a "realistic reëxamination" of the independence question.

However, by successive executive pronouncements, the United States as early as 1906 was already committed to eventual Philippine independence. It would seem that American preparation of the country for political independence is not to be matched by her performance in preparing it for economic self-sufficiency. However, a few considerations are here in order.

It is not too difficult to tear down an old political structure and build up a new one. This the Americans did, when they supplanted the Spanish colonial system with a new political order. It is not as easy to tear down an old economic structure. For this is usually rooted in landholdings, in the social complex, in such less tangible things as family relations, superstition and tradition.

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Furthermore, just as our cultural optimism and political stability are not simply the marks of our race but are also the products of many centuries of paradoxical forces, and just as we did not achieve by chance our now-victimized civil service, neither is it an accident that today we can boast of the widest entrepreneurial and technical base in Southeast Asia. In fairness, this must be attributed in substantial measure to the impact of universal education, introduced by the Americans to a people already gifted with a forward cultural outlook.

Again, the encouragement of agriculture *per se* does not necessarily mean developing a colonial economy. The successful industrial development of free nations, the most notable recent example of which is Australia, has invariably begun with successful agricultural development which provided both the foreign exchange and the raw materials for native mills and factories. What gave our agricultural economy its colonial tinge was its combination with free trade. Once free trade ceased or was modified, the beneficent, nay, indispensable effect of agriculture on industry immediately became evident. High in the priority list prepared by our National Economic Council are those industries which process locally grown or mined raw materials. And, of course, our foreign exchange reserves are to a great degree generated by our agricultural and mineral exports.

Indeed, a fairer criticism would seem to be not that there was too much emphasis on agriculture but that there was not enough. Huge tracts of land remain uncultivated and there is little scientific farming on those that are cultivated. This condition may be traced in part to the American quota system which offered no encouragement to produce more than could be admitted to the United States duty-free. But it must also be traced to other things, such as the tenancy system which is just now emerging from its semi-feudal state.

In 1937 a Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs was created by the Philippine Commonwealth and the United States Government in order to correct, before independence in 1946, the inadequate situation brought about by free trade. Before its recommendations could be implemented, the Pacific War broke out.

The devastation of war, of course, compounded the economic difficulty. To the problem of trade reorientation was added one of higher priority—rehabilitation. With the help of U.S. War

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Damage payments, reconstruction was largely completed by 1950 and the country entered into a period of development and limited industrialization. Adjustment to termination of duty-free relations with the United States is currently taking place through the instrumentality of the Bell Act, as amended by the Laurel-Langley Agreement.

Due to their stubborn resistance, the Filipinos suffered the greatest damage among all Japanese-occupied peoples in the war. They also have been subjected to Tammany-style travesties on the democratic process by some of their politicians. In spite of this they have managed to stay ahead of most of their neighbors in a material sense and have made spectacular gains in their struggle for readjustment and economic expansion. Between 1949 and 1957 over 13,700 new manufacturing firms were registered, and the boomlet in industrial promotion has just begun. Food production has kept ahead of population increase. Exports have also increased accompanied by a noticeable rearrangement in the export trade. Sugar, desiccated coconut, inedible coconut oil, cigars, scrap and filler tobacco, pearl buttons and canned pineapple in 1940 constituted 60 percent of total domestic exports (excluding gold and embroideries), valued at 221 million pesos. In 1957 they formed only 30 percent of the total, worth 853 million pesos. The most vigorous postwar growth in the export sector was manifested by copra, logs, lumber and base metals. A wider distribution of foreign trade has reduced United States purchases of Philippine exports from a prewar 75 percent of the total to 52 percent in 1957. Japanese and Northwestern European purchases have accounted for most of the balance.

The pace of industrialization is reflected in the curve of consumer goods imports. In 1949, they constituted 47 percent of total imports, valued at 1,172 million pesos. In 1957, they went down to 22 percent of a total of 1,129 million pesos. On the other hand, capital goods went up from 10 to 20 percent and raw materials from 43 to 58 percent.

An indication of the consistent record of Philippine growth is the country's sustained position as third highest in recorded annual per capita income among all the ECAFE countries (stretching from Afghanistan in the west to Japan in the northeast). She is surpassed only by highly industrialized Japan and rubber-rich Malaya.

Yet much more must be done—not in the vague future but as

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soon as resources allow. The lives of millions in the provinces have as yet been hardly touched by economic development. An urgent drive to provoke Philippine capital into leaving bamboo safes and entering productive enterprises is succeeding. It has become so popular that Congress is preparing regulatory measures, patterned after American legislation to prevent abuse. And last April, in answer to demands of private business for relief from foreign exchange controls, the administration decided to introduce partial decontrol on non-essential and non-governmental items.

But Philippine capacity to form capital is limited. Our needs and wants, on the other hand, appear unlimited. And we cannot afford to save from present consumption the resources required to realize all of them. The way out of the vicious circle is foreign capital.

IV

In 1959, the "Filipino First" policy was born as a campaign slogan of the majority party. While it did not succeed in saving from defeat national candidates favored by the administration—even with the help of a split opposition—the concept had some justification.

Its justification is found primarily in the preëminent position held by the more than half a million Chinese in the distributive trades, in village retailing and urban finance, just as their countrymen do in varying degrees in Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries. It is this situation which prompts us to continue recognizing Nationalist China rather than to give a Red Embassy in Manila a chance to coerce a ready-made economic empire into subversive action. The problem is so big that it cannot be considered simply in economic terms but in terms of national security.

Communists and extremists have tried with some success to give the policy an anti-American twist. Those who would use it for the laudable purpose of reducing the economic power of the Chinese population are denounced as blind Sinophobes, and the people are reminded that the real enemy is American imperialism. The administration was faced with the necessity of dissociating itself from this Communist propaganda and at the same time making sure that its policy did not collide with its proclaimed desire to attract American and European capital.

One manifestation of its concern over these problems was the

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recent celebrated case of the President's unsolicited invitation to the United States to base missiles in the Philippines. While the invitation received immediate popular support, some saw it as a patent effort to dispel any fears that the administration might be weakening in its firm policies regarding national security. Encouraged by the wide acceptance of this sudden action, the President has since then made several public statements urging a sobering of the "Filipino First" movement. In this he shows signs of following in the footsteps of other Asian countries, notably India, which have sheared off extremist nationalist fringes in order not to impede national development and the requirements of international economics. This is particularly evident in the matter of attracting foreign capital. The trend has, of course, disconcerted the Communists, whose aim has been to discourage foreign investments in Asia and thus prove the incapacity of free enterprise to give sufficient relief to underdeveloped economies.

There is also a growing awareness of the accomplishments of U.S. Government lending agencies, though the recent "Buy American" condition has not made local industrial promoters happy. Many of these find European and Japanese capital equipment better suited to their requirements. Moreover, the move has slowed down the trend toward a fairer appreciation of American intentions in Asia.

Some concern is also expressed here and in other Asian capitals over the dubious attitude taken by the United States towards the proposal to internationalize foreign aid and lending among non-Communist nations. Such a move would eliminate the fear of "colonialism" which continues to haunt the political outlook of former dependent areas and hampers their development. There are obvious legislative, diplomatic and cross-accounting difficulties in the scheme which must be threshed out among the donor nations, but a firm statement by the United States in general support of it would have the same effect as, say, an unequivocal statement against colonialism in Africa—a renewed confidence in American free-world leadership.

In his recent book "Democracy Is Not Enough,"[1] John Scott takes a hard look at the underdeveloped lands of Asia and prescribes a sort of moratorium on democracy in order to permit them to concentrate on lifting their living standards. The Philippines is one of the countries he would exclude from this radical prescrip-

[1] New York: Harcourt, 1960.

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tion, along with India, Japan and Malaya. It would be more useful, perhaps, to consider them as examples to inspire rather than as exceptions to be envied. In any case, whether or not the Philippines will continue as one of the pace setters will depend on how far the current stirrings in favor of fundamental changes in our political structure can carry. The shape of our country in the years to come is being fashioned in this generation by citizens who have learnt the secret of permanent and rapid political and economic development—namely, the maximum participation of the people.

The most promising economic program will fail unless the people contribute their optimum output to its realization. Communist China knows this and is attempting to raise output forcibly by such monstrous methods as the communes. In India, dedicated men like Jayaprakash Narayan are seeking to reawaken in the *Panchayats* the self-reliance of the Indian villager, thereby to refashion Indian polity on indigenous bases. In the Philippines, the *barrio* revolution begun by Ramon Magsaysay has matured into private and official movements to revive the spirit of *bayanihan,* the original unwritten rule of village self-help which had been buried under the mass of initiative-robbing positive law descended from the national government, colonial and independent alike. The ultimate success of democratic Asian nationalism will come when the Indian way and the Philippine way—alike in being the way of free, voluntary initiative—are able to demonstrate conclusively that liberty, justice and God need not be jettisoned in order to allow the people to work for the satisfaction of their temporal wants.

Meanwhile, because of our over-centralization, our electoral system, the many faults of our constitutional structure, it could be said that in the Philippines we may not have democracy at its best but we do have democracy at its hardest. Such a judgement, while critical of the system, is a tribute to the people. The important thing is that it is democracy and that it is working. And in the irrepressible optimism of the people and their deep-seated faith in the superiority of free enterprise lies a promise that here democracy will someday be at its best. Herein lies our claim to the understanding and support of free nations.

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THE SOVIET STANDARD OF LIVING, AND OURS

By Marshall I. Goldman

"Today our task is to tip the scales in world production in favor of the Socialist system against the capitalistic system, to surpass the most advanced capitalist countries in labor productivity and output per head of population, and to attain the world's highest living standards. In this stage of the competition, the Soviet Union intends to surpass the United States economically."—N. S. Khrushchev, "Target Figures for the Economic Development of the Soviet Union," Soviet Booklets, no. 47, London, 1959.

KHRUSHCHEV, in outlining these goals of the First Seven Year Plan, did not mean to imply that success would be attained overnight. He was realistic enough to realize that, at least with respect to the standard of living, there was a considerable gap to overcome. In fact, of all the areas of competition with the U.S.S.R., it seems safe to say that the Soviet Union lags farthest behind in its standard of living.

Yet Western commentators must be very cautious. We remember the plight of observers in other fields who at one time made similar statements and then found that in spite of everything the Russians had indeed "caught up." Soviet retail sales are continually increasing and 1960 sales of such items as refrigerators are to grow by 60 percent over 1958. In the light of the new interest shown by the Soviet Government in consumer goods distribution and an improved standard of living we should survey the state of consumption in the Soviet Union before risking an evaluation of Russia's chances of "catching up."

II

By the time Stalin died in March 1953, the wartime destruction of a large portion of Soviet manufacturing facilities had been repaired and the level of Soviet industrial production was above its prewar level. In the continually neglected areas of domestic trade and the standard of living, however, it is estimated that by 1952 real wage income, although slightly higher than prewar, was still below that which existed in 1928, the year before collectivization.[1] It was necessary to recover not only from World War

[1] Janet Chapman, "Real Wages in the Soviet Union, 1928–52," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, May 1954, p. 147. Even though it is probable that there were more workers per family in 1952, consumer goods production was always of minor importance.

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II but also from the trauma of the five year plans and collectivization. While conditions slowly improved, the greatest transformation took place only after Stalin's death.

There seems to be little doubt that the Russian people welcomed the death of Stalin in more ways than one. The reforms and concessions granted immediately after Stalin's death are well known. Pardons, reduced tensions and the ending of the Korean War followed. The immediate improvements in the standard of living were also important. While it is clear that conditions improved from Malenkov on, the immediate increase in retail sales seems to suggest that consumer goods were used as a political tool —presumably to preserve stability.

A close inspection of the sales data by quarterly and semiannual increases indicates the rapidity of the change. Retail trade increased in the second quarter of 1953 by 23 percent, and by 26 percent in the second half of the year. This was double the increase of the earlier quarters and triple the increase of the first quarter of 1953. Moreover, there seems to have been an even greater improvement in rural trade. In the countryside sales increased by 30 percent the first half and by 32 percent the second half.

After the sales surge immediately following Stalin's death, retail trade volume continued to increase at a somewhat more subdued but nevertheless fairly rapid rate. While consumer goods production has continued to take second place to heavy industry, and while many of the more optimistic plans of Malenkov (at one time the outspoken exponent of expanded consumption) have been abandoned, the living conditions of the people have been substantially improved. By 1959, yearly retail sales were about double the sales of 1952, the last full year under Stalin.

Clearly the living standard of the Soviet consumer is rapidly improving. Whether or not such growth means that the Soviet Union will be able to overtake the United States will be considered later. At this point, attention will be focused on the pressures created by the recent expansion of consumption on both the population and the distribution network. The reaction to such pressures, it will be seen, has affected consumption goals.

III

From the point of view of the Soviet citizen, conditions are much better. There is no reason to believe that this increased

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availability of consumer goods has not served to whet Soviet appetites for even more. The Russians have found that new apartments create a need for new furniture, new suits create a need for new shoes. So goes the familiar and heretofore unending process.

It also seems clear that demands have been stimulated by the improved and more objective exposure to Western living conditions. The Russian people are obtaining more accurate information about the way of life in the West. To some extent this is gleaned from the magazine *Amerika,* and from the large number of foreign tourists in Russia. The American exhibition also was an especially effective method of conveying a picture of a country with a much higher standard of living. While some Russian citizens simply did not understand what was being shown at the Fair, many left convinced that it was time their society began to provide some of the same living conveniences.

Russian delegations for the first time are being allowed to visit Western or Eastern European countries. While the number is in no sense comparable to the number of foreigners visiting the Soviet Union, a strong impact is none the less made. Moreover, Khrushchev's recent visit to the United States and the descriptive and visual coverage of the sights he saw—supermarkets, private homes, superhighways and farm houses with swimming pools —should only increase the Russian hunger for consumer goods.

Finally, it is not just a matter of creating desires. The latent demand and the financial resources for implementing these demands are in abundant evidence. The author personally has met members of the Soviet upper and middle income groups who have the necessary 25,000–40,000 rubles (two and a half to four times the average yearly wage) needed to purchase a Russian car, but who nevertheless have been on a waiting list for three years and expect to wait several more. Khrushchev may be entirely correct when he asserts that the American system of individual automobile ownership and the resultant traffic problem demonstrate an irrational use of economic resources. However, his pledge to spare the Russians this problem by substituting a taxi pool for individual automobile ownership hardly coincides with the dream of many Soviet workers.

The contrasts in living standards, of which the Russian is becoming increasingly aware, have had a considerable demonstration effect. One frank letter-writer in a Russian paper went so far as to criticize the present Soviet emphasis on such technical tri-

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umphs as the sputnik and Tupoliev jet airliner. Instead he dared to suggest that a more important challenge to Soviet industry would be to produce a pair of shoes that would wear as long as those made in the West. The realization that other nations and even other members of their own society have a vastly superior standard of living only accentuates the desire of individual Russians to obtain the same things. As a result, there is a strong demand for an even more rapid improvement in the standard of living.

The growth in consumption has also had an important effect on the operation of the distribution network. This has led to considerable change, both voluntary and involuntary, in the operation and structure of the marketing system. The resulting innovations may be divided into two categories: those introduced to improve the efficiency of the existing trade network; and those used to cope with the phenomenon of "overproduction," an unusual planning problem for a Communist state.

Although the volume of trade turnover has shown an impressive increase, the trade network itself has been enlarged at a much slower rate. Whereas by 1958 the absolute volume of trade had increased by somewhat less than 170 percent over that of 1940, the number of retail and restaurant outlets had increased by only 30 percent.[2] Although this is one way of holding down costs of distribution, the quality of service suffered. The existing network had to be made more effective until investment funds could be diverted from heavy industry and housing.

To facilitate the flow of goods through an inadequate distribution network the Soviet authorities have introduced a series of "progressive" marketing methods. Since 1953, over 1,500 stores have been converted to self-service in the Russian Republic alone. Similarly, vending machines dispensing everything from beer to eau de cologne have appeared throughout the country. A national mail order firm sends goods to provincial areas, thus reducing the need for retail outlets. It should of course be understood that these "progressive" measures are often altered to meet Soviet conditions and do not always evolve in the operational form familiar in the United States. Yet on the whole they have permitted the existing distribution machinery to dispense an increased volume of goods.

[2] *Voprosy Ekonomiki* (Problems of Economics), no. 8, 1959, p. 55. Naum Jasny disputes the increased sales figure of 170 percent. *The Soviet 1956 Statistical Handbook: A Commentary*, Michigan State Press, East Lansing, 1957, p. 178.

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More recently, there have been other innovations of a different nature.[3] The motivation here was not to make better use of existing facilities but to promote the sale of a few over-abundant items. In no sense does this mean that Soviet stores are now filled with overstocked counters and shelves of goods. None the less, in some localities the sale of certain high-priced commodities is below expectations and accordingly the inventories are too high. Instead of the usual annual increase, sales may actually fall off. This occurs primarily with the more expensive varieties of such goods as watches, bicycles, television sets, radios and cameras.[4]

Unusual steps were taken to cope with this saturation of the market in certain models of four or five items. On July 1, 1959, the prices of almost all the expensive models of these commodities were reduced 15–30 percent. Subsequently it was announced that they would be sold on an installment basis, with interest charged on the unpaid balance. Moreover, they have been advertised and promoted widely. These phenomena, familiar to Western businessmen, are almost always associated with a buyer's market and overproduction. The decision to adopt such measures must certainly have caused quite a disturbance among some Communist leaders, both above and below ground.[5]

The phenomenon of advertising in a Communist economy warrants special attention. Recently it has become increasingly important, and not only for the four or five overproduced items listed above. In addition to the First All Socialist Advertising Conference, held in Prague in 1957, and a nation-wide competition for the best window display in the Soviet Union, the formation of several Soviet Republic Advertising Agencies in late 1958 represents a significant alteration of policy. Not only has there been increased emphasis on billboards and truck-side advertising, but radio and TV commercials are being used. What was regarded as heresy no more than two years ago is now considered an important marketing tool.

[3] For a more detailed discussion of these as well as the preceding category of changes, see the author's "Marketing—A Lesson for Marx," *Harvard Business Review*, January–February 1960, p. 79.

[4] Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1958*, Gosstatizdat, Moscow, 1959, p. 704, indicates that radio, watch and bicycle sales in 1958 were lower than in 1957 and/or 1956. The First Deputy Minister of Trade of the R.S.F.S.R., D. D. Korolev, during a visit to Boston recently, stated, "A few years ago we discovered that we had produced too many radios and cameras. We produced more than we could sell under the existing conditions."

[5] *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, July 1, 1959, p. 4, describes the price reductions. The issue of August 16, 1959, p. 4, outlines the procedure for installment sales.

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Finally, centralized planning of distribution and retail trade is yielding more and more to decentralized planning. Not only has the power to make major decisions been transferred to local planning units, but the operating enterprises themselves have been given increased discretion over their own operations. Moreover, *Iarmarki* (wholesale trade shows and exhibitions) have been greatly increased in number and importance. There has always been a strong ideological distaste for the participation of non-producing and non-consuming agencies in the flow of goods from producer to consumer; yet wholesalers of each commodity line now hold at least two shows a year for the traditional purpose of matching buyers and sellers.

To sum up, there clearly have been major innovations in Soviet marketing since 1953. While there may be many reasons for it, including the desire to improve the way of life of the Soviet consumer, increased sales volume was probably the most important cause. The latter phenomenon gave rise to two new developments. The larger volume of retail sales made it necessary to improve the operation of the existing distribution network, resulting in a series of measures which increased marketing efficiency and did not seem ideologically objectionable. The second development was the emergence in the Soviet Union of certain phenomena which usually indicate overproduction and lack of planning—traditionally stigmatized as distasteful features of capitalism.

IV

It may well be that as retail trade continues to grow in the Soviet Union, marketing methods will come more and more to resemble those of the West. The questions to be considered now are the crucial ones—how fast will the Soviet Union grow, and will it overtake the standard of living enjoyed in the United States?

First, what is the significance of the future Seven Year Plan goals? By past Soviet standards, the goals as originally announced were somewhat modest in scope. Whereas formerly the average increase of sales had been almost 10 percent annually, the projected increase in sales volume from 667 billion rubles to 1,080 billion rubles in 1965 would mean an over-all increase of only 60 percent or about 7 percent annually. To some extent, of course, this is a problem of numbers. As the base broadens, a

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larger and larger absolute increment is needed to maintain a given percentage growth rate.

In October 1959, less than a year after the announcement of the Seven Year Plan goals, the Soviet Government called for a sharply increased expansion in the production of consumer goods. Although the goals were projected only three years ahead, the average annual growth from 1959 to 1961 was raised to 12 percent, or by a total of 42 percent. It seems fair to say that this sudden acceleration in goals is the fruit of the psychological seeds mentioned above, the most fertile of them undoubtedly being Khrushchev's visit to the United States.

As yet there is no indication that the Russians plan to maintain this pace beyond 1961. It may be assumed, however, that if the Russians succeed in meeting the 1961 goals, the 12 percent growth rate will continue into 1965, at least as an upper limit.

The most significant aspect of the Seven Year Plan concerning food targets was the call for the Soviet Union to surpass the United States in per capita production of butter, milk and meat. On December 26, 1959, Khrushchev announced that per capita production of butter and total production of milk exceeded that in the United States. Considering the levels of agricultural production during the collectivization famine of the 1930s, this is quite an accomplishment. But as D. G. Johnson and A. Kahan point out, the relation of Soviet production of meat and milk to American production of these goods has improved little if any over the pre-revolutionary era when Russia was a major livestock producing nation.[6] Still, this does represent a substantial improvement for the average Russian, although the targets for other fresh foods are less spectacular.

It must be remembered that the standard of living is not only a matter of production. Distribution and marketing must also be improved. It is one thing to show that you can produce certain things; it is another to provide them to your consumer in a fresh state and when he wants them. Thus in the same speech in which Khrushchev claimed that butter *production* per capita is now greater in the Soviet Union than in the United States, he complained that Omsk had no butter in its stores and that milk and meat shortages were reported in Kharkov, Rostov and other areas.

Soviet production and consumption of soft goods other than

[6] Joint Economic Committee of the United States, *Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies*, Washington, G.P.O., 1959, I, p. 222.

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foods have similarly improved in the post-Stalin years and are to continue to grow under the Seven Year Plan. While the over-all average increase in production of such items is to grow by approximately 50 percent, the output of specific items such as knitted underwear is scheduled to double. The Soviet production of wool fabric in 1958 already exceeded American production; and by 1965 it is slated to be double the 1958 American output.

Yet all the discussions having to do with foods and soft goods tend to be polemical in nature. Clearly, the Soviets have made vast improvements, at least over the dreadful days of the early 1930s. While they should have done much more, and done it sooner, the fact remains that they are on the verge of overtaking the United States in both the production and consumption of certain food and soft items. It is with regard to consumer durables, however—on which Americans especially pride themselves—that the test must be made.

As might be expected, sales of Soviet consumer durables are to increase at more than the average rate of growth.[7] For example, the original plan called for an annual increase in washing-machine sales of 26 percent and the revised plan calls for 38 percent. For refrigerators, the respective figures were 22 to 30 percent and for television sets 19 and 25 percent. All were above the over-all average sales growth projections.

Taking the maximum variant, we find that by 1965, production and sale of 4,750,000 Russian washing-machines will surpass 1959 American sales of 4,010,000. For refrigerators, the original Seven Year Plan goals for 1965 as well as the revised goals are lower than 1959 U.S. sales. This is also true of the sales and production figures of the other durable goods. At best, sales of Soviet refrigerators in 1965 will be three-fifths of U.S. sales in 1959, or a little over two million units. Yet considering that sales of washing-machines and refrigerators in the Soviet Union totalled 3,600 and 50,000 in 1953 and 670,000 and 415,000 in 1959, this is a significant improvement (despite the fact that, at best, only washing-machines will exceed 1959 U.S. sales.)

The Russians are much further behind with respect to housing and automobile production. Even though housing construction in the Seven Year Plan is to be 2.3 times greater than it was in the preceding seven years, a noted economist, V. Nemchinov, asserts

[7] The following statistics are derived from *Planovoe Khoziastvo*, No. 2, 1959, p. 63, *Electrical Merchandising Week*, January 18, 1960, p. 35, and *Pravda*, January 22, 1960, p. 3.

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that 55 percent of the housing to be completed under the plan will be needed just to maintain the present low housing standards. Due to demographic growth and normal housing depreciation, it is necessary to run just in order not to lose ground.

While the Russians dream some day of duplicating many aspects of American life, they do not include automobile production in their aspirations for the time being. Thus automobile production is to expand from the 124,500 units produced in 1959 to 200,000 units in 1965, but the Government does not exhort the Russian worker to overtake the U.S. 1959 production of 5,590,000. It simply cannot afford nor does it desire to divert the resources from heavy industry which even a fraction of this production would require. Consequently, instead of a rate of growth equivalent to that of the other rapidly growing durable consumer goods items, the seven-year increment in auto production of 64 percent is not much larger than the lower over-all increase in retail sales.

V

With the goals in mind, let us now evaluate them and see if increases of the magnitude suggested are possible. The past record in this respect is not encouraging for the Russian citizen. The Soviet Government has always regarded heavy industry as the most important economic sector and thinks of consumer goods as expendable. During the prewar five year plans, the goals for consumer goods were almost never kept. This background warrants a certain amount of skepticism toward planned increases in the immediate future.

While heavy industrial production is still the major objective, it does seem fair to suggest that consumer goods in the Soviet Union today are more important than ever before. Yet retail sales in 1960 are to increase by only 6.9 percent over 1959. Moreover, Khrushchev apparently supposes that the great production increases are to be gained from increased efficiency and productivity and with little new capital investment. Better use of waste and scrap may indeed result in some added production. However, the expansion is unlikely to meet the revised 1961 goals of a 12 percent annual increase without substantial investment and a more rapid sales increase for 1960. If anything, the 6.9 percent rate of growth just meets the original Seven Year Plan goals of a 7 percent annual increase.

The 1961 goals seem to be exaggerated, especially since they

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are to be achieved in such a short period. Although Khrushchev certainly wishes to concentrate more of Russia's economic resources on producing consumer goods, he will find it difficult to meet the original 1965 plan, not to mention the revisions of 1961, unless he can route substantial quantities of materials from some other production sector. Since he shows no intention of reducing his emphasis on heavy industry, this may partially explain his strong support of disarmament.

Let us assume that the Russians attain their goals, that they do reach or surpass the production levels of various American consumer goods. Will this then mean they have overtaken our standard of living? To compare living standards is an extremely difficult statistical problem. Quantitative measurements are not the only criteria to be considered. Taste and variations in quality come into the equation too. To compound the problem, tastes change. Consumption of potatoes per capita has fallen in Russia; it was lower in 1958 than in 1957, and both these were lower than the 1953 figure. Does this mean the Russian consumer was worse off in 1958 than in 1953? We face both dilemmas when we discuss Russian woolen fabrics. As was pointed out earlier, the Russians now produce more of these than we do in the United States. Yet before this can be claimed as a Russian victory, it must be remembered that it comes about partly as a reflection of climatic tastes and needs and partly because synthetic fabrics have been substituted for woolen fabrics in the United States.

Many qualitative differences also exist. How is it possible to adjust for the fact that all but a fraction of the milk sold in the United States is pasteurized, while a much smaller percentage is so treated in the Soviet Union? Similar considerations hinder comparison of durable consumer goods. To say that the Soviet Union will produce 2,500,000 or 4,500,000 washing-machines in 1965 is meaningless unless there is some way of comparing their qualitative features with those of a washing-machine produced in another country. At the present time, almost all Soviet models are the wringer type with only a limited washing capacity. To say that by 1965 they will be producing 60 percent or 120 percent as many units as we did in 1959 under the circumstances may not have much meaning. And is it possible to compare Soviet housing with that in the United States? Our emphasis is on private homes while in the Soviet Union it is on semi-private apartments with jointly shared kitchens and toilets. Finally, because

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the quality of production is often so poor in the Soviet Union, all comparisons remain to some degree suspect even if one finds commodities somewhat comparable in nature.

There is a further element to be considered. Although we are concerned with the consumption sector, we run into many of the problems encountered by those who measure stocks and flows in the capital goods industry. While it is necessary to consider what is newly consumed this year, it is also important that some account be taken of what was purchased in previous years, but which still is in use and continues to satisfy and serve. Thus as a larger and larger share of annual total expenditure is devoted to durable commodities, the standard of living is improved not only in the given year, but in the years of the immediate future.

The special character of durable goods consumption has two implications. First, it means that actual living conditions prior to Stalin's death were even lower than the simple retail sales data suggest, because so large a portion of consumption expenditures were completely consumed in the same year. This also means that comparative studies of relative standards of living, both with other countries and between different periods, are even more difficult than has already been suggested by various researchers. How is one to describe in statistical language the relative standards of living when one of the countries has a large stock of consumer durables and the other does not?

An attempt has been made to calculate the stock of selected appliances in the Soviet Union as they existed in 1959 and as they will be in 1965.[8] For 1959–65, two possible estimates are offered. The larger, a projection of the revised goals for 1961, is certainly the upper limit. On the other hand, the original goals of the Seven Year Plan are not necessarily a lower limit. If anything, they may be considered a median estimate.

In order to be as conservative as possible, the counterpart American figures do not refer to stocks, but to the number of households possessing these goods. Because many own more than one, the actual American stock of goods is much higher. An ex-

[8] The past sales figures for 1950 to 1959 are found in *Sovetskaia Torgovlia* (Soviet Trade), Gosstatizdat, Moscow, 1958, p. 57, *Sovetskaia Torgovlia,* January 1959, p. 12 and *Pravda,* January 22, 1960. The original 1965 figures are given in *Vestnik Statistiki,* no. 5, 1959, p. 91, and the revised figures are derived from *Pravda,* October 16, 1959. To obtain an estimate of existing stocks, it is necessary, however, to find a sales figure for the years prior to 1950. Since sales of most consumer durables before 1950 were almost nil, the danger of making any significant error is small. If anything, the estimates are purposely high. The figures for the United States are taken from *Electrical Merchandising Week,* January 18, 1959, p. 59.

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treme example is that compared with a stock estimate of 155,000,000 radios, the number of households possessing radios is about 50,000,000. Because the estimate of Soviet stocks fails to take into consideration replacement of scrappage (important, considering the notoriously poor quality of Russian consumer goods), the comparisons tend to overstate the availability of Soviet durable consumer goods while the corresponding American figures are understated.

Regardless of the sudden growth in production and sales, the stock of Soviet washing-machines will equal only 16,000,000 by 1965 at best. This would represent 35 percent of the almost 47,100,000 U.S. households possessing washing-machines in 1959. If sales increased at the originally expected rates, the figure would be 25 percent instead of 35 percent. The relevant comparisons for refrigerators is a maximum of 10,000,000 units by 1965 compared with 49,600,000 in the United States in 1959.

A similar disparity will continue to exist far beyond 1965 between other stocks of Soviet and American consumer durables. This is not meant to imply that washing-machines, refrigerators, television sets and radios are the only items to be considered in evaluating relative standards of living. Many more comparisons are necessary (and not just of material goods) before one can make a final judgment. None the less, if precise comparative considerations of such stock variables as housing and automobiles were possible, they would only work to our advantage.

An approximate indication of the difference in Soviet and American housing conditions is suggested by the fact that in 1957, each Soviet urban resident had 83 square feet of living space. Nemchinov, the Soviet economist mentioned earlier, says that the Soviet goal of 129 square feet per person will not be achieved until much after 1965. An exact estimate of comparable American data is not available. However, the most informed guess is that American living area per capita in 1950 was approximately 269 square feet, or more than double the eventual Soviet goal. Considering the housing boom since 1950, it is logical to suppose that the present U.S. living area per capita is even higher.

VI

What does all of this imply for the United States? First of all, it appears that the Soviets are determined to match not only the heavy industrial production of the United States, but also its

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standard of living. In their attempt to do so, they have shown that improved retail trade is a convenient political tool for assuring public allegiance. They have also discovered, however, that in trying to overtake the United States in the pleasures and joys it derives from a high annual sales rate, they also encounter many of our problems. As long as the consumer is kept at a low consumption level, and is given more money than goods to buy with it, there is no difficulty. Whatever is produced is sold. However, when conditions improve even slightly, new troubles arise. The Soviets have found that the consumer is fickle and that demand cannot be precisely estimated and planned, as they had always assumed. Where the market is thinner, certain commodities (usually those with higher price tags) simply do not move. The result is that they must fall back on the capitalistic expedients of advertising, consumer credit and middlemen.

The standard of living will doubtless continue to improve in the Soviet Union. This is to be expected regardless of any decision about total disarmament. However, a personal visit into any Soviet apartment off the main street or a drive through any Russian village will answer the question whether the Russians will overtake the United States during the next few seven year plans. There is little doubt about the capability of Russian heavy industry. But the disparity between the simple two-wheel horse cart of the typical peasant and the supersonic Tupoliev jetliner of the transcontinental passenger is immense.

At the opening of the American Fair in Moscow, Khrushchev asserted that "after the fulfillment of the Seven Year Plan, we will need five years, maybe less, to overtake the United States in total and per capita production." Even if this were so, he should know that overtaking the United States in production of specific commodities is not enough. Production must be sustained over a long enough period of time to allow the acquisition of these items by the average citizen. This is not to say that the Russians will never have a stock of consumer durables as large as exists in the United States; but considering the distance to be overcome, and the past record in regard to consumer goods, the possibility of the Russians catching up within the present generation seems very remote.

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THE WHITE SETTLER'S ROLE IN KENYA

By M. F. Hill

AT the dawn of the twentieth century, a railway, widely regarded as a project either of crazy quasi-idealism or rash imperialism, was telescoping its way from Mombasa on the Indian Ocean to Lake Victoria, leaving a pile of problems in its wake. The decision to undertake this great and arduous enterprise had been made for a number of reasons. It was prompted partly in order to discharge Britain's responsibilities under the Act of Brussels to put an end to the slave trading by establishing law and order in the interior; partly to make possible the retention of Uganda—where missionaries of the Church Missionary Society had been precariously settled since 1876—as a British "sphere of influence" and later as a Protectorate; and partly to secure Britain's position at the source of the Nile waters on which the Sudan and Egypt were so greatly dependent.

In reaching the decision to build the railway no heed was paid to the possible development of the Highlands of Kenya. In 1894 the British Government declared a protectorate over part of Uganda and in 1895 over the rest of East Africa. At the same time it leased a coastal strip, ten sea miles in width along the littoral of Kenya, from the Sultan of Zanzibar. That strip remains today the Protectorate of Kenya. The rest became the Colony of Kenya, by formal annexation, in June 1920.

The deficits on the Protectorate and the railway had to be borne by the British taxpayers, by way of grants-in-aid from the Treasury. The only way whereby both Protectorate and railway could be set on a sound economic basis was by the development of the raw and almost empty lands on either side of the railway. If that task had been left to the Africans there would have been little chance of the railway paying its way within 20 years. The subsistence economy of the African tribes was so precarious that they did not even produce surplus foodstuffs as an insurance against the recurrent famines. Many of the native tribes were pastoral and of nomadic disposition; and those tribes which did till the soil with wooden digging sticks had little or nothing to offer to the world's markets. Moreover, the African population was mainly concentrated around the shores of Lake Victoria, in the Kavirondo country, and in the Kikuyu country from the skirts of

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Mount Kenya and the Aberdare range to Masailand. In Ukamba and in the Nandi country there was also a relatively high density of population. But the greater part of southern Kenya was the grazing and the hunting grounds of the Masai, a nomadic tribe whose whim and will were law over much of the country.

Such was the contemporary background to the decision that white settlement beside the railway was the only practicable means of building an economy. It seemed the only way to provide freight for the railway to carry to and from the sea, to provide revenue for the Government which would in turn enable a start with the social services which the Africans direly needed and which would aid them to move away from barbarism towards civilization and a better way of life. For the Africans of 60 years ago, life was short and brutish. The population was estimated to be less than 2,500,000. Killing famines and plagues of men and beast were common. The infant mortality rate was appalling and harsh Nature maintained a balance between the population and the ability of the land to support it at a low standard of living. For many dark centuries, the Africans of the land now called Kenya had lived in a stagnant backwater, remote and almost entirely unaffected by the stream of human progress.

The establishment of white settlement restricted the nomadism of the Masai; it deprived the Kikuyu of a fringe of land between Kiambu and Limuru; and it deprived the Nandi and the Lumbwa of a part of their lands. No other tribe lost land to the settlers, and in 1933 the Report of the Kenya Land Commission led to a just settlement of all claims, as of right, to land which was alienated during the early days of the century. For the rest, white settlement filled a vacuum and built the Colony of Kenya. It also created the awkward and perturbing political, social and economic problems which face the people of Kenya today.

II

Whatever may be the argument about the force and the durability of the various pledges given by successive British Governments to the settlers of Kenya, it is incontrovertible that they were encouraged to settle in Kenya and to develop the country as a direct instrument of British policy. In a formal address in 1954, Sir Evelyn Baring, then Governor of Kenya and now Lord Howick, spoke of the bright future of the agricultural immigrant and quoted the Secretary of State for Colonies as saying that "Her

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Majesty's Government are not likely to lend themselves to encouraging people to come if they intend to betray them. They will be entitled to feel confidence in the possession of the homes they have built or will build for themselves and for their children."

In the years before the First World War settlement made fair progress. The difficulties were formidable, for everything related to agriculture in the country had to be learned by the slow and expensive process of trial and error. Many an early settler lost all his own capital and all that he could borrow in the learning of lessons which proved of inestimable value to those who followed. Little or nothing was known about the climate, the rainfall, the qualities of the soil, about the endemic and epidemic stock diseases, about the multitude of pests and diseases which attacked the crops and reduced the prospect of a fair harvest to the certainty of another depressing interview with the Bank.

The First World War came to Kenya just when the economic barometer was moving towards "set fair," just when farms and coffee and sisal plantations, fashioned from a slice of raw Africa, were beginning to pay; it imposed a check to all progress and for four years men fought and died and many farms reverted to scrub and bush. In 1914 the European population consisted of about 3,000 in all—officials of the Government and settlers, men, women and children. Of that number, 1,700 served in the armed forces. There remained in Kenya only a bare minimum to maintain some form of government and to preserve all they could of the farms, many of which were run by gallant women.

Between the two world wars the farmers were hard hit by the postwar slump of the twenties, and by the Great Depression of the thirties. An agricultural colony like Kenya was very susceptible to an economic blizzard which followed a drought and which joined forces with a severe scourge of locusts to wreck human endeavor. Between 1928 and 1933 the price of Kenya's export crops fell to a third or a half of their previous value. The Depression was a grievous setback followed by years of slow recovery until the outbreak of the Second World War, when thousands of settlers again joined the forces. Not until the later years of the Second World War was a reasonable margin of profit again restored to farmers.

Since World War II the economy of Kenya has made rapid strides, which can be well illustrated by the growth of the Government's annual expenditure. In 1940, it was £2,675,222; in 1950,

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£10,624,840; and the estimate for 1960–61 is £32,014,765. Apart from the ordinary recurrent expenditure, the outbreak of the tragic Mau Mau revolt in 1952 imposed an immense financial burden. Since 1953 the total cost of the emergency has been £57,185,424, of which the British Government met about half.

III

There has long been argument about the so-called "White Highlands" of Kenya wherein rural land—all towns and townships are excluded—is reserved for European ownership and occupation. Last November in the Legislative Council, the Hon. L. H. Brown, then Acting Director of Agriculture, dealt with this controversial matter. In the course of his speech, Mr. Brown said:

> It has often been stated that much of the best land in Kenya was taken by Europeans. This view is regularly voiced by strangers to the country and frequently appears in supposedly authoritative publications. The fact that it is erroneous is not usually well received by people with preconceived notions or axes to grind. Nevertheless it is. The study of available data reveals the following facts.
>
> Of the land in Kenya which has a rainfall of over 30 inches per annum, 8,500 square miles lies in European areas and 32,306 square miles elsewhere in the Colony, chiefly in African land units though some is Crown land. In other words, there are at best one acre in five in this category available to Europeans.
>
> A large proportion of the European land is also cold, poorly drained or has shallow soil, and the area available for mixed farming is reckoned to be about 4,700 square miles. Some of these same factors affect African lands in this category but the proportion is smaller. There is, for instance, only a small proportion of African land badly drained and little of it is cold or above 8,000 feet. Africans, in fact, concentrated in the past on those areas of the country enjoying an adequate rainfall to grow crops and where it was comparatively warm. Similar pictures emerge with ranching land. If you examine the areas of ranching land with a rainfall between 20 and 30 inches, there are 4,025 square miles available to Europeans and 37,621 square miles elsewhere, *i.e.* about one acre in ten is in European hands.

Mr. Brown then went on to describe what the various racial groups had done with their land. He pointed out that with less than one-fifth of the best land, the Europeans and Asians provide about 46 percent of the Colony's total agricultural production, with a value of £33,000,000. Of this amount, produce worth nearly £20,000,000 becomes available for export. By contrast, he added, production on African land is worth about £40,000,000, but since most of it is for subsistence, only some £5,500,000-worth is available for sale—not all of it for export.

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"The picture therefore is," he concluded, "that if all the land in Kenya were in African hands its productivity would be much lower than at present. In addition the wage bill of over £10,000,000 for Africans would not find its way into the pockets of Africans living in the present European Highlands. I need not point out that this wage alone is nearly twice the total value of surplus crops produced in African areas."

Since agriculture today accounts for all but £3,000,000 of Kenya's total exports of £33,000,000, any measure which reduces the productivity of the land is not in the interests of the country as a whole. To achieve a reasonable rate of growth will require political stability and an economic climate which is encouraging to farmers and investors.

Although it is estimated that since 1950 over £300,000,000 has been invested in Kenya—£121,000,000 on public account—it is still a poor country. There are no minerals of account. There is no prime mover; no oil and no coal have yet been discovered; there is no heavy industry. It is not an easy country to farm, and in much of it rainfall and water supplies are badly distributed. Because our exports compete in world markets with those of other primary producing countries, Kenya greatly depends on world conditions for its prosperity. The African population of approximately 6,200,000—divided into 48 tribes—is increasing at an annual rate of between 1.5 and 2 percent. In all these circumstances it is not easy to maintain existing standards of living, much less to increase them and expand the social services so necessary to the well-being and progress of the African people.

IV

In February the constitutional conference, held at Lancaster House in London, produced proposals for a radical revision of Kenya's constitution, and laid down the principle that independence was the ultimate objective. In the present tempo of change in Africa all the indications are that Kenya will be ruled by an independent African government within a comparatively few years.

After the general elections next year there will be a Legislative Council of 65 elected members. Fifty-three will be elected on a common roll and they in turn will elect 12 "national" members, composed of four Africans, four Europeans, two Asian non-Muslims, one Asian Muslim and one Arab. The position of minority

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communities on the common roll will be safeguarded by 20 of the 53 seats, ten allocated to Europeans, eight to Asians and two to Arabs. There will be communal primary elections for the reserved seats, in order to ensure that the candidates elected command support from their own community. The details of how the primary elections will be run have not yet been determined, but it is obvious that the European, Asian and Arab members will, in fact, be elected by an overwhelmingly African electorate. The franchise for the common roll seats will be based on (a) ability to read and write own language, or over 40 years of age; or (b) holding office in a wide range of scheduled posts at time of registration; or (c) an income of £75 per annum.

Under the new constitution the Council of Ministers will consist of 12 Ministers, with an Arab representative having the right of attendance. There will be an unofficial majority with four official and eight unofficial Ministers. The eight unofficial posts will be filled by four Africans, three Europeans and one Asian. The Governor will retain the right to appoint Ministers and to distribute portfolios.

The outcome of the London Conference surprised and caused some dismay to the European community. Although they are the mainstay of the economy they number only some 65,000, including government officials and the employees of large companies who are not permanently settled in Kenya. By and large the great majority of the Europeans recognized the need for, and the inevitability of, change and accepted the general pattern of the new constitution with some reservations. But they disliked, for instance, the fact that in the future they would be unable to send representatives of their own choice to Legislative Council. Nevertheless, they hoped that the new constitution would lead to an improvement of racial relations and hold forth the prospect of a stable government, which is so essential to the expansion of an economy greatly dependent on continuing overseas investment.

Since the African elected members returned from the London Conference the anxieties of the European community have been greatly increased by their public statements, more especially in regard to the White Highlands; by demands for the release from restriction of Jomo Kenyatta, the leader of the Mau Mau revolt, and claims that he will be the first African Prime Minister of Kenya; and by assertions that the new constitution will soon be upset and replaced by an independent African Government.

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There is general recognition that the reservation of the White Highlands solely for European ownership and occupation must go and it will be set aside by legislation which will shortly be presented to Legislative Council. But several African elected members have declared that European-owned farms must be greatly reduced in size, and that European-owned land in the Highlands should be expropriated for the settlement of African peasants.

Today the four thousand or so European landowners and farmers fear that they are about to be betrayed and they feel scant confidence in the continued possession of the homes and the farms they have made for themselves and their children. Some of them, the descendants of the early pioneers, are now the third generation on the land. Confidence is shattered and there are increasing signs of the economy shrivelling in a cold wind of deflation. Civil servants grow increasingly anxious about their prospects once independence is achieved. Few settlers look hopefully to the future.

Admittedly there is belated if growing recognition in Great Britain of the need to preserve the economy of Kenya which is so dependent on European agriculture. But the political trends, and the avowed intentions of leading African politicians, are all against measures providing the European farmer with security of tenure for more than a few years; and if Mr. Mboya and his supporters have their way, there will be only a very few years.

Recently Mr. James Gichuru, the chairman of the committee appointed to draft the constitution of the recently formed Kenya African National Union, made it very clear that the Union's policy was directed towards a one-party state. He said that democracy, as it is practiced in Britain, was unworkable in Kenya. He also supported the agitation for the release of Jomo Kenyatta. About the same time Mr. Mboya announced that he would call for a campaign of civil disobedience if Kenyatta were not released within three months, and his party, the Nairobi Peoples' Convention Party, issued a Press statement which declared that Jomo Kenyatta will be the first head of a free Kenya Government "whether the other communities or the present government like it or not."

There are some who believe that, sooner or later, it will be impossible to resist the mounting pressure for the release of Kenyatta. If that be so, the prospect offered to the European community will be to live as aliens in a one-party state headed by

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Kenyatta. It is one thing to live in a Kenya ruled by an African or a predominantly African Government. It is another thing to live in Kenyattaland.

Nor is anxiety confined to the European community. The Arabs are anxious about the future of the coastal strip, the Protectorate, for the extreme African nationalists demand the abrogation of the Zanzibar Treaty and the annexation of the strip. The Indians, who largely control retail trade, fear a replica of the boycott in Uganda and they tend to pander to African nationalism in the hope that it is the right band-wagon. Amongst the smaller tribes there is fear of domination by the Kikuyu, Kenya's largest tribe, numbering 1,500,000, or about 25 percent of the African population. The Luo have always disliked the Kikuyu and the Masai have always despised them. These tribal divisions, glossed over within the largely de-tribalized urban populations, are the basis of the political rivalries amongst the African elected members. Recently Mr. Mboya, by far the most able of them and a fine speaker, has lost ground and become unpopular with many of his colleagues. At times he gives the impression of seeking to outvie his rivals in extremism; as a Luo he may feel impelled to support the "cult of Kenyatta" as a means of gaining support from the Kikuyu.

The real problem in Kenya today is how to correlate the rate of political advance with the need for a stable government and the preservation and expansion of an economy on which the real interests of all Kenya's 48 disparate tribes depend. Lord Chandos, still better known as Oliver Lyttelton, a former Secretary of State for the Colonies, once wrote:

"Let us not forget that, behind our own self-interest, beyond our deep desire to see our own property preserved and the lives of our fellow countrymen protected, there lies the certainty that, without partnership between African and European, first one territory and then another will soon revert to the primeval darkness from which they are trying to emerge. A multi-racial society is not yet round the corner—indeed, it is easy in moments of depression to disbelieve in its success; but witchcraft and superstition, ignorance, famine and disease are just round the corner unless European help is forthcoming."

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CRISIS IN THE BRITISH WEST INDIES

By S. Walter Washington

AT a time when so many of the colored peoples of the world are demanding and gaining their independence from colonial rule, it is something of an anomaly to find a people who, having taken a second look, are not sure they want it so quickly or in the way it was planned. This is what has happened on the island of Jamaica, one of the principal units in the Federation of the West Indies. For several decades the British Colonial Office has encouraged the trend toward a Caribbean federation which would ultimately achieve dominion status within the Commonwealth. But following a pattern known elsewhere in the less developed regions of the world, the movement among the colonial peoples themselves was confined to a small group of educated, politically minded men in each dependency. A generation of them has been attending conferences with each other, with leaders in other parts of the British Empire, and even with leaders of other nations—always on the assumption that federation and dominion status were their goal.

A federation of ten island dependencies, with severe limitations on the powers of the central government, was formally inaugurated in 1958. But when it seemed ready to take the big step toward full growth with dominion status, the Jamaicans—or rather the politically conscious and economically prosperous quarter of them—decided that they were getting along very well as they were. They questioned whether they should go so far so fast in the direction previously indicated by their leaders—Norman Manley, Premier, and his predecessor in office, Sir Alexander Bustamante, now leader of the Opposition—who were also disposed to take a second look.

But this feeling of doubt and hesitancy was not shared by the dominant voice in the island of Trinidad, which has less than half the area and population of Jamaica but because of its location and resources plays an equally important role in the federation movement. The government of Trinidad and Tobago is under the one-man rule of Dr. Eric Williams, a representative of a younger generation than those who have for years been attending the inter-island and international conferences. In 1955 he was spectacularly successful in creating a new political party

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which, within a year, won its first election campaign. Under his guidance Trinidad has progressed fast politically and now Williams appears in a hurry to exhibit his talents on a bigger stage.

II

The constitution of the Federation provides for a legislature consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives; a Governor General responsible to the Colonial Office; a Supreme Court, a Prime Minister, five Ministers in charge of departments, and a small number of federal bureaucrats with specified responsibilities. Powers reserved to the Crown include defense, foreign relations and those necessary for maintaining financial stability.[1] For the first five years the constitution limits the annual budget to 9,120,000 B.W.I. dollars (equal to U.S. $5,472,000) which is derived from direct contributions by the member governments. This monetary limitation has constituted an effective check on the activities of the central government.

A schedule attached to the constitution specifies the powers reserved to the Federal Legislature and those that may be exercised either by the Federal Legislature or by the legislatures of the member states. Another provision that is relevant to this discussion fixes the composition of the House of Representatives at 45 members of whom five shall be elected in Barbados, 17 in Jamaica, ten in Trinidad and Tobago, one in Montserrat, and two each in Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Christopher Nevis and Anguila, Santa Lucia and Saint Vincent. This representation was determined, not on the basis of population alone, but under a formula combining population, income and the desire to disperse power. There is also a provision that at some time before the end of the first five years there shall be convened a conference of all the governments in the Federation with the British Government to review the constitution.

All the provisions of the constitution were agreed to by the representatives of all the territories, including those of Jamaica. But hardly had the Federal Government started to function when its House of Representatives adopted a resolution calling on the Executive to convene in 1959, during the second year of federation, the conference envisaged by the constitution for the fifth

[1] Each territory in the Federation also has its constitution granted by the Crown. Variations among them indicate different degrees of political maturity. Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados have Governors representing the Crown while the smaller units have Administrators. The constitutions reserve for the Crown varying degrees of control over the local police.

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year, "in order to achieve the goal of self-government and Dominion Status within the Commonwealth at the earliest possible moment." This resolution originated with the Opposition[2] and, although many members of the House undoubtedly realized that it was premature, the political climate in the West Indies does not encourage a politician to advocate publicly any delay in securing a greater degree of independence. To carry out the intent of the resolution, the Prime Minister summoned representatives of all the member governments to a conference in Trinidad to seek agreement on amendments to the constitution which were to be presented to the British at a subsequent review conference. This fitted in well with the ideas of fast-moving Dr. Williams of Trinidad but not with those of the Jamaicans, who were not at all sure what they wanted. It is therefore not surprising that when the conference convened on September 28, 1959, the Jamaican bipartisan delegation arrived with every intention of sabotaging it. They succeeded. After a week of wrangling over the agenda the conference broke up in utter confusion.

The weapon used by the Jamaicans, led by Premier Manley, was a demand that representation in the House of Representatives be based solely on population. This would give the Jamaicans half the seats, and they refused to discuss any other question until this principle was accepted. Dr. Williams protested, and did so for several days, getting himself and everybody else more and more irritated. He finally accepted the principle but the two sides wrangled over details until some delegates were not speaking to others. On the eighth day the Jamaicans took a plane for home with the agreement that the many unsolved problems would be studied further in two committees. So much for the conference, which at least served the purpose of bringing into the open the sharp divergence of views within the Federation.

The fact is that the idea of federation has not been sold to the public in Jamaica, nor in the other islands. The Federal Prime Minister, Sir Grantley Adams of Barbados, has been blamed for inaction and ineptness in this field and some of his colleagues have tried to make him the scapegoat, but the leaders of the various territories must share the blame with him. Both in Jamaica

[2] Before the elections to the Federal House of Representatives, the political parties already existing in the several islands formed liaisons to create two federal political parties, one supporting the Government and the other the Opposition. During the present crisis, however, geographical points of view have tended to overshadow the rather artificially created differences between the two parties.

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and in Trinidad insular nationalism has been cultivated by the very leaders who assumed that federation was in the offing. Despite the fact that all of the islands have been controlled by the same Colonial Office and for many international purposes have been treated as a unit, they have had separate constitutional histories. Local self-government has been attained in differing degrees and at different times and every step forward has been marked by hard fighting. Each island is proud of what it has obtained and will not lightly surrender its powers to a central authority.

As Jamaica is the largest and the most advanced constitutionally, its political leaders are particularly loath to cede power to a Federal Government in which they share control with smaller islands having less governmental experience. Another factor which affects the attitude of Jamaicans more than others is the sea. As elsewhere in the world, the sea has proved to be a barrier to political and economic unity—more pronounced for Jamaica because it is much further from the other islands than they are from each other. Still another factor is the overpopulation from which all the islands suffer. Jamaica's poor may or may not be poorer than the poor of the other islands but they are certainly more numerous. Many thoughtful Jamaicans feel that all their brains, energies and money will be needed to seek solutions of their own social problems and that they should not take on any responsibilities for the smaller islands with fewer resources. Conversely, they do not see how federation would help solve their own social problems.

It is, however, in a narrower economic field that we find the real reasons for the sudden change in Jamaica's attitude toward federation. In the first place, Jamaica several years ago embarked on a program of industrialization in an effort to provide work for its surplus labor. New capital investments—foreign and domestic—have been attracted by such inducements as freedom from taxation for stipulated periods, high tariffs and import quotas. Mr. Manley and the other Jamaican leaders insist on honoring their commitments to these investors and do not trust Federation policy-makers to do so. Dr. Williams of Trinidad, which already has a refinery, has objected to Jamaica's concession to Esso Standard Oil, S.A., on the grounds that one refinery for the Federation is enough. Prime Minister Adams raised a storm by suggesting that after the end of the five-year period of austerity the Federal Government would levy an income tax, and furthermore that it might

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be retroactive. His subsequent explanation that such a measure would of course have to be voted by the Federal Legislature did not calm the Jamaicans but made them determined to control the legislature by pushing through a constitutional amendment which would base representation solely on population.

Second, in a period of boom resulting from tourism and the largest bauxite production in the world, Jamaica has mortgaged all its assets for some time to come. One official has stated that Jamaicans are practicing economic brinkmanship on a large scale. The balance must not be upset by any interference by Federal authorities. Third, individual income taxes are among the highest in the world. Officials and businessmen shudder at the thought of contributing to the cost of expanded Federal services. "It's something we've been pushed into by a bunch of wild idealists" is a statement commonly heard in business circles when the subject of federation is mentioned. Finally, Jamaica has the highest tariffs of any member of the Federation and its officials have contended that the cost of lowering them to the medians suggested by the report of the Trade and Tariff Commission on Customs Union is more than the island's government can afford.

III

To Jamaicans, Norman Washington Manley, Q.C., is the very personification of the federation movement. Having first made his mark as the leading barrister of the British West Indies, in 1938 he entered politics as a Socialist with motives of high idealism. In 1955 his party—the Peoples National Party (P.N.P.)—won the election and he became Chief Minister, now called Premier. Reëlected in 1959, he still retains much of his idealism, but the responsibilities of power have tempered him. He has devoted his talents to developing the economy of Jamaica in ways that are far from those of a doctrinaire Socialist. He has become a seasoned politician and is generally recognized as the outstanding statesman of the West Indies. Both the leaders and the general public of all the islands looked to him to be the first Federal Prime Minister and this expectation gave his own Jamaicans confidence that their interests would be protected. There was general disappointment when he chose to remain with his island's government because there seemed to be no one in his party capable of keeping it united and of holding on to the premiership. This decision, which meant that leadership of the Federation passed to a non-

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Jamaican, was undoubtedly a factor in fostering the anti-federation movement among his own people.

In the 1959 election campaign Manley's opponent, Sir Alexander Bustamante, leader of the Jamaica Labor Party, made the Federation an election issue. Although he had been one of the builders of federation, he now questioned its value to Jamaica and threatened secession if he should win. Manley stood by federation but compromised with some of his previous principles. His platform demanded that the House of Representatives be based strictly on population and that the constitution be further amended so as to exclude from federal control (a) the development of industry, (b) the power to levy income taxes, and (c) the power to levy excise duties and consumption taxes. Manley won a sweeping victory and set out almost immediately for the Trinidad Conference which, as we have seen, he effectively sabotaged.

Having allowed election pressures to dilute his former enthusiasm and having disrupted the conference, on his return to Jamaica Manley attempted to strengthen the sentiment in favor of federation. In a debate on the conference in the Jamaican House of Representatives he declared that for the island to attempt to "go it alone" in seeking dominion status would be against the trend of the modern world, that it would be too heavy a burden, that Jamaica could not support separate representation abroad, nor a separate university, that it would be better for the islands to handle their trading resources as a unit, and that new industries were being attracted to the island by the prospect of a customs union.

Sir Alexander Bustamante disagreed, alleging that by "going it alone" Jamaica would escape the drag of the small islands, which in a federation would in any case trade with, and be attracted to, Trinidad more than Jamaica. But the debate ended in general agreement by all sides that Jamaica could not drop out immediately, that during the remainder of the five-year period every effort should be made to get a federation on Jamaica's terms, and only if this failed would Jamaica secede. Manley said that the establishment of a customs union would take at least ten years and must be reached by stages, involving first some measure of free trade within the Federation. In other words Jamaica took its stand for a weak Federation—or what might be better described as a confederation.

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Thus Dr. Williams of Trinidad has emerged as the leading champion of a strong federation. Trinidad is smaller than Jamaica and, although its population density is greater, it has a higher per capita income due largely to its oil resources. One of Trinidad's problems is its attraction for the inhabitants of the nearby smaller islands where opportunities for the expanding populations are fewer. It has endeavored, without much success, to restrict immigration, but Williams has accepted the principle of freedom of population movement within the Federation, provided that there be a customs union which would, he believes, provide a wider market for expanding industry in his island.

As soon as the Federal Legislature passed its resolution calling for early dominion status and a conference to revise the constitution, Williams and his aides began to draw up their blueprint. It is evident that he was at least a year ahead of the Jamaicans in thinking his problem through. A document called "The Economics of Nationhood" was ready for presentation to the Trinidad Conference in September. In contrast to the Jamaicans' advocacy of limiting the federal powers, Williams' proposals extended considerably the responsibilities falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government. To the present 18 items on this list (defense, immigration and emigration, exchange control, the University College of the West Indies, etc.), Williams proposed to add currency, banking, customs, foreign trade, trade between the territories, postal services, civil aviation, television and radio broadcasting, primary and secondary education, taxation ("subject to a financial agreement to be worked out between the Federal Government and the Member Governments") and others, making a total of 45.

Under the present constitution most of these matters are on the so-called Concurrent Legislative List, meaning that the Federal Government may refrain from legislating on them and leave them to the member governments. Primary and secondary education is now, however, on neither list and some of the member governments would certainly oppose Williams' plan to make it a subject of federal legislation. With regard to taxation, Williams explained that the Federal Government should have the right to levy any tax it wants to but that in practice it should confine itself to death duties, excise duties, import and export duties, and an income tax, the last of which could also be levied by the member governments. As a means of compensating the members for

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their losses of revenue, he proposed a system of grants from the central government.

The Trinidad Conference never got around to discussing these proposals but Premier Manley, in the subsequent debate in the Jamaican House of Representatives, characterized them as naïve and declared that their adoption would ruin Jamaica. It is evident that, if there is to be a federation including Jamaica, Williams' proposals can be considered only as an end to be worked towards.

Since becoming Chief Minister in 1956, Williams has been constantly on the offensive. He has provided an honest government as compared with the unsavory reputation of most of its predecessors. He has crossed swords with the Colonial Office in endeavoring to advance his island's constitutional status to that attained by Jamaica many years earlier. He has ruthlessly attacked the "old guard," in which he includes the former political leaders, most of the established business community, and the one daily newspaper of his capital city, *The Trinidad Guardian.* The negro masses of Trinidad render him a devotion bordering on the fanatical but, much as he has strengthened the allegiance of some, he has lost the respect of others.

His personality is probably as great an issue in the federation debate as are his principles. He is intolerant of opposition and is accused of dictatorial tendencies. Membership in his party, the Peoples National Movement, is subject to conditions which are reminiscent of the totalitarian parties of Europe. His attitude toward "Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition" in Trinidad does not accord with British tradition, which is well established in Jamaica and even more in Barbados. Difficulty in getting along with others of equal stature has resulted in his being surrounded with many seeming "yes men." An exception is Mr. C. L. R. James, internationally known as a Trotskyist and editor of *The Nation,* the party's weekly newspaper, which has threatened the opposition with suppression. All of this causes concern to the leaders on the other islands.

Williams succeeded in having Trinidad chosen as the seat of the Federal Government, but his victory was complicated by the fact that the site chosen—Chaguaramas—is occupied by the United States Navy as one of the bases leased by Britain during the last war. Following Washington's refusal to evacuate it immediately, Williams initiated an anti-American campaign, which

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was designed both to arouse nationalistic feeling among his countrymen and to obtain the capitulation of the Americans before one of the competing sites for the Federal capital should win the favor of the other member governments. The anti-American campaign has had only a limited success because of the many ties which Trinidad has with the United States; it hasn't budged the Americans from Chaguaramas, and it has complicated Williams' relations with Federal officials and with the leaders of the other member governments. With some dissent, they still agree on Chaguaramas for the capital but they disapprove of Williams' tactics. They are conscious of the importance to the West Indies of hemisphere defense and they value the friendship of the American people. The United States has promised to reconsider at a later date its position on Chaguaramas and the West Indian Federal leaders hope that technological advances will soon make the base unnecessary in the judgment of American strategists.

Although Williams advocates a strong central government for the Federation he insists that he, as Premier of Trindad, should negotiate the Chaguaramas question with the United States and he has openly denounced both the Federal Government and the British Colonial Office for standing on their right to handle foreign relations. He says that the concession was granted to the United States without consulting the people of Trinidad and the issue is one for them to settle. In other respects, too, Williams fights to keep the Federal Government weak while advocating that it be stronger. A feeling is widespread that he would be satisfied only were he to become Prime Minister.

IV

Will there be a West Indian Federation with dominion status? Despite the many harsh words that have been exchanged within recent months, the prospects seem good, although confederation may better describe the form which it originally takes. The smaller islands would benefit from a strong federation and Williams no doubt has hoped to gain their political favor by his championship of this cause. But they want to include the Jamaicans and their leader, Manley, in order to temper the influence of Williams. He in turn would be glad to have Jamaica included as an offset to British Guiana if it should enter the Federation. The East Indian majority in British Guiana combined with the growing number of East Indians in Trinidad presents a threat to negro domination

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of the Federation which all the islands fear. All must therefore accept Jamaica's terms for a weak center and most hope that when these are accepted Manley will become Prime Minister.

The Jamaican Government believes that the Federal Government should start with no more than those powers essential to gain recognition as a political entity acceptable to international agencies and more particularly to the British Commonwealth of Nations. In one of the committees set up by the Trinidad conference of last September, agreement has been reached on a proposed constitutional amendment recognizing population as the basis of representation in the lower house of the Federal Government. In the other committee a plan has been worked out for the gradual development of a customs union along lines pleasing to the Jamaicans.

In a federation of islands, however, differences of tariff rates can be less of an impediment to the free exchange of goods than the maritime costs—freight rates, the loading and unloading of vessels, dock fees, dock workers' union demands, etc. These and the imposition of excise taxes, which Jamaica insists must remain a function of the member governments, will constitute serious limitations on the operation of any common market in the West Indies, whatever happens about customs duties. If Jamaica's demands are met, the Federal Government will have no right to levy an income tax or to control industrial development. Its revenue will be derived entirely from the customs tariff, and the Jamaicans believe that even this source will be in excess of the Federal Government's needs so that part can be retained by the member governments.

If and when formal agreement is reached, recommendations for amendments to the present constitution will be presented to the British Government. When they have been accepted, dominion status should follow soon thereafter. There will then exist a weak federation, or a confederation—a form of government that has not been lasting and that history tells us is apt to change in one of two directions. Whether the Federation of the West Indies eventually falls apart or whether its central powers are ultimately strengthened depends on many factors, not all of which are within the control of its members.

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STATESMEN AND SOLDIERS IN WAR

By Sir Ian Jacob

IN the last few years there has been a spate of books written by men who took a leading part in the war. Nearly all of these have been autobiographical, giving an account of the events which took place as known to the author, but also including criticisms and judgments made at the time or subsequently. There is good reason to suppose that the people who read these books find themselves somewhat confused. First of all, they have been surprised by the strength of the criticism levelled by the writers at other leading military and political figures, many of whom occupied, and now occupy, dominant positions. It is true that these criticisms have not aspersed their characters; but they have called in question their strategic grasp and their military skill. Secondly, many people find it difficult to draw a clear picture of what really happened from accounts which differ, if not about the basic facts, at any rate about the surrounding circumstances. Thirdly, people become confused about the relationship between the various military authorities and between the military leaders and their political masters. They find it difficult to understand the respective roles of the statesmen, of the chiefs of staff and the commanders in the field. Let us try here to sort out the responsibilities and throw light on the methods which were adopted by those who conducted these great affairs.

II

No one should be surprised by the fact that there were differing opinions, arguments and deep personal rifts. A great war is no light matter. The whole existence of the nation is at stake. As time goes on, the weaker men are eliminated and those who achieve and retain power, either civil or military, are the tough and the strong. Such men have powerful convictions, both personal and national. They have thousands of lives in their hands. It is not surprising, then, that there should be controversy, particularly within an alliance.

While the war is still in progress most of this controversy remains secret, especially when the outcome of the operations is seen to be successful. This was true in the last war, particularly from 1942 onwards, when the Allies held the initiative. It was not

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so true in the First World War. Then the lack of success, the enormous casualties and the changes that took place at the top revealed a good deal of what was going on. After 1942, however, what the public saw was a series of apparently harmonious conferences followed by victorious operations. The war ended with a blaze of adulation for the triumphant victors. Only now do the controversies come fully into the light of day.

On the question of what really happened, and why, many years will pass before final assessments can be made. Both official histories and numerous individual accounts are being published, and as time goes on further documentary sources will become available. Eventually historians will establish an approximation to the truth. They will always be confronted, however, with two difficulties.

First, they cannot recapture the atmosphere of the time or evaluate the pressures bearing at any given moment on the principal actors. It is here that the accounts of individual participants may help, because each makes some contribution to the ultimate truth and paints in a fresh piece of the canvas of human action.

Secondly, there cannot be a totally objective observer, or even historian. Each is bound to see things through his own national spectacles. Each is unconsciously governed by historical modes of thought and the judgment of each is to some extent swayed by considerations of national interest. For this reason, even though they may come very close to accuracy on the main facts, they will find it exceedingly difficult to weigh the great strategic controversies and arrive at definite judgments on the merits of the views so strongly expressed by the leading figures. Furthermore, they and their readers alike now see the results that flowed from the decisions actually reached; what might have happened if other decisions had been taken can only be the subject of conjecture.

The difficulty can be illustrated by reference to one of the great controversies which arose after the successful breakout from the Normandy beachhead. After a crushing defeat, the Germans were in full retreat, pursued by the Allied armies. Up to this moment General Montgomery had been exercising command of the British and American armies. Now he was relieved of this responsibility, which was assumed by General Eisenhower. Montgomery held the view that the war could be brought to a rapid conclusion if one strong thrust were made by a single Army

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Group, all other forces being halted so that the logistical resources could be concentrated to maintain the momentum of the thrust. General Eisenhower, on the other hand, decided that the advance should continue on a wide front until all the armies had closed up to the Rhine, after which a powerful attack would be made across the river to isolate the Ruhr and drive on into the heart of Germany. The British Chiefs of Staff supported Montgomery. The American Chiefs of Staff thought that the question should be decided by General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander, and they were not prepared to interfere with his conduct of the battle.

The controversy was naturally vigorous and prolonged. I say naturally because great interests were at stake and powerful men held deep and sincere convictions which they were bound to express. What happened is there for us all to study. What we can never know is whether any other course of action would have produced better results. Each one of us must draw his own conclusions, and these will inevitably be influenced by personal and national considerations. Most of the principal actors have recorded their opinions. Although, as in all human affairs, personal relationships to some extent colored their judgments at the time, their main motive was quite simply the desire to bring about victory as quickly as possible. They certainly thought that their own views were soundly based and it is no discredit to them that they criticize the perspicacity and skill of the colleagues with whom they shared the responsibility and with whom they disagreed.

III

To understand the individual accounts that are appearing, one needs a clear grasp of the status and responsibilities of the various authorities, civil and military, who participated in the conduct of the war. Who were these authorities and how did they interact? Let us look first at the national arrangements in the United Kingdom.

There were three principal British authorities. In the first place there was the Cabinet, answerable to Parliament and to public opinion. The essence of the British political system is that the Cabinet is collectively responsible for all the deeds of the Government. It holds power for as long as it can retain the support of the majority in Parliament. In the Second World War the Cabinet possessed two characteristics not normally present in peacetime. From May 1940 onwards it contained members drawn from

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all parties in Parliament, and was therefore unlikely to fall unless the great body of public opinion turned against it. Then, it had at its head Mr. Churchill, who not only was Prime Minister but was also Minister of Defense. By virtue of this combination of offices Churchill was in a position to ensure unified control over the whole war effort, to inject political policy into the field of military operations and to interpret military strategy to the Cabinet. As time went on and confidence developed, the Cabinet increasingly devolved their collective responsibility for the conduct of the war to Churchill, who dealt personally and directly with the Cabinet's military advisers.

These military advisers were the three professional heads of the Navy, the Army and the Air Force. Together they constituted the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Not only did they have a collective responsibility for strategic advice to the Cabinet, but they also had the responsibility for carrying out the strategy which they had recommended, once it had been approved by the Cabinet or by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, acting for the Cabinet. The Chiefs of Staff Committee had come into existence after the experience of the First World War had shown the fatal results that flowed from diverse and sometimes irresponsible advice reaching the Cabinet from uncoördinated sources. When the Second World War broke out it had been in existence long enough to have "run itself in" as a piece of machinery, and was in a position to create and execute a military policy with an efficiency unknown in our previous history.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee had the duty to survey the whole scene of military activity, and, subject to the supreme civil authority of the Cabinet, to issue instructions to the commanders of all three services in all parts of the world. From this it follows that the responsibility of the commander in a particular theater of war lay in planning and conducting operations so as to give effect to the directives received from the Chiefs of Staff, using to the best of his ability the resources allotted to him. The degree of control exercised by the Chiefs of Staff over a commander-in-chief might vary according to circumstances. There might be occasions when this control would be more rigorous than usual because the Chiefs of Staff would have to insist on a given line of action based on their wide view of the whole military situation and their knowledge of the state of the national war effort, or in order to secure compliance with conditions imposed on political

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grounds by the Cabinet. In general, however, the aim of the Chiefs of Staff would be to give the commander-in-chief in the field freedom of action, and to refrain from back-seat driving.

It can be seen that things have greatly changed since the days of Napoleon, or, to take a British example, from the days of the great Duke of Marlborough. Then the commander-in-chief would visit the capital during the winter lull in operations and take an active part in framing political policy. He would then return to conduct the summer campaign, and would himself carry on political and military negotiations with allies. Since Napoleon was omnipotent, after he had decided upon political policy and resolved on military action he would himself take the field and conduct the campaign. Today the three levels of responsibility are clearly defined. The Government takes care of all political action; the Chiefs of Staff formulate grand strategy; and the commanders in the field conduct the operations in their respective theaters.

Since the arrangements in the United States were very similar to those in the United Kingdom it was comparatively easy to set up Allied machinery to conduct the war. We also had the advantage of a common language. But just as apparently identical words often had quite dissimilar shades of meaning, so although the American governmental organization and distribution of authority appeared to be the same as ours it had many subtle differences. These worked at times to make the solution of awkward problems between the two Allies more difficult.

The same three tiers of authority existed in the United States. The prime civil authority lay with the President. In some respects his position was more clearly defined than that of the Prime Minister. He had more complete executive responsibility and he was Commander-in-Chief of the American forces. He was also Head of State. But he had a far less organized and coördinated governmental machine through which to operate. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff corresponded almost exactly to the British Chiefs of Staff, and the two groups came together naturally and easily to form the Combined Chiefs of Staff. At the third level were the commanders in the field.

In the British view, the American authorities—including even the President—appeared to regard the war much more than we did as a purely military affair. Obviously the first aim in wartime is military victory. Indeed, Mr. Churchill, speaking to the House of Commons in May 1940, said: "You ask what is our aim? I can

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answer in one word: Victory." Nevertheless, once it can be seen that victory is assured, political considerations must come increasingly to the fore. What finally matters then is that the outcome of the military operations shall have created a much more favorable political situation than that which existed when the war began. It seemed to us that the United States authorities were slow to realize this. Consequently we felt that the President was inclined to leave too much freedom of action to his Chiefs of Staff and did not inject into their thinking the vital political considerations which would so deeply affect the postwar situation. Similarly, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff gave great freedom of action to their theater commanders and were disinclined to impose conditions to govern their strategy. Right up to the end of the war they considered that purely military considerations must prevail, and that the judge of these must be the Commander-in-Chief. The immense and increasing military power developed by the United States produced a feeling of self-sufficiency and led to some disregard of the political necessities of the European situation. On occasion they produced those feelings of exasperation that now become so evident in the postwar accounts being published by British writers. Conversely, the views expressed by American military writers show their natural impatience with allies who, they felt, were introducing ideas the validity of which they did not appreciate and which merely tended to hamper the progress of the great tide of American military might.

These difficulties should not be exaggerated. There were irritations and arguments; there were misunderstandings and personal antagonisms. Nevertheless the simple combination of President and Prime Minister, with the Combined Chiefs of Staff guiding and sustaining largely integrated field commands, produced by far the most successful warfare-by-coalition known to history. Never have two such powerful nations combined in an alliance with such a degree of harmony and with such absolute success.

Apart from the benefits of an easy dovetailing of the two sets of organs of authority, other advantages were secured to the Allies by the nature of the two principals—the President and the Prime Minister. Both were determined to work hand-in-glove, and as time went on they developed a close friendship. Both saw clearly that the close combination of the powers of the English-speaking world was of an importance that over-rode all other

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considerations. Thus, although divergences of policy arose in relation to France and to China, and although their methods of handling Stalin gradually evolved on different lines, the structure of collaboration that these two men built did not break fundamentally. They were men who knew the value of loyalty and who put their trust in the military leaders they had chosen. Except for the replacement of Admiral Pound, who died in harness as First Sea Lord, the Combined Chiefs of Staff remained to the end as composed in January 1942.

It is evident that the President and the Prime Minister, starting with dominant constitutional positions and building up equally dominant personal positions, could have executed their power almost as they wished. They could, for example, have determined military as well as political policy by themselves issuing instructions to commanders in the field. They might have gone in the direction taken by Hitler, who assumed complete control of strategy, and in the end of tactics too. It was often suspected in England that Churchill, who had fought as a soldier in several campaigns in his youth, was bent on setting himself up as the supreme military authority. However, neither he nor the President did anything so foolish. Jointly they gave political guidance, where necessary, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff; they saw to it that the military strategy proposed was on a scale, and to a timetable, that they could approve; and they determined that it was likely to secure the results that would not only be militarily advantageous but would further the political interests of the alliance. It was the Combined Chiefs of Staff who drew up the military strategy and plans, who allocated the resources and who instructed the field commanders.

It is fair to say that the Prime Minister seemed to take more hand in discussions with the British Chiefs of Staff in the formulation of military policy than the President did on his side. Roosevelt seemed more inclined to leave things in the hands of General Marshall. If this was so, it came partly from the different temperaments of the two men and from the disparity in the total resources that each could muster for the war. Up till 1944 this disparity did not effectively exist; but at that point the American potential was increasing by leaps and bounds whereas the British potential was stationary or declining. Churchill had to look more closely at the use which the military leaders proposed for the limited national resources. The important point, however, is that

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neither the President nor the Prime Minister ever over-rode his military advisers except for political reasons.

Another aspect of control that assumed increasing importance as the war came to a climax, and as the forces deployed in the various theaters of wars became increasingly powerful, was the degree of authority to be granted to a Supreme Commander. On this point there was some difference of opinion between the Americans and the British. The British held that the Chiefs of Staff, in close touch with their governments, must retain strategic control over all theaters, particularly as the approaching end of the war made political considerations of growing importance. The Americans preferred to give the Supreme Commander a broad directive and then leave him free to decide all points as they arose, military considerations being dominant. A good proportion of the disunity that prevailed from time to time stemmed from this divergence of outlook. On the landing in the South of France, on the organization of the command of land forces under Eisenhower, on the direction of the final advance and the liberation of Prague and Berlin—on all these points the British Chiefs of Staff, backed by the Prime Minister on occasion, sought to convince the U.S. Chiefs of Staff of the rightness of their view and to get them to join in instructing the Supreme Commander accordingly. In every case the U.S. Chiefs of Staff sought the opinion of the Supreme Commander, and then took the line that they saw no reason to question his right to decide the matter. They declined to exercise a close supervision over his military policy, nor were they pressed to do so by the President. Roosevelt's powers were failing as his end drew near, but in any case he preferred to be guided by General Marshall. It is a matter of opinion whether different decisions would have brought about a more favorable political situation in postwar Europe. The study of the art of control in war will dwell for long on these matters. We can at least be thankful that the divergences were no greater than they were, and that they were outweighed by the over-all harmony of the alliance.

One wonders how the strong-minded men who led the Allied forces in the war were able to bear the strain not merely of responsibility and hard work, but of interference, prodding, criticism and complaint coming from their political masters. How, in turn, could the politicians cope with the frustrations of ill-success and the heavy casualties in operations which they found difficult

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to understand and whose limiting factors they often could not appreciate? In the First World War the relations between the politicians and the soldiers were marked by ill-will and intrigue. Was it the same this time? Generally speaking, it was not, and the main reason for this was that as a result of the lessons of the past the correct functions of the civil and military authorities had been defined and machinery had been built up through which each could exert its proper force without disruption. One sees in Lord Alanbrooke's book how severe the strain became and how at times fatigue and exasperation grew to be almost more than he could bear. The dynamic concentration of his great master, who could never relax and who exerted constant pressure on every point, coming on top of his endless daily burden of work, was at once an inspiration and a penance. We must make allowances for the fact that we are reading a diary in which the impressions are immediate and not always balanced. Even so, one feels the atmosphere which always pervades the conduct of great affairs.

The fact is that powerful forces generate heat as well as motion, and only those men who can pursue their course without being bent and charred by the heat survive in their high positions. Nearly every great commander in history has been driven to the limit by the importunity of his government at home, and often by its lack of understanding and support. This is one of the hazards of high command. Fortunate were those commanders who served men who, while driving them hard, gave them consistently loyal support and encouragement.

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WHERE IS THE MIDDLE EAST?

By Roderic H. Davison

INTERNATIONAL crisis is one of the best teachers of geography. Among the centers of crisis that have burst onto the American public's map in recent years are Suez, Cyprus, Baghdad, Algeria, the Lebanon and others commonly lumped together today under the general label "Middle East." In the context of the cold war, the Middle East has rapidly emerged as a primary center of concern for American foreign policy.

Yet the fact remains that no one knows where the Middle East is, although many claim to know. Scholars and governments have produced reasoned definitions that are in hopeless disagreement. There is no accepted formula, and serious efforts to define the area vary by as much as three to four thousand miles east and west. There is not even an accepted core for the Middle East. Involved in the terminological chaos is of course the corollary question of how the Middle East relates to the Near East—or, indeed, whether the Near East still exists at all.

What might be simply a comedy of semantic confusion is rendered more serious because popular use of the neologism Middle East has obliged scholars and specialists to employ it also, to their disadvantage. The United States Government as well has now begun to use the term officially, but in varying senses that add to the general obfuscation.

In 1957 a national policy, the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine, was established to provide for American military and economic aid to nations in "the general area of the Middle East," to use the language of the Congressional resolution. Committees of the House and Senate naturally asked Secretary of State Dulles to define the region where the United States was prepared to act. Mr. Dulles furnished a reasonably exact definition of the Middle East: "the area lying between and including Libya on the west and Pakistan on the east and Turkey on the north and the Arabian peninsula to the south," plus the Sudan and Ethiopia. He added that Middle East and Near East were now, in his view, identical. With this understanding, the resolution passed both houses.

A year later came the Lebanese crisis, the July 14 revolution in Iraq, and the dispatch of American and British troops to the Lebanon and Jordan. President Eisenhower addressed a special session of the United Nations General Assembly on August 13, 1958. Throughout his speech he mentioned the Near East frequently, but not the Middle East. Reporters queried the State Department to find out exactly what area his proposal applied to. They were told by the Department that Near East and Middle East were interchangeable terms to designate an area comprising Egypt, Syria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms.[1] This differed widely from the Secretary's own definiton of the year before by cutting out over two-thirds of *his* Middle East.

[1] *The New York Times,* August 14, 1958. Probably the Yemen was inadvertently omitted from this list, and possibly the Sudan.

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Up to this point the State Department knew no Middle East at all in its own organization. It had only an Office of Near Eastern Affairs—whose bailiwick, characteristically, coincided neither with President Eisenhower's Near East nor with Secretary Dulles' Middle East. Then, at the end of 1958, the Middle East crept into the Department's table of organization through the Office of Research. A newly created Aegean and Middle East Division in that office was to cover Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Since Greece surely, and Turkey probably, must be counted as Aegean states, only four are left to make up the Middle East. No Arab state is included.

Actually the confusion in nomenclature originated in the Great Power politics of the first part of this century. If there is a villain in the piece, it is the British Government. Captain Mahan, the American naval officer, and Valentine Chirol, foreign editor of *The Times* of London, are unwitting accessories before the fact. But fundamentally the power and parochial outlook of the western nations are responsible. All civilizations, east and west, have stuck convenient labels on distant lands, and the west has not been alone in this practice. To the Turks, for instance, all Western Europe was for centuries simply *Frengistan,* "the land of the Franks," and even today Morocco is for Arabs the "far west," *al-maghreb al-aksa.* But it has been western, not eastern, terminology that has girdled the globe, along with the spread of western civilization and political influence.

II

The ancient Greeks used to divide the world into the cultured south and the barbarian north. It was with Rome that the concept of an East-West division began. Later, with the age of exploration, it became common to designate China, Japan and Malaysia as Far or Farther East. This distinction persisted until the end of the nineteenth century. Seen from Europe, there were the East and the Far East. For Europe, the East began where the Ottoman Empire began. Metternich is supposed to have said that "Asia begins on the Landstrasse." But in the early nineteenth century most Europeans agreed with Kinglake who, reporting on his travels of 1834, found that the East began at Belgrade, where he crossed from Hapsburg into Ottoman domains. His delightful account, "Eöthen, or Traces of Travel Brought Home from the East," discoursed on the Balkans, Syria, Palestine and Egypt, which Kinglake saw no reason to chop off from the eastern continuum with a label of Near or Middle East. Similarly, the "Eastern Question" came to denote the contest of European Powers for influence in Ottoman lands.

In the 1890s came the first shift in terms. The label Near East elbowed its way into popular usage as a by-product of the great decade of European imperialism. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 produced an unstable situation that led to competiton among the Great Powers for spheres of influence in China. At the same time the Armenian massacres coupled with Cretan and Macedonian troubles brought new crises involving the fate of the Ottoman Empire. Europe awoke to the fact that there were now two Eastern questions, Far and Near. By 1896 the term Near East had become current. Old hands grumbled somewhat at the new label, but it stuck, sometimes rendered as Nearer East.

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An epoch-making geography, "The Nearer East," published in 1902 by D. G. Hogarth, an English archaeologist and traveler who knew the region from the inside, helped both to fix the term and define its limits. "The Nearer East," said Hogarth somewhat ruefully, "is a term of current fashion for a region which our grandfathers were content to call simply the East." "Few probably could say offhand where should be the limits and why," he continued, but then intrepidly proceeded to set bounds. His Near East included Albania, Montenegro, southern Serbia and Bulgaria, Greece, Egypt, all the Ottoman lands of Asia with the entire Arabian peninsula, and two-thirds of Iran, up to its "waist," a stretch of sterile desert and mountain between the Caspian and the Indian Ocean. Not everyone agreed with these exact limits for the Near East, but with its approximate scope there was little quarrel.

In the same year in which Hogarth put the stamp of geographical approval on the new Near East, Middle East was also born. This was the creation of the American naval officer, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan had made his reputation with the publication in 1890 of "The Influence of Sea Power upon History." Soon he was sought out by magazine editors for articles on naval affairs and world strategy. Russian expansion, the partition of China, and the German penetration of Turkey, as well as the American conquest of the Philippines, turned Mahan's attention to Asia. Among his articles on Asia was a piece on "The Persian Gulf and International Relations" which appeared in the September 1902 issue of the *National Review* of London. Here Mahan considered the Anglo-Russian contest along with the new element of the projected German Berlin-to-Baghdad railway with its probable terminus on the Persian Gulf. Envisioning the desirability of Anglo-German coöperation to keep the Russians out, he affirmed the need for Britain to maintain a strong naval position, with bases, in the Persian Gulf region. "The Middle East, if I may adopt a term which I have not seen, will some day need its Malta, as well as its Gibraltar. . . . The British Navy should have the facility to concentrate in force, if occasion arises, about Aden, India and the Gulf." And so the term Middle East saw the light of day just over a half-century ago. But Captain Mahan drew no exact bounds. For him the Middle East was an indeterminate area guarding a part of the sea route from Suez to Singapore. *The Times* was furnished by the *National Review* with advance proofs of Mahan's article, and found it worthy of long extracts, but neither quoted nor commented upon the new term.

Within two months, however, on October 14, 1902, *The Times* carried the first of a series of articles from its special correspondent, this one datelined Tehran under the heading "The Middle Eastern Question." Nineteen more lengthy dispatches followed, each under the same headline. The unnamed correspondent was Valentine Chirol, already known as a writer on the East, with one book on Greeks and Turks and a second on "The Far Eastern Question." Chirol had read his Mahan in the *National Review*, and had seized on Middle East as the title for his own forthcoming reports from the lands of the western and northern approaches to India. The rapid advance in Asia of the Russians alarmed Chirol. "To them," he wrote in his first article, "Tehran is merely one link in a long chain which stretches from Constantinople to Peking, and the pressure they apply in Persia is perhaps not

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infrequently meant to be felt as much in the Far East or in the Near East as in what Captain Mahan has aptly christened the Middle East." Chirol's use of the term made it familiar to a wide public.

Mahan's essentially naval concept of the Middle East was expanded by Chirol to embrace a wider area. Chirol included the approaches to India, land and sea: Persia, the Gulf, Iraq, the eastern coasts of Arabia, Afghanistan and Tibet. This was made plainer when the articles, slightly revised, appeared in book form as "The Middle Eastern Question, or Some Political Problems of Indian Defence." Mahan was again acknowledged as author of the term, which Chirol now defined as "those regions of Asia which extend to the borders of India or command the approaches to India, and which are consequently bound up with the problems of Indian political as well as military defence. The Middle Eastern Question is itself only a part of a much larger question upon which the future of Asia depends. . . . It is the outcome of that constant projection of European forces—moral, commercial, and miltary—into Asia which is slowly but steadily transforming all the conditions that enabled us to achieve, and so far to retain as masters of India, a position of unparalleled ascendancy in the Asiatic continent." Near East, Middle East, Far East were all projections of European—particularly British—thinking. The old Eastern Question, as Chirol pointed out, had been extended by recent events across all Asia. One segment had been chopped off for the Far East, another for the Near East. Now he chopped off the Middle East as a separate unit. On the day when Chirol's concluding article was published, *The Times,* editorially, used Middle East without embarrassment to indicate India and its approaches.

Middle East became fixed in the English lexicon on the Mahan-Chirol pattern. The Near East centered on Turkey, the Middle East on India, the Far East on China. The whole East, like all Gaul, was divided into three parts.

III

After World War I things began to change. The Balkan Wars of 1912–13 had already driven the Turks from all but a corner of their European territories. By 1918 their control over the Arab lands was also gone. France became the mandatory for Syria and the Lebanon, Britain for Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq. In British thinking these chunks of territory tended to become assimilated to the approaches to India. Middle East then began to edge over into Near East. On March 1, 1921, Winston Churchill gave official sanction to the Middle Eastern aggression against the Near East. As Secretary of State for Colonies, he set up in the Colonial Office a Middle Eastern Department to supervise Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq. He was not without learned support from the Royal Geographical Society, which the Society was later to regret. Its Permanent Commission on Geographical Names had resolved the year before that henceforth the Near East should denote only the Balkans; the lands from the Bosphorus to the eastern frontiers of India would be named Middle East. In this fashion the Middle East burst onto the Mediterranean coast.

Thus suddenly to try to thrust the Near East out of Asia introduced a confusion heretofore unknown. The new and broader Middle East concept

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was far from winning general approval in Britain, much less in America. The Near East College Association, Near East Relief and the Near East Foundation pursued their work in former Ottoman lands of Asia with no change of name. Americans generally adhered to the Near East of Hogarth, the Middle East of Chirol. Of another British-created Middle East nothing, happily, was heard in America, and little in Britain itself. This was the Royal Air Force's Middle East, composed of Egypt, the Sudan and Kenya. The Middle East crept into Africa noiselessly.

Thus matters stood when in the spring of 1939 it became apparent that Europe was reaching a new crisis. British preparations included, in the eastern Mediterranean, a strengthening of position which was shortly to have an irreversible effect on terminology. The decision had already been made in 1938 that, in case of war, the Middle East Air Command should have control not only over its African hub but also over Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, Aden and Malta, heretofore independent commands. The British army followed suit in 1939 by consolidating the separate commands of Egypt, the Sudan and Palestine-Transjordan, and by adding Cyprus, Iraq, Aden, British Somaliland and the Persian Gulf. Presently General Wavell was sent to Cairo as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East.

For the first year of war the 1939 version of Middle East meant little to the public. But after the collapse of France and Italy's entry into the conflict in June 1940, the Middle East Command became extremely important. Its Mediterranean fronts were crucial in 1941 and 1942. German troops reinforced the Italians operating from Tripoli and Cyrenaica against Egypt; German conquest poured down through the Balkans into Greece and Crete; further German armies threatened to over-run the Russians and come down through the Caucasus; and Vichy French forces in Syria and an anti-British revolt in Iraq gave added hope to the Nazis. The Middle East Command was now stretched to the utmost in dealing with Ethiopia and the Somalilands and Eritrea, Libya, Greece and Crete, Iraq and Iran. Inevitably the fluctuating area involved in fighting under the Middle East Command was referred to, both popularly and officially, as the Middle East. No definite bounds were ever set to the term, and the territories with which the Command was officially charged varied from time to time. Iran was added in 1942; Eritrea was dropped in September 1941 and welcomed back again five months later. The British created also a Middle East Supply Center and the post of Minister of State in the Middle East, both based on Cairo. The areas over which the Center and the Minister had authority were not quite coterminous, nor yet duplicates of the Middle East Command area, and they fluctuated also; but in general they stretched from Malta to Iran and from Syria to Ethiopia.

Like the Mahan-Chirol Middle East of 40 years before, the Middle East of World War II was a strategic concept imposed from without by British interests. The center had shifted from India to Cairo, but the rationale was similar. As in Mahan's concept, so in the 1940s the fringe was fuzzy, the boundaries undelimitable. Various attempts were made to prove that the undefinable Middle East of World War II was a unit. The major contemporary historian of the area during the war finds a "geopolitical unity" based on

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Islam, on traditional European imperialist interests and on the annihilation by plane and motorcar of the Syrian desert barrier between "Near" and "Middle" East.[2] The historian of the Supply Center finds "geographical unity" in an area which depends upon trade through the eastern Mediterranean and Red Seas.[3] But all such justifications break down on examination, and what remains is that the Middle East was "the area included in the army and air commands," as the official British history by I. S. O. Playfair acknowledges.

Churchill, by now Prime Minister, used Middle East accordingly, that is to say in a very loose sense. He was willing to envision Turkey, neutral so far, as coming into the Middle East. He was even prepared to see the Middle East jump into Europe—as he contemplated the "possibility of centre of gravity in Middle East shifting suddenly from Egypt to the Balkans, and from Cairo to Constantinople." He was willing to see Iraq drop out of the Middle East. Sometimes he lapsed into earlier usage and referred to the Arab area as Near East.[4]

In fact Churchill, despite his earlier complicity in moving the Middle East westward, seems to have had qualms all along. "I had always felt," he wrote after the war, "that the name 'Middle East' for Egypt, the Levant, Syria, and Turkey was ill-chosen. This was the Near East. Persia and Iraq were the Middle East; India, Burma and Malaya the East; and China and Japan the Far East."[5] Even this considered statement exhibited confusion. The Levant was nothing if not Syria, yet he distinguished the two; and the East had commonly been divided into three parts rather than Churchill's four. But his instinct was, in 1942 as well as later, officially to reëstablish the Near East in at least a part of its old domain. On August 6, in the face of great difficulties in the North African fighting, Churchill proposed to reorganize the Middle East Command by dividing it. Egypt, Palestine and Syria would become the Near East Command based on Cairo; Persia and Iraq would become the new Middle East Command based on Basra or Baghdad. He pressed the point with the War Cabinet until they agreed to the division, but not to the change in name. To avoid confusion, they insisted that the Middle East Command should remain in Cairo, while Iraq-Persia would simply be detached from it.

Possibly Churchill was impelled to this unsuccessful attempt at correcting area labels by questioning in Parliament, which had begun in the previous year. The first to express doubts was Sir Francis Fremantle, who seized an occasion after General Wavell had been shifted from the Middle East Command in Cairo to India, and General Auchinleck brought from India to Cairo. On July 10, 1941, Sir Francis asked the Prime Minister "whether he will now revert to the previous official description of the Middle East and Near East as corresponding to those countries of which Generals Wavell and Auchinleck are respectively in military command and so avert the present

[2] George Kirk, "The Middle East in the War," in "Survey of International Affairs, 1939–1946," v. 2. London: Oxford, 1952, p. v.

[3] Guy Hunter, "Economic Problems: The Middle East Supply Centre," *ibid.*, p. 169.

[4] *Cf.* Winston S. Churchill, "Their Finest Hour" (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), p. 546 and 173–174; and "The Grand Alliance" (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), p. 350.

[5] Winston S. Churchill, "The Hinge of Fate." Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950, p. 460.

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confusion of terms?" The Government's reply was delivered by Clement Attlee, Lord Privy Seal, in the following colloquy:

"Mr. Attlee: This was considered: but the title of Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, is now so well established that any change now might lead to confusion. For some months at least many people would adhere to the old forms. Documents would lose their continuity. Mistakes costing lives might be made. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister is of opinion that it is better to go on as we are.

"Sir F. Fremantle: Is this not an affront to the English language, of which the Prime Minister is a master, in that the dictionary says that 'middle' is that which is equidistant from extremities? What is the extremity on this side from which the Middle East is equidistant?

"Mr. Glenvil Hall: What is the extreme of silliness in questions?"[6]

Evidently Churchill had reversed his views by the summer of 1942, but was unable to convince the War Cabinet. So Cairo remained the center of the Middle East as far as Cabinet and Parliament were concerned until after V-J Day, when members returned to the charge.

The Royal Geographical Society showed less restraint. Blitz and blackout had curtailed but not arrested its program. On May 10, 1943, members listened, evidently with approval, to the veteran diplomat Sir Percy Loraine on "Perspectives of the Near East." Introducing his subject, Sir Percy said: "The term 'Near East' . . . appears to have become almost completely obsolete, but when I was an appreciably younger man there used to be a Near East and a Middle East. Now apparently there is only a Middle East; and the title I chose for my lecture can be taken therefore as to some extent a mild protest against the process of unnecessary assimilation."[7]

Sir Percy found his first ally in this campaign in Colonel Lawrence Martin, chief of the Division of Maps in the Library of Congress, who loosed a public blast against "The Miscalled Middle East." His definitions of Near East and Middle East agreed almost exactly with those Sir Percy had given.[8] "Thoughtful persons," said Martin, adhered to his definition of Near East. The trouble was of course that during the war there were far more fighting persons and political persons than there were "thoughtful persons." American officials from the President on down had succumbed to the British wartime usage of Middle East. By June of 1944 the president of the Royal Geographical Society, Sir George Clerk, also was urging its members to stick to the Loraine-Martin prescription. But it was in vain. The neo-Middle East survived intact to the end of the war.

IV

After the war was won and Attlee had replaced Churchill as Prime Minister, members of the House of Commons resurrected the earlier line of questioning. On April 16, 1946, "Major Symonds asked the Prime Minister whether it is the intention to continue to use the term 'Middle East' to cover those geographical areas which, in the past, have been referred to as

[6] *Parliamentary Debates,* House of Commons, v. 373, columns 308–309.
[7] *Geographical Journal,* London, July 1943, p. 6.
[8] *Geographical Review,* New York, April 1944, p. 335.

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'Near East' and 'Middle East'." To this Mr. Attlee replied: "It has become the accepted practice to use the term 'Middle East' to cover the Arab world and certain neighbouring countries. The practice seems to me convenient and I see no reason to change it." Though this imprecision satisfied Mr. Attlee, Mr. Keeling, another member, continued by asking, "If Egypt is to be called the 'Middle East,' where is the 'Near East' now?" "It all depends where you are in the world," was the Prime Minister's answer.[9]

Mr. Keeling was a vice-president of the Royal Geographical Society, and in this capacity also he later approached Mr. Attlee about "those Arab countries generally grouped under the misleading term 'Middle East.' " Mr. Attlee remained firm, though he now provided a different definition for his Middle East—"at least the area of Egypt, Palestine, Cyrenaica, Syria and Lebanon, Transjordan, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula as well as, in most cases, Persia and Turkey."[10] Although this definition of Middle East was unsatisfactory to the Society, it evidently gave up the struggle for principle.

Members of Parliament were slower in accepting the inevitable, and even managed to trap the Government into acknowledging that it was impossible to do what Mr. Attlee had just done twice—to define the Middle East. On May 19, 1947, "Brigadier Low asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs which countries are included in the term 'Middle East' and which in the term 'Near East.'

"Mr. Mayhew [Under-Secretary]: There appears to be no agreed definition of these vague geographical terms.

"Brigadier Low: Since the hon. Gentleman and his right hon. Friends use these terms is it not a fact that they must know what they mean?

"Mr. Mayhew: Where precision would be required, we should not use these terms."[11]

In 1951 the Government was better prepared. On July 25 in the House of Commons "Surgeon Lieut.-Commander Bennett asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what countries are included in the term, the 'Near East,' as used in official terminology.

"Mr. Ernest Davies [Under-Secretary]: The term 'Near East,' which was connected with the Ottoman Empire, is outmoded in this country and 'Middle East' has superseded it for official purposes. The countries included in the term 'Middle East' are Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, Persia, Syria, the Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the Trucial Sheikhdoms, Kuweit, Bahrein, Qatar, Muscat, the Aden Protectorate and the Yemen."[12]

The last parliamentary attempt to save the Near East occurred on June 30, 1952, in the following exchange between two members and Mr. Anthony Nutting, Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:

"Mr. Cocks: What countries now remain in the Near East?

"Mr. Nutting: The term 'Near East' is now outmoded.

"Mr. Nicholson: Does the Government share the view that the East begins at Dover?"[13]

[9] *Parliamentary Debates,* House of Commons, v. 421, columns 2519–2520.
[10] *Geographical Journal,* March–April 1946, p. 85–86.
[11] *Parliamentary Debates,* House of Commons, v. 437, column 1996.
[12] *Ibid.,* v. 491, columns 448–449.
[13] *Ibid.,* v. 503, columns 28–29.

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The Government refused to be needled into logical argument by the unreconstructed Near Easterners. Commons thereafter subsided.

Meanwhile the United Nations had become involved in the semantic struggle, but on a different plane. Unhampered by tradition, the new international organization assumed that the Near East was dead and that the problem was simply to delimit Middle East. In the spring of 1948 the question became actual when a suggestion originally made by Dr. Charles Malik of the Lebanon, to create an Economic Commission for the Middle East, was officially sponsored by Egypt. An ad hoc committee to study this question appointed a subcommittee to define the area. From its labors there finally emerged a list of member states considered to be in the Middle East: Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia and Greece. This was the broadest Middle East yet to be officially invented, straddling three continents. It stretched along the southern border of the Soviet bloc from the Albanian to the Chinese frontier.

In the postwar years the result of all this discussion was an unquiet confusion, an agreement to disagree. The British Government continued to regard the Near East as dead. Western Europeans began grudgingly to use the term Middle East, grumbling that it was an Anglo-Saxon invention. In the United Nations, Middle East was the usual term. Statesmen from the eastern Mediterranean countries also found themselves using it, often against their better judgment, for it carried the implication that they were no longer in the Near East, close to the West, but thrust back into Asia in contradiction to their historic connections with Europe and in violation of their cultural and political interests. The United States Government still officially knew no Middle East.

But the American press was never able to cut loose from the British wartime usage of Middle East. Specialists on the area tried to sweep back the tide, on the ground of geographical reason and historical logic, but to no avail. Most forthright were the cartographers. The "Atlas of Islamic History" showed the modern Near East as extending from Egypt's western border to Iran's eastern border, and the Middle East from Afghanistan's western border to Burma's eastern border.[14] The National Geographic Society in 1952 and again in 1956 issued bulletins defining the traditional three Easts as the proper norms. But not even the cartographers could raise the dead. So far as the American public, at least, was concerned, the quiet funeral of the Near East may be said to have occurred at the time of the Israeli invasion of Egypt. *The New York Times* put the obituary simply: "Middle East is now (as of Nov. 1, 1956) used in preference to Near East to conform to the change in general usage."[15] The new Middle East was here to stay, but Mahan and Chirol would not have known their child.

V

It remained then for specialists who accepted the new Middle East with good or ill grace to try to define the area. They have produced definitions in profusion. Some apply spatial terms to a chronological sequence, making

[14] Harry W. Hazard, ed., 3rd ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954, p. 34, 35, 41.
[15] *The New York Times Index*, 1956, p. 751.

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Middle East roughly the equivalent of the former Near East in area, but its successor in time, with the demise of the Ottoman Empire as the dividing line. Some equate Middle East to the Arab world—"the Arabic-speaking Near East," as an American professor in Beirut put it. Others spread the Middle East over a large portion of the Islamic world of some 370,000,000 people, including Morocco on the west and East Pakistan, India and Russian Turkestan on the east, as does the Middle East Institute of Washington. The American Friends of the Middle East have recognized that the Middle East may be "more a psychological than a geographical area." In the words of their executive vice-president, "the Middle East can be defined as comprising those countries between the Pillars of Hercules and the Straits of Macassar in which, if an injustice is perpetrated in one, a protest will be raised in the the others—plus Israel." Psychological overtones appear also in the recent definition of the unifying principle of the Middle East—a principle so elastic as to apply potentially to half the globe—by a prominent sociologist: "The people of the area are today unified not by their common solutions but by their common problems: how to modernize traditional lifeways that no longer 'work' to their own satisfaction." Anthropologists define the Middle East as a culture area extending from Morocco and Timbuktu to Russian Turkestan and West Pakistan.

It looks as if the search for a single criterion of unity, or even a set of criteria, is bound to fail when applied to so heterogeneous an area. For as the term Middle East has developed in history to its present condition, the unifying principle has always been the political and strategic interest of outside powers, especially of Britain. An approach to a new strategic concept of the Middle East in American terms has been made by a professor who puts one foot of his Middle East in Europe: "For the United States, the Middle East ranges from Athens to Tehran and from Ankara to Cairo." But this is unlikely to satisfy other specialists. Recently the geographer of the State Department has concluded that the Middle East cannot be defined.[16]

Given the hopeless disunity among specialists and governments as to where the Middle East is, how can the term be intelligently employed? For it is obvious that the neologism will be with us for some time, and if Near East is no longer accepted, Middle East is the only currently available replacement. Three possibilities exist. One is to recognize the Middle East as shapeless—a territorially indefinable state of mind, like the Middle West in the United States. A second possibility is to admit frankly that there is no particular Middle East, but that there are as many Middle Easts as there are problems touching this fuzzy region in any way. In this case Middle East must on each occasion be redefined. But such agreement on either vagueness or multiplicity is unlikely to clear up the confusion. The most logical possibility for intelligent use of the term is therefore the third—an agreement on arbitrary limits. There is no common denominator to recent definitions of the Middle East; some of them fail to coincide in any portion whatsoever. Nevertheless, a survey of such definitions reveals the most common core to be

[16] G. Etzel Pearcy, "The Middle East—An Indefinable Region," *Department of State Bulletin,* March 23, 1959, p. 407–416; reprinted as Department of State Publication No. 6806, Near East and Middle Eastern Series 39.

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Turkey, Iran, Israel, Egypt and the Arab states of Asia. Desirable as such arbitrary agreement might be, it seems unlikely of achievement, for logical objections would demand the inclusion of Afghanistan with Iran, the Sudan with Egypt, Greek Thrace with Turkish Thrace, and so ad infinitum.

The general public can probably struggle along with an imprecise Middle East, provided the imprecision is clearly understood. But can the United States Government? We are now committed by the Eisenhower Doctrine to economic and military aid to nations "in the general area of the Middle East." In view of the three totally different Middle Easts outlined by the State Department in the last two years, and the official geographer's inability to delimit the region, where are we prepared to act? It may be argued in reply that vagueness has a certain advantage in foreign policy. This was Secretary Dulles' first reaction when Congressional committees asked him to define the area. Mr. Dulles felt that drawing a defense perimeter might be an invitation to the Soviet Union to take anything outside that line. Intentional vagueness sometimes has advantage as a tent-like cover for unformulated possibilities of future action or inaction. Furthermore, it may be argued, as in a recent incisive study of American policy in this area, that "the important thing is what we do about the Middle East, not how we define it."[17]

Yet this obvious truth makes it no less important to know where the United States is prepared to do something, and presumably to let other governments know. More often than vagueness, precision is the essential element in diplomacy. Later on in his testimony Secretary Dulles recognized this, when he indicated that he was willing to list by name those countries to which the Eisenhower Doctrine would apply. Senator Morse raised the crucial question as to whether, if Bulgaria went Titoist and were attacked by the U.S.S.R., the Eisenhower Doctrine would apply to Bulgaria. "That is not in the area of the Middle East," said Secretary Dulles.[18] But of course by some definitions Bulgaria is in the Middle East, and Morse went on to point out that this sort of problem was implicit if an amorphous and non-technical regional term were officially used.

In the last analysis, then, a term of convenience like Middle East may on occasion become a term of great inconvenience. Not only is the term amorphous, but it seems to imply gratuitously that the Mediterranean lands have no close relationships with the United States and the West generally, but are Asian in outlook. The only solution, then, to the dilemma of how to use the term officially would be a pledge of total abstinence. Five years ago the government of India decided to give up Middle East as meaningless in relation to its own position. And in that lucid moment in 1947 the British Government's reply to a questioner in Commons had been that, "Where precision would be required, we should not use these terms." Can the State Department, the White House, and Washington generally be induced to take the pledge?

[17] John C. Campbell, "Defense of the Middle East." New York: Harper, 1958, p. x.

[18] *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations . . . on S. J. Resolution 19,* 85th Congress, 1st Session, p. 275, 278.

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PEKING ON COEXISTENCE

AMONG the factors cited to explain Premier Khrushchev's resumption of an uncompromising "Stalinist" line has been the strong opposition voiced from Peking to any efforts to relax world tensions which might diminish the revolutionary fervor of the Communist peoples. An extreme example of this attitude was furnished by an article in the April 15 issue of *Red Flag*, the organ of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The article, written by the journal's Editorial Department, and presumably approved by the Control Secretariat of the Party, is entitled "Long Live Leninism!" It goes beyond usual official pronouncements from Peking in assailing not merely "opportunists" and "revisionists" like Tito but by implication elements in the Soviet Union and in Communist circles elsewhere who favor coexistence and even coöperation with "capitalist imperialism" in a manner which endangers "the emancipation of the proletariat." This emancipation, it is emphasized, "can come about only by the road of revolution and certainly not by the road of reformism."

The article asks: "What kind of 'coöperation' is meant? Is it 'coöperation' of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie to protect capitalism? Is it 'coöperation' of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples with imperialists to protect colonialism? Is it 'coöperation' of socialist countries with capitalist countries to protect the imperialist system in its oppression of the peoples in those countries and suppression of national liberation wars?"

"The modern revisionists," continues the article, "proceeding from their assured dictum on the current world situation and from their assured dictum that 'the Marxist-Leninist theory of class analysis and class struggle is obsolete,' attempt to overthrow totally the fundamental theories of Marxism-Leninism on a series of questions like violence, war, peaceful coexistence, etc. There are also some people who are not revisionists but well-intentioned persons who sincerely want to be Marxists, but are confused in the face of certain new historical phenomena and thus have some incorrect ideas. For example, some of them say that the failure of the U.S. imperialists' policy of atomic blackmail marks the end of violence. While thoroughly refuting the absurdities of the modern revisionists, we should also help these well-intentioned people to correct their erroneous ideas."

These and various other passages in the article seem to attack "revisionists" and "confused" Marxists only for faults of a purely theoretical nature. But in the Communist world differences on ideological matters often indicate sharp differences on current policies, indeed are sometimes voiced as the most serious way of rebuking associates for critical errors in behavior and policy or of laying the foundation for charges of "heresy."

Following the introductory passages from which the above quotations are taken, the article continues:

"In the initial period of the October Revolution, all the imperialist powers resorted to the war form of violence against the Soviet Union, which was a continuation of their policies; in World War II, the German imperialists used the war form of violence on a large scale to attack the Soviet Union, which was a continuation of their policy. But, on the other hand, the imperialists have also established diplomatic relations of peaceful coexistence with the

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Soviet Union in different periods, which is also, of course, a continuation of imperialist policy in another form under certain conditions.

"True, some new questions have now arisen concerning peaceful coexistence. Confronted with the powerful Soviet Union and the powerful socialist camp, the imperialists must, at any rate, carefully consider whether they would not hasten their own extinction, as Hitler did, or bring about the most serious consequences for the capitalist system itself, if they should attack the Soviet Union, and/or attack the socialist countries.

" 'Peaceful coexistence' is a new concept which arose only after socialist countries appeared in the world following the October Revolution. It is a new concept formed under circumstances Lenin had predicted before the October Revolution, when he said: 'Socialism cannot achieve victory simultaneously in all countries. It will achieve victory first in one or several countries, while the others will remain bourgeois or pre-bourgeois for some time.'[1] The concept is one advanced by Lenin after the great Soviet people overcame the armed imperialist intervention. As was pointed out above, at the outset the imperialists were not willing to coexist peacefully with the Soviet Union. The imperialists were compelled to 'coexist' with the Soviet Union only after the war of intervention against the Soviet Union had failed, after there had been several years of actual trial of strength, after the Soviet State had planted its feet firmly on the ground, and after a certain equilibrium of power had taken shape between the Soviet state and the imperialist countries. . . ."

The following paragraph suggests that coexistence is good so long as Communism is increasing its strength relative to the "imperialist system."

"So long as there is a continuous development of these mighty forces [in the socialist countries of Asia and Africa, etc.] it is possible to maintain the situation of peaceful coexistence, or even to obtain some sort of official agreement on peaceful coexistence or to conclude an agreement on prohibition of atomic and nuclear weapons. That would be a fine thing in full accord with the aspirations of the peoples of the world. However, under these circumstances, as long as the imperialist system still exists, the most acute form of violence—namely, war—has by no means ended in the world. The fact is not as depicted by the Jugoslav revisionists, who say Lenin's definition that 'war is a continuation of politics,' which he repeatedly elucidated and persisted in while combating opportunism, is obsolete."[2]

There follows the thought that wars will recur until imperialism disappears.

"We believe in the absolute correctness of Lenin's thinking: War is an inevitable outcome of exploiting systems, and the source of modern wars is the imperialist system. Until the imperialist system and the exploiting classes come to an end, wars of one kind or another will always appear. They may be wars among the imperialists for redivision of the world, or wars of aggression and anti-aggression between the imperialists and the oppressed nations, or civil wars of revolution and counter-revolution between the exploited and exploiting classes in the imperialist countries, or, of course, wars in which the imperialists attack the socialist countries and the socialist countries are forced to defend themselves.

[1] Lenin, "War, Program of the Proletarian Revolution," in "Selected Works," Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, v. I, part 2, p. 571.

[2] See "Active Coexistence and Socialism," *Narodna Armija,* Belgrade, Nov. 28, 1958.

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"All types of war represent the continuation of the policies of definite classes. Marxism-Leninism must not sink into the mire of bourgeois pacifism, and can only appraise all these kinds of wars and thus draw conclusions for proletarian policy by adopting the method of concrete class analysis. . . .

"To attain their aim of plunder and oppression, the imperialists always have two tactics: the tactic of war and the tactic of 'peace.' Therefore, the proletariat and the people of all countries must also use two tactics to counter the imperialists: the tactic of thoroughly exposing the imperialists' peace fraud and striving energetically for a genuine world peace, and the tactic of preparing for a just war to end the unjust war when and if the imperialists should unleash it. . . .

"The Jugoslav revisionists deny the inherent class nature of violence and thereby obliterate the fundamental difference between revolutionary violence and counter-revolutionary violence; they deny that imperialist war is a continuation of imperialist policy, deny the danger of the imperialists' unleashing another big war, deny that it will be possible to do away with war only after doing away with the exploiting classes, and even shamelessly call the U.S. imperialist chieftain Eisenhower 'the man who laid the cornerstone for eliminating the cold war and establishing lasting peace with peaceful competition between different political systems.'[3]

"Modern revisionists seek to confuse the peaceful foreign policy of the socialist countries with the domestic policies of the proletariat in the capitalist countries. They thus hold that peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems means that capitalism can peacefully grow into socialism, that the proletariat in countries ruled by the bourgeoisie can renounce class struggle and can have 'peaceful coöperation' with the bourgeoisie and the imperialists, and that the proletariat and all the exploited classes should forget the fact that they are living in a class society, and so on. All these views are also diametrically opposed to Marxism-Leninism. They are put forward in an attempt to protect imperialist rule and keep the proletariat and all the rest of the working people perpetually in capitalist enslavement."

The article now lays stress on the fact that peaceful coexistence between nations should not extend to peaceful coexistence of classes within nations.

"Peaceful coexistence between nations and people's revolutions in various countries are by nature two different things, not the same thing; two different concepts, not one; two different kinds of questions, not the same kind of question. Peaceful coexistence refers to relations between different nations; revolution means the overthrow of the oppressors as a class by the oppressed people within a country, while in the case of the colonial and semi-colonial countries, it is, first and foremost, a question of the overthrow of alien oppressors—namely, the imperialists. . . .

"Let us, in the light of bloody facts, both of the historical past and of the modern capitalist world, examine all this nonsense about the 'peaceful growth of capitalism into socialism' put out by the old revisionists and their modern counterparts. Does it follow, then, that we Marxist-Leninists will refuse to adopt the principle of peaceful transition even when there exists the possibility of such peaceful development? No, decidedly not!

[3] "Eisenhower Arrives in Rome," *Borba*, Belgrade, Dec. 4, 1959.

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"It would be in the best interests of the people if the proletariat could attain power and carry out the transition to socialism by peaceful means. It would be wrong to ignore such a possibility when it appears. Whenever the opportunity for the 'peaceful development of the revolution' presents itself Communists must seize it, as Lenin did, so as to realize the aim of the socialist revolution. The opportunity as such, however, is always, in Lenin's words, 'an extraordinarily rare opportunity in the history of revolutions.' When in a given country a certain local political power is already surrounded by revolutionary forces or when in the world a certain capitalist country is already surrounded by socialism, there might be a greater possibility for the peaceful development of the revolution. But even then, the peaceful development of the revolution should never be regarded as the only possibility and it is therefore necessary to be prepared at the same time for the other possibility; *i.e.* non-peaceful development of the revolution. . . ."

The authors now assert that a peaceful transition is unlikely at present.

"At a time when the imperialist countries and the imperialists are armed to the teeth as never before in order to protect their savage man-eating system, can it be said that the imperialists have become very 'peaceable' towards the proletariat and the people at home and the oppressed nations abroad, as the modern revisionists suggest, and that, therefore, the 'extraordinarily rare opportunity in the history of revolutions' which Lenin spoke about after the February revolution will become a normal state of affairs confronted by the world proletariat and all the oppressed people, and so that what Lenin referred to as a 'rare opportunity' can be picked up anywhere by the proletariat in the capitalist countries? We hold that these views are groundless. . . .

"The question is not whether the proletariat is willing to carry out a peaceful transformation; it is rather whether the bourgeoisie will accept such a peaceful transformation. This is the only possible way in which followers of Lenin can consider this question.

"So, contrary to the modern revisionists who seek to benumb the revolutionary will of the people by empty talk about peaceful transition, Marxist-Leninists hold that the question of the possibility of peaceful transition to socialism can be raised only in the light of the specific conditions in each country at a particular time. The proletariat must never allow itself to one-sidedly and groundlessly base its thinking, policy, and its whole work on the calculation that the bourgeoisie is willing to accept peaceful transformation. It must, at the same time, make two preparations: one for the peaceful development of the revolution and the other for the non-peaceful development of the revolution. Whether the transition will be carried out through armed uprising or by peaceful means is a question that differs categorically from that of peaceful coexistence between the socialist and capitalist countries; it is an internal affair of each country, one to be determined only by the relative strength of the classes in that country in a given period; a matter to be decided only by the Communists themselves of that country. . . .

"What is opportunism? According to Lenin, 'Opportunism consists in sacrificing fundamental interests in order to gain temporary, partial benefits.'[4] And

[4] Lenin, "Speech at Conference of Activists of the Moscow Party Organization," in "Collected Works," 4th Russian edition, v. 31, p. 412.

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what does the fall in the revolutionary level mean? It means that the opportunists seek to lead the masses to interest themselves only in their day-to-day, temporary and local interests, with no thought for their long-term, fundamental and over-all interests. . . .

"Lowering revolutionary standards means lowering the theoretical standards of Marxism-Leninism. It means lowering political struggles to the level of economic ones and reducing revolutionary struggles to within the limits of parliamentary struggles. It means bargaining [away] principles to achieve temporary benefits. At the beginning of the 20th century Lenin in 'What Is To Be Done?' drew attention to the question that 'the spread of Marxism was accompanied by a certain lowering of theoretical standards.' Lenin cited Marx's opinion contained in a letter on 'The Gotha Program' that we may enter into agreements to attain the practical aims of the movement, but we must never bargain over principles and make 'concessions' in theory. . . .

"The modern revisionists and certain representatives of the bourgeoisie try to make people believe that it is possible to achieve socialism without a revolutionary party of the proletariat and without the series of correct policies of the revolutionary party of the proletariat mentioned above. This is sheer nonsense and pure deception. The 'Communist Manifesto' by Marx and Engels pointed out that there were different kinds of 'socialism': there was 'petty-bourgeois socialism,' 'bourgeois socialism,' 'feudal socialism,' and so forth. Now, as a result of the victory of Marxism-Leninism and the decay of the capitalist system, more and more of the mass of the people in various countries are aspiring to socialism and more so-called socialism of different shades has emerged from among the exploiting classes in certain countries."

The article then upbraids persons (Khrushchev presumably included) who have minimized the importance of ideological considerations.

"In regard to the question of safeguarding world peace at the present time there are also certain people who declare that ideological disputes are no longer necessary, or that there is no longer any difference in principle between Communists and social democrats. This is tantamount to lowering the ideological and political standards of Communists to those of the bourgeoisie and social democrats. Those who make such statements have been influenced by modern revisionism and have departed from the positions of Marxism-Leninism.

"The struggle for peace and the struggle for socialism are two different kinds of struggle. It is a mistake not to draw a proper distinction between these two kinds of struggle. The social composition of those taking part in the peace movement is, of course, very complex; it also includes bourgeois pacifists. We Communists stand right in the forefront in defending world peace, right in the forefront in opposing imperialist wars, in advocating peaceful coexistence, and opposing nuclear weapons.

"In this movement we shall stand together with many complex social groups and make necessary agreements for the attainment of peace. But at the same time we must uphold the principles of the working class party and not lower our political and ideological standards and reduce ourselves to the level of the bourgeois pacifists in our struggle for peace. It is here that the question of alliance and criticism arises.

" 'Peace' in the mouths of modern revisionists is intended to whitewash the

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war preparations of the imperialists, to play again the old tune of 'ultra-imperialism' of the old opportunists, which was long since refuted by Lenin, and to distort our Communist policy concerning peaceful coexistence between countries of two different systems into elimination of the people's revolution in various countries. . . .

"The declaration of the Moscow meeting of the Communist and workers parties, November 1957, pointed out that 'the main danger at present is revisionism, or, in other words, right-wing opportunism.' Some say that this judgment of the Moscow meeting no longer holds good under today's condition. We believe this statement to be wrong. It makes the people overlook the importance of the struggle against the main danger—revisionism—and is very harmful to the revolutionary cause of the proletariat. Just as from the beginning of the 70s of the nineteenth century there was a period of 'peaceful' development of capitalism during which the old revisionism of Bernstein was born, so under the present circumstances when the imperialists are compelled to accept peaceful coexistence and when there is a kind of 'domestic peace' in many capitalist countries, revisionist trends find it easy to grow and spread. Therefore, we must always maintain a high degree of vigilance against this main danger in the worker's movement.

"As pupils of Lenin and Leninists we must utterly smash all attempts of the modern revisionists to distort and carve up the teachings of Lenin. . . .

"When a socialist country, in the face of imperialist aggression, is compelled to launch counter-attacks in a defensive war, and goes beyond its own border to pursue and eliminate its enemies from abroad, as the Soviet Union did in the war against Hitler, is this justified? Certainly it is completely justified, absolutely necessary and entirely just. In accordance with the strict principles of Communists, such operations by the socialist countries must be strictly limited to the time when the imperialists launch a war of aggression against them. Socialist countries never permit themselves to send, never should, and never will send their troops across their borders unless they are subjected to aggressive attack from a foreign enemy. Since the armed forces of the socialist countries fight for justice, when these forces have to go beyond their borders to counter-attack a foreign enemy, it is only natural that they should exert an influence and have an effect wherever they go; but even then, the occurrence of people's revolutions and the establishment of the socialist system in those places and countries where they go will still depend on the will of the masses of the people there. . . ."

This last paragraph, indicating that wherever Communist armies go they will establish Communist régimes, recalls that, in the course of the Soviet-Jugoslav polemics in 1948, Stalin expressed regret that the Red Armies had not been able at the close of the Second World War to help the Communist Parties in France and Italy to set up "People's Democracies" in those two countries. The elastic interpretation given by the Chinese Communists to the term "aggression" is also interesting in connection with Mr. Khrushchev's subsequent statement in Paris that the flight of the U.S. spy plane over Soviet territory constituted aggression and would justify the Soviet Union in attacking and destroying the bases from which such flights originated.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political, Military and Legal

FULL CIRCLE: THE MEMOIRS OF ANTHONY EDEN. Boston: Houghton, 1960, 676 p. $6.95.

While this is the first volume of Sir Anthony's memoirs it covers his career only from 1951 to 1957, as Foreign Secretary and then Prime Minister. In consequence it is a somewhat somber and unhappy, but none the less very important narrative, climaxed, as it is, by the disastrous Suez episode. Although it is naturally a personal justification of Sir Anthony's position on such issues as E.D.C., the war in Indo-China and the treatment of Nasser, it contains a great deal of valuable information for the historian. But above all it reveals most poignantly the differences in approach and style that British and American diplomacy display—at times with very unfortunate consequences. While one need not accept the wisdom of all Sir Anthony's decisions, he makes it quite clear that the United States can on occasion be a very confusing and exasperating ally.

FROM EMPIRE TO NATION. By RUPERT EMERSON. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, 466 p. $7.75.

Having "thrown my scruples to the winds and joined in a search for uniformities on the grand scale," Professor Emerson here undertakes the enormous task of a general interpretation of the rise of nationalism and self-assertion among the Asian and African peoples. The organization is thematic rather than regional and includes such topics as the relation between democracy and the new nationalism, and the application of the principles of self-determination.

THE POLITICS OF THE DEVELOPING AREAS. EDITED BY GABRIEL A. ALMOND AND JAMES S. COLEMAN. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960, 591 p. $10.00.

This collaborative study in comparative politics includes sections on Southeast Asia by Lucian W. Pye, South Asia by Myron Weiner, Sub-Saharan Africa by James S. Coleman, the Near East by Dankwart A. Rustow and Latin America by George I. Blanksten. The volume is introduced by a theoretical section—"A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," by Gabriel A. Almond.

THE END OF EMPIRE. By JOHN STRACHEY. New York: Random House, 1960, 351 p. $5.00.

In this interesting and well-written study, Mr. Strachey examines the course of imperialism, the various theories in explanation of it, the likely shape of events and the role the Commonwealth may play as a form of bridge connecting the developed and underdeveloped areas of the world.

AN APPROACH TO SANITY. By FIELD-MARSHAL THE VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1960, 94 p. $2.75.

Essays and articles on East-West relations in which the Field Marshal presents

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his points crisply enough, but in such a way that the reader must either take them or leave them alone.

DIE WELT ZWISCHEN KRIEG UND FRIEDEN. By Peter Dürrenmatt. Berne: Hallwag, 1959, 246 p. Swiss Fr. 13.50.

A Swiss radio commentator's observations and judgments on the state of the world since 1945.

NATO IN THE 1960'S. By Alastair Buchan. New York: Praeger (for the Institute for Strategic Studies, London), 1960, 131 p. $3.00.

An effort to analyze the various dangers and problems that will confront NATO over the next decade and to suggest ways of meeting them. The author's recommendation is in the direction of a deterrent system under the control of NATO itself.

NUCLEAR POLICY FOR WAR AND PEACE. By Thomas E. Murray. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1960, 241 p. $4.00.

A former member of the Atomic Energy Commission presents his troubled reflections on American nuclear policy: the problem of security and secrecy, the question of disarmament and testing, and the very difficult task of keeping democratic control over these tremendous new forces.

FALLOUT: A STUDY OF SUPERBOMBS, STRONTIUM 90 AND SURVIVAL. Edited by John M. Fowler. New York: Basic Books, 1960, 235 p. $5.50.

A symposium on nuclear weapons, fallout, radioactive effects, shelters and the question of nuclear testing.

THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY. By F. A. Hayek. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960, 569 p. $7.50.

Professor Hayek, who defines himself as "an unrepentant Old Whig," here develops and expands on themes appearing in his earlier "The Road to Serfdom": the premises of freedom, the institutions necessary to secure individual liberty and a critique of the welfare state.

THE FUTURE AS HISTORY. By Robert L. Heilbroner. New York: Harper, 1960, 217 p. $4.00.

Mr. Heilbroner scrutinizes the numerous "revolutions" of our century—economic, scientific, cultural as well as political—and attempts to ascertain the drift of the future. Well written and stimulating in its insights, it leaves little room for any relaxed optimism about the shape of things to come.

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1959. By Richard P. Stebbins. New York: Harper (for Council on Foreign Relations), 1960, 464 p. $6.00.

The latest volume in the Council's authoritative series presents a concise record and interpretation of the international activities of the United States during the calendar year 1959. While emphasizing the development of East-West relations, the narrative also devotes considerable attention to events in Africa, the Caribbean and other non-Communist areas, as well as to new trends in American military and economic policy. Can be heartily recommended both for ready reference and for consecutive reading.

THE END OF IDEOLOGY. By Daniel Bell. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1960, 416 p. $7.50.

In this collection of essays, Mr. Bell, a sociologist who has a remarkable talent for writing, sure-footedly and informingly, on a wide range of topics, is chiefly concerned with social changes in the United States of the 1950s, but he also has some

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perceptive things to say on Soviet studies and Marxist thought.

POLITICAL REALISM AND THE CRISIS OF WORLD POLITICS. By Kenneth W. Thompson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960, 261 p. $5.00.

A perceptive and thoughtful study of the currents of "political realism" in recent thinking on American foreign policy, as represented by such men as Hans J. Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, the late Nicholas Spykman and George Kennan.

ISSUES OF FREEDOM. By Herbert J. Muller. New York: Harper, 1960, 170 p. $3.50.

A lucid essay on the meanings of freedom and its role in culture and society.

INTELLIGENCE AND DEMOCRATIC ACTION. By Frank H. Knight. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, 177 p. $3.75.

In these lectures Professor Knight discusses the problems confronting a free society and the way the critical intelligence can be applied to them in the search for their solution.

CONTEMPORARY THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. Edited by Stanley Hoffmann. Englewood Cliffs (N. J.): Prentice-Hall, 1960, 293 p. $4.95.

Selected readings on the study of international relations, with a critical obbligato by the editor.

REINHOLD NIEBUHR ON POLITICS. Edited by Harry R. Davis and Robert C. Good. New York: Scribner, 1960, 364 p. $6.50.

A large selection of Niebuhr's political writings, organized topically by the editors.

OUR TIMES: THE BEST FROM THE REPORTER. Edited by Max Ascoli. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1960, 502 p. $6.50.

The 1950s, as reflected in some 30-odd articles and pieces from *The Reporter*.

FOR WANT OF A NAIL. By Hugh R. Wilson, Jr. New York: Vantage Press, 1960, 96 p. $2.75.

This brief book contains a series of letters from the late Hugh R. Wilson, then Minister to Switzerland, to Cordell Hull, in connection with the Ethiopian crisis in the League of Nations.

MEINE DANZIGER MISSION: 1937–1939. By Carl J. Burckhardt. Munich: Callwey, 1960, 366 p. DM. 24.

Dr. Burckhardt, a distinguished historian and last League of Nations Commissioner in Danzig, here combines his talents and experiences to give a valuable account of his diplomatic experiences on the eve of the Second World War.

ROOSEVELT'S ROAD TO RUSSIA. By George N. Crocker. Chicago: Regnery, 1959, 312 p. $5.00.

A blisteringly critical but generally familiar review of F.D.R.'s wartime foreign policy.

A HISTORY OF MILITARISM. By Alfred Vagts. New York: Meridian, 1959, 542 p. $7.50.

This is a revised edition of an important study which first appeared in 1937.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN CONTEMPORARY WAR. By Major General G. I. Pokrovsky. New York: Praeger, 1959, 180 p. $4.00.

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A translation of three pieces published in Russia in 1956 and 1957, dealing with the influence of science and technology on war and warfare. The author, a physicist, has been an officer in the engineering technical services of the Soviet Army.

STATE IMMUNITIES AND TRADING ACTIVITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Sompong Sucharitkul. New York: Praeger, 1960, 390 p. $10.00.

A study of the problems relating to a trading state's immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign domestic courts.

BOOKS ON COMMUNISM. Edited by R. N. Carew Hunt. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960, 333 p. $2.70. (London: Ampersand, 1959, 15/.)

A useful annotated bibliography of books in English on Communism and the Communist world.

A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY: ASIA, AFRICA, EASTERN EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA. New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1960, 534 p. $4.75.

An exceptionally well annotated listing of books and journals in Western languages, chiefly English.

MEZHDUNARODNYI POLITIKO-EKONOMICHESKII EZHEGODNIK, 1959. Edited by N. N. Inozemtsev. Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Institut Mirovoi Ekonomiki i Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii, 1959, 751 p. Rubles 18.

The latest volume of a Soviet yearbook on world affairs; the first appeared in 1958.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NATIONAL SECURITY. By James R. Schlesinger. New York: Praeger, 1960, 292 p. $5.00.

This extended discussion of economic aspects of the present international conflict between the Communist and non-Communist parts of the world includes chapters on economic growth, economic mobilization and planning, the role of international trade and the prospects for the underdeveloped areas. The author is associate professor of economics at the University of Virginia.

EKONOMICHESKOE POLOZHENIE STRAN AZII I AFRIKI V 1957 G. I V PERVOI POLOVINE 1958 G. Edited by B. M. Dantsig and B. I. Potapovskii. Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Institut Vostokovedeniia, 1959, 295 p. Rubles 14.

A review of basic trends in industry, agriculture, foreign trade and finance in 14 Afro-Asian countries. Extensive factual data based on U.N., Western and national sources is given, but it is monotonously interpreted according to the Soviet formula —dealings with the West hold up economic development, while aid and trade with the U.S.S.R. result in progress.

KRIZIS SOVREMENNOI BURZHUAZNOI POLITICHESKOI EKONOMII. By I. G. Bliumin. Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Institut Mirovoi Ekonomiki i Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii, 1959, 563 p. Rubles 15.45.

A critical Soviet survey of recent developments in Western economic theory and analysis.

THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET AND ITS MEANING TO THE UNITED STATES. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959, 152 p. $4.75.

A brief discussion of the European Common Market and a statement on American

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policy, prepared by the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development.

GEGEN DIE BRANDUNG. By Wilhelm Röpke. Erlenbach-Zurich: Rentsch, 1959, 418 p. Swiss Fr. 18.50.

A *Festschrift* in the form of a selection of Röpke's shorter writings over the last 40 years.

A HUMANE ECONOMY. By Wilhelm Röpke. Chicago: Regnery (with the assistance of the Institute for Philosophical and Historical Studies), 1960, 312 p. $5.00.

This study of the social framework of the free market economy is a translation of the author's "Jenseits von Angebot und Nachfrage," noted here April 1960.

EDUCATING YOUNG NATIONS. By W. E. F. Ward. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960, 194 p. $2.70. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1959, 15/.)

A concise introduction to some of the educational problems of colonial and newly independent countries. The author, former educational adviser to the British Colonial Office, has had much practical experience in the field.

WORLD AFFAIRS AND THE COLLEGE CURRICULUM. By Richard N. Swift. Washington: American Council on Education, 1959, 194 p. $3.50.

An appraisal of the place of world affairs in the undergraduate curricula of American colleges and its relation to other subjects of instruction.

MAN'S GREAT FUTURE. Edited by Erwin D. Canham. New York: Longmans, 1959, 192 p. $4.00.

Articles about the human race's splendid future, if it survives to enjoy it.

The Second World War

MÉMOIRES. I: ALGER, TUNIS, ROME. By Marshal Juin. Paris: Fayard, 1959, 399 p. Fr. 1200.

This first volume of Marshal Juin's memoirs covers his activities in North Africa and Italy, from the landing in 1942 to the capture of Rome in the summer of 1944.

STALINGRAD: POINT OF RETURN. By Ronald Seth. New York: Coward-McCann, 1959, 254 p. $4.50.

An account of the great battle, based in part on the author's visit to Stalingrad and use of the archives of the Defense Museum in that city.

THE MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST. VOLUME III (SEPTEMBER 1941 TO SEPTEMBER 1942): BRITISH FORTUNES REACH THEIR LOWEST EBB. By Major-General I. S. O. Playfair and Others. London: H.M.S.O., 1960, 482 p. 50/. (New York: British Information Services, $9.29.)

This volume in the official British war history deals chiefly with the military misfortunes in North Africa before the turning point of El Alamein.

TIME RUNS OUT IN CBI. By Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1960, 428 p. $6.75.

This volume in the official U. S. Army history of World War II concerns the Army's mission in China-Burma-India between Stilwell's recall in October 1944 and V.J. Day.

THE VICTORY CAMPAIGN. By Colonel C. P. Stacey. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1960, 770 p. $4.00.

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This third and final volume in the official Canadian war history is devoted largely to the role of the Canadian Army in Western Europe from D-Day to the end of the war.

L'ITALIA E LA SECONDA GUERRA MONDIALE. By Emilio Faldella. Bologna: Cappelli, 1959, 808 p. L. 3000.

An effort to write a general history and interpretation of Italy's role and fortunes in the Second World War.

The United States

THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD ARENA. By W. W. Rostow. New York: Harper, 1960, 568 p. $8.75.

This massive book—part of the American Project conducted at the Center for International Studies at M.I.T.—undertakes a wide-ranging review of the development of American society, the interplay between this society and the rest of the world, especially in the last 20 years, the prospects and problems for the future, and the tasks before American society. There are very few topics Mr. Rostow is not willing to take on, but the book for all its length remains an essay.

THE ECONOMICS OF FREEDOM. By Massimo Salvadori. Garden City: Doubleday, 1959, 242 p. $4.50.

Mr. Salvadori, a professor of European history, comes to the defense—though not uncritically—of the American capitalist system and the promise it continues to hold for a free society.

THE SPLENDID MISERY. By Jack Bell. Garden City: Doubleday, 1960, 474 p. $4.95.

A rather freewheeling account, by a Washington reporter, of the American Presidency and of the Eisenhower incumbency.

PUTTING FIRST THINGS FIRST. By Adlai E. Stevenson. New York: Random House, 1960, 115 p. $3.00.

In these eight speeches and papers, all dating from 1959, Mr. Stevenson with his usual grace and perception touches on a variety of topics in domestic and foreign affairs. He presents, of course, "a Democratic view."

THE ENEMY WITHIN. By Robert F. Kennedy. New York: Harper, 1960, 338 p. $3.95.

The former chief counsel (1957–1959) to the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field tells of his experiences.

THE ANATOMY OF FREEDOM. By Harold R. Medina. New York: Holt, 1959, 178 p. $3.50.

Speeches and essays on a variety of legal, political and educational topics, by the former Circuit Judge of the Court of Appeals.

THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER. By Morris Janowitz. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1960, 464 p. $6.75.

An extensive political and sociological inquiry into the "professional life, organizational setting, and leadership" of the American military in the present century.

Western Europe

EUROPEAN ASSEMBLIES: THE EXPERIMENTAL PERIOD, 1949–1959. By Kenneth Lindsay. New York: Praeger, 1960, 267 p. $7.50.

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A report and papers on the development of international parliamentary assemblies in the years since the end of the Second World War.

LA NUOVA FRONTIERA. By Renato Giordano. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1959, 273 p. L. 1600.

An Italian supporter of European unity discusses the various internal and external cleavages that have divided Europe and the need to find a synthesis between the requirements of democracies and those of power.

THE MAN WHO IS FRANCE. By Stanley Clark. New York: Dodd, 1960, 240 p. $3.50.

A brief but informative appraisal of Charles de Gaulle's career thus far.

BRIAND. By Ernst Geigenmüller. Bonn: Athenaeum, 1959, 272 p. DM. 19.80.

A sympathetic biography by a German journalist who knew Briand in the years before and after the First World War.

L'EXPÉRIENCE MARXISTE EN FRANCE. By François Herbette. Paris: Médicis, 1959, 349 p. NF. 16.

Articles from the *Bulletin Quotidien* of the Société d'Études et d'Informations Économiques, during the period of the Popular Front.

SAARPOLITIK 1945–1957. By Robert H. Schmidt. Berlin: Duncker, 1959, 652 p. DM. 54.

This first volume of a three-volume series on the Saar since 1945 is devoted to its political structure: party organization, interest groups, lobbies and the press.

DIE SAAR ZWISCHEN DEUTSCHLAND UND FRANKREICH. By Per Fischer. Frankfurt/Main: Metzner, 1959, 308 p. DM. 19.50.

A well-documented history of the Saar as a problem in German-French relations between 1945 and 1959.

ZWISCHEN BONN UND LONDON. By H. G. Alexander. Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag, 1959, 308 p. DM. 14.80.

A German correspondent's essay on contemporary Anglo-German relations, stimulated chiefly by the arguments over the Heuss visit in 1958.

BONN AUF DER WAAGE. By Alfred Rapp. Stuttgart: Union Verlag, 1959, 278 p. DM. 12.80.

The Bonn correspondent of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* looks into the state of health of the Federal Republic to see if it shows signs of the afflictions which laid low the Weimar Republic at about the corresponding stage in its existence.

DIE KPD IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK. By Hans Kluth. Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1959, 154 p. DM. 9.50.

Contains useful information on the organization and activity of the Communist Party in West Germany between 1945 and 1956, the year it was outlawed.

WER GEWINNT DEUTSCHLAND? By Paul Wilhelm Wenger. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1959, 423 p. DM. 19.80.

The author, a believer in the need for "phantasie" in politics, seems to regard the Holy Roman Empire as the model for the future of Germany and Central Europe.

DIE DIKTATUR HITLERS BIS ZUM BEGINN DES ZWEITEN WELTKRIEGES. I. TEIL. By Walther Hofer. Konstanz: Athenaion, 1959, 135 p. DM. 14.40.

A concise account, part of the "Handbuch der Deutschen Geschichte" series.

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AUS EINEM DIPLOMATISCHEN WANDERLEBEN. By Friedrich Rosen. Wiesbaden: Limes, 1959, 441 p. DM. 28.

The third and fourth volumes of these posthumously published diplomatic memoirs (Rosen died in 1935) deal with German diplomacy in the First World War and the early years of the Weimar Republic.

DR. GOEBBELS, HIS LIFE AND DEATH. By Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960, 306 p. $4.50.

An industrious biography of Hitler's evil Minister of Propaganda; does not add greatly to our knowledge of the Nazi movement.

DER RICHTER IM DRITTEN REICH. By Hubert Schorn. Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1959, 742 p. DM. 50.

A rich documentary history of the vicissitudes of judges under the Third Reich.

DAS DRITTE REICH UND SEINE DENKER. By Léon Poliakov and Josef Wulf. Berlin: Arani, 1959, 560 p. DM. 39.50.

A large, though somewhat cumbersome collection of documentary materials relating to ideology and intellectual life in Germany under the National Socialists.

MY LIFE. By Grand Admiral Erich Raeder. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1960, 430 p. $6.00.

A translation of the German Admiral's autobiography (original German volumes noted here October 1957 and April 1958).

MY ROAD TO BERLIN. By Willy Brandt as told to Leo Lania. Garden City: Doubleday, 1960, 287 p. $4.50.

In this informal and interesting autobiographical account, the Mayor of Berlin tells of his earlier activities in the Socialist underground, his years in Norway and of the vicissitudes of Berlin in recent years.

AUSTRIAN CATHOLICS AND THE FIRST REPUBLIC. By Alfred Diamant. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960, 325 p. $6.50.

A close study of Austrian Catholic social ideas and movements in the years between 1918 and 1934, including more general observations on the Catholic critique of the modern state and the social question.

REPORT FROM PALERMO. By Danilo Dolci. New York: Orion, 1959, 310 p. $4.00.

A vivid and very depressing picture of Sicily presented in the form of a series of bleak personal narratives.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION. By Leonard Schapiro. New York: Random House, 1960, 631 p. $7.50.

This is a major contribution to Soviet studies. Making very extensive use of documentary sources and the rich but scattered literature on the subject, Mr. Schapiro traces, with skill and a clear eye, the history of this unique political movement, analyzes the leading themes in its evolution and describes its organization, composition and leadership in the successive phases of its career.

THE KREMLIN AND WORLD POLITICS. By Philip E. Mosely. New York: Vintage, 1960, 557 p. $1.65.

Students of Soviet policy, domestic as well as foreign, will welcome having so conveniently available these 25 selected studies from among the writings of a leading

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American scholar. The topics covered include the Soviet outlook on politics, the collapse of the wartime alliance, the cold war and post-Stalin developments. It is an indication of Mr. Mosely's perception and grasp of the subject that pieces ranging over the years from 1938 to the present are still germane, and still illuminating.

KREML OHNE STALIN. By Wolfgang Leonhard. Cologne: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1959, 646 p. DM. 21.80.

The author of the unusually interesting autobiography, "Child of the Revolution," (noted here July 1958) now turns to political analysis in this ambitious study of developments within the U.S.S.R. since Stalin's death. Based on an extensive use of the documentary evidence, it is centrally concerned with the struggle for power and Khrushchev's rise to the top. In general he finds the Party strong and the system modernized rather than liberalized.

TO MOSCOW—AND BEYOND. By Harrison E. Salisbury. New York: Harper, 1960, 301 p. $4.95.

Mr. Salisbury, a correspondent for *The New York Times,* reports on his trip to the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia in 1959, gives his version of trends in the Khrushchev era and makes a number of proposals concerning United States policy, chiefly with an eye to achieving mutual accommodation.

KHRUSHCHEV'S RUSSIA. By Edward Crankshaw. Baltimore: Penguin, 1960, 175 p. 85 cents.

A skillfully written interpretation of internal developments in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death. Some of Mr. Crankshaw's conclusions, however, are pretty speculative.

SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY 1924–1926. VOLUME II. By Edward Hallett Carr. New York: Macmillan, 1960, 493 p. $7.50.

In the sixth volume of this massive and major "History of Soviet Russia," Mr. Carr continues with his exploration of the years 1924–26. As the preceding volume dealt with economic developments in that period, so the present deals with domestic political and institutional affairs: the bitter struggle for power within the Party leadership and the maturing structure of the Soviet system of government.

FOR VICTORY IN PEACEFUL COMPETITION WITH CAPITALISM. By Nikita S. Khrushchev. New York: Dutton, 1960, 783 p. $3.95.

A translation of speeches and statements made by Mr. Khrushchev in 1958 in the field of international affairs. Quite revealing and often interesting despite their repetitiveness.

THE SOVIET DESIGN FOR A WORLD STATE. By Elliot R. Goodman. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960, 512 p. $6.75.

A substantial and scholarly study of Soviet purposes and goals with regard to the eventual international order. It is the author's well-documented conclusion that the achievement of a Communist world state is still on the agenda and still an operative concept.

L'U.R.S.S. 28 ANS APRÈS: 1931–1959. By Émile Servan-Schreiber. Paris: Plon, 1959, 182 p. NF. 6.90.

The author, a French editor, reflects on the changes he observes in the Soviet Union since his last visit in the early 1930s.

LA TRAGÉDIE DES JUIFS EN U.R.S.S. By Léon Leneman. Bruges: Desclée, 1959, 325 p.

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An extensive presentation of the difficulties and forms of discrimination which have been imposed on the Jewish population of the U.S.S.R.

CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES—III. Edited by Leo Gruliow. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960, 230 p. $6.00.

A translated documentary record of the Twenty-First Congress of the Soviet Communist Party.

KHRUSHCHEV AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SPEAK ON EDUCATION. By George S. Counts. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1959, 66 p. $2.50.

A translation, with comment, of the 1958 Soviet theses on educational reorganization.

BACK TO BOKHARA. By Fitzroy Maclean. New York: Harper, 1960, 156 p. $3.50.

Chiefly a lively account of the author's visit to Soviet Central Asia after an absence of 20 years.

THE TRIUMPH OF TYRANNY. By Stephen Borsody. New York: Macmillan, 1960, 285 p. $4.50.

This is a history of the vicissitudes of Central Europe since 1918 with principal emphasis on the successive Nazi and Soviet conquests of the area. Professor Borsody, long a resident of both Czechoslovakia and Hungary, has an excellent feel for the area and yet writes with sobriety and balance. His principal thesis is the need, thus far not realized, of a federalistic solution.

GOVERNMENT, LAW AND COURTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by Vladimir Gsovski and Kazimierz Grzybowski. New York: Praeger, 1960, 2 v. $30.00.

A massive comparative study, by many specialists, of law and government in the Soviet Union and the Communist states of Eastern Europe. The contents include articles on the origins and special features of these regions, the administration of justice, judicial procedure, and criminal, civil and labor law.

MANNERHEIM SUOMEN KOHTALOISSA. II OSA. SUOMEN MARSALKKA. By Erik Heinrichs. Helsinki: Otava, 1960, 487 p. Fmk. 1700.

The concluding volume of the best biography yet to appear on Mannerheim, written by his close military associate.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE BALTIC STATES, 1918–1940. By Albert N. Tarulis. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959, 276 p. $5.50.

A well-documented but pedestrian history of Soviet policy toward the Baltic States from the time of their establishment to their incorporation into the Soviet Union.

THE FORMATION OF THE BALTIC STATES. By Stanley W. Page. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959, 193 p. $4.50.

A brief history of the emergence of the Baltic States as independent nations at the end of the First World War. The author is more successful in dealing with international affairs than with the local background.

THE RELUCTANT SATELLITES. By Leslie B. Bain. New York: Macmillan, 1960, 233 p. $3.95.

Chiefly a journalist's first-hand account of the 1956 Hungarian revolt. Interesting as a direct reporter, and in some cases a corrector of erroneous information, he

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tends to flail about when generalizing on the meaning of the revolution, his appraisal of the participants and the role of American policy.

GRIVAS: PORTRAIT OF A TERRORIST. By Dudley Barker. New York: Harcourt, 1960, 202 p. $3.95.

A British journalist's brief and hardly flattering ("the most inept politician in Greece—perhaps in Europe") account of the leader of the E.O.K.A. in Cyprus.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE ESTABLISHMENT. Edited by Hugh Thomas. London: Blond, 1959, 208 p. 21/.

Six essays concerning, more or less, the Establishment: "the alliance of those institutions and social attitudes which defend each other against attacks and enable the ruling class to maintain itself regardless of its present abilities."

THE GLORIOUS FAULT. By Leonard Mosley. New York: Harcourt, 1960, 334 p. $5.95.

A lively biography that starts with the challenging proposition: "George Nathaniel, first and last Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, was almost certainly the most fascinating character of major importance to have figured in English politics since the days of Sir George Savile, first Marquess of Halifax (1633–1695)."

SIR NEVILE HENDERSON: BRITISCHER BOTSCHAFTER IN BERLIN VON 1937 BIS 1939. By Rudi Strauch. Bonn: Röhrscheid, 1959, 384 p. DM. 24.

A detailed diplomatic study of Sir Nevile Henderson's unfortunate role as British Ambassador to Germany.

LORD LOTHIAN (PHILIP KERR), 1882–1940. By J. R. M. Butler. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960, 384 p. $10.00.

Biographies of British public figures seem inevitably to start with chapters entitled Boyhood, Oxford, South Africa (or India). This conscientious life of Philip Kerr, eleventh Lord Lothian, is no exception to the tradition.

ESSAYS IN LABOUR HISTORY. Edited by Asa Briggs and John Saville. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960, 363 p. $10.00.

A volume of essays in memory of the late G. D. H. Cole.

THE CANADIAN ECONOMY: PROSPECT AND RETROSPECT. By Richard E. Caves and Richard H. Holton. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959, 676 p. $10.00.

A review of the pattern and temper of Canada's economic development and a lengthy forecast of the shape of things to come in 1970.

CANADA IN WORLD AFFAIRS: OCTOBER 1955 TO JUNE 1957. By James Eayrs. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs), 1960, 291 p. $4.50.

This is the ninth volume in the series reviewing Canada's role in international affairs and in the Commonwealth.

The Middle East

DEFENSE OF THE MIDDLE EAST: PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN POLICY. By John C. Campbell. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1960, 400 p. $5.00. (Paper; New York: Praeger, $1.75.)

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A revised version of a book first published in 1958 (noted here April 1958). Two new chapters cover the events of the last two years, and the remainder of the book has been partially rewritten. The conclusions on American policy are substantially unchanged.

THE CHANGING MIDDLE EAST. By Emil Lengyel. New York: Day, 1960, 376 p. $5.75.

Chiefly a survey of developments in the Middle East during the 1960s, quite extensive in scope but somewhat uneven and spotty in its treatment of the various countries of the area.

INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By Kurt Grunwald and Joachim O. Ronall. New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1960, 394 p. $7.00.

A discussion of the general problems of industrialization in the Middle East and a country-by-country description of industrial progress or lack of progress.

DAS NEUE MEKKA LIEGT AM NIL. By Adelbert Weinstein. Wiesbaden: Rheinische Verlags-Anstalt, 1958, 278 p. DM. 11.50.

A report on the Near East, of interest because of the author's ability (he is a former staff officer turned journalist) to get to the military in these lands.

TURKEY: AN ECONOMY IN TRANSITION. By Z. Y. Hershlag. The Hague: Van Keulen, 1959, 340 p.

This is a comprehensive study of the Turkish economy from independence through the mid-fifties by an Israeli economist. It draws a picture of the erratic evolution of Turkey's economic policies, illustrated and supported by much material that is not ordinarily available to the English-language reader. The single-minded emphasis on economic growth and the prominent role of the state under etatist and ostensibly non-etatist régimes emerges with clarity, although the work is as non-political as contemporary economic analysis can contrive to be.

NASSER'S NEW EGYPT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS. By Keith Wheelock. New York: Praeger, 1960, 326 p. $6.00.

An interesting and well-balanced analysis of Nasser's military régime. While the author received the Egyptian Government's coöperation in collecting materials for the study, it is by no means an uncritical appraisal.

THE SINAI CAMPAIGN OF 1956. By Edgar O'Ballance. New York: Praeger, 1960, 223 p. $5.00.

An account of the Israeli campaign in the Sinai, which the author finds somewhat less spectacular than it has often been depicted.

L'ÉTAT D'ISRAËL DANS LE MONDE. By Pierre Paraf. Paris: Payot, 1958, 229 p. Fr. 1200.

A brief survey of Israeli politics, economics and culture.

South and Southeast Asia

INDIA TODAY. By Frank Moraes. New York: Macmillan, 1960, 248 p. $4.00.

A leading Indian newspaperman and writer here looks, with an unusually critical but not hostile eye, at his own country, its social problems, political divisions and its certainly difficult future. A very thoughtful and sober appraisal.

INDIA 1947–50. Edited by S. L. Poplai. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Indian Council of World Affairs), 1960, 2 v. $13.25.

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A very useful selection of documents, the first volume dealing with domestic affairs, the second with foreign policy and Commonwealth relations.

THIMAYYA OF INDIA: A SOLDIER'S LIFE. By Humphrey Evans. New York: Harcourt, 1960, 307 p. $5.95.

A biography of the Chief of Staff of the Indian Army, and former chief of the U.N. truce team in the Korean War.

CEYLON GENERAL ELECTION 1956. By I. D. S. Weerawardana. Colombo: Gunasena, 1960, 262 p. Rs. 15.

A study of the election with much accompanying information on Ceylonese politics and society.

BASIC DATA OF THE ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN. By W. Nelson Peach and Others. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Public and Business Administration, University of Karachi), 1959, 235 p. $4.00.

A useful collection of statistical data.

BURMA'S CONSTITUTION. By Maung Maung. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1959, 325 p. Guilders 18.50.

A study of the origins, provisions and operation of the Constitution of the Union of Burma. The author is on the Law Faculty at the University of Rangoon.

CASES IN VIETNAMESE ADMINISTRATION. By John D. Montgomery and the NIA Case Development Seminar. Saigon: National Institute of Administration (in coöperation with the Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group), 1959, 481 p.

A set of case studies on problems of Vietnamese administration which also throws light upon the local political and economic scene.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

CHINA: ITS PEOPLE, ITS SOCIETY, ITS CULTURE. By Chang-tu Hu and Others. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1960, 610 p. $10.00. (New York: Taplinger, distributor.)

This volume, one of the Human Relations Area Files series, "Survey of World Cultures," is a massive collaborative study of mainland China: its culture, social organization, economy and governmental system.

DIE WIRTSCHAFT CHINAS: DOGMA UND WIRKLICHKEIT. By Werner Handke. Frankfurt/Main: Metzner, 1959, 337 p. DM. 24.50.

An appraisal of Communist China's economic development by a former German consular official in Hong Kong.

MARXIST-LENINIST CHINA. By James Emmett Garvey. New York: Exposition Press, 1960, 447 p. $6.00.

An analysis of Communist Chinese military doctrine, which the author finds to be an exceptionally able application of Marxist-Leninist theory.

THE MAY FOURTH MOVEMENT. By Chow Tse-tsung. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, 486 p. $10.00.

A very comprehensive study of the history and intellectual content of the important May Fourth movement, named for the mass demonstrations of Chinese students in 1919.

CHINA GEHT NICHT RUSSLANDS WEG. By Louis Barcata. Stuttgart: Goverts, 1959, 278 p. DM. 19.80.

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A journalist's report on Communist China. His thesis is indicated in the title.

DIE WIRTSCHAFTLICHE VERFLECHTUNG DER VOLKSREPUBLIK CHINA MIT DER SOWJETUNION. Frankfurt/Main: Metzner, 1959, 105 p. DM. 8.80.

An analysis of the development of Chinese-Soviet economic relations, including chapters on Soviet credits and industrial assistance.

ONE CHINESE MOON. By J. Tuzo Wilson. New York: Hill and Wang, 1959, 274 p. $4.95.

A Canadian geophysicist's illuminating report on a trip to Communist China in the summer of 1958.

JAPAN'S AMERICAN INTERLUDE. By Kazuo Kawai. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960, 257 p. $5.00.

A Japanese scholar, with many years' residence in the United States, analyzes the years of American occupation from 1945 to 1952 and the viability of the various changes and reforms introduced in those years. On the whole Mr. Kawai judges the Occupation, for all its shortcomings, "a magnificent success" in setting Japan on a healthy direction for its own later development.

NATIONALISM AND THE RIGHT WING IN JAPAN. By I. I. Morris. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1960, 476 p. $8.00.

A close study of right-wing and nationalist movements and manifestations in Japan in the period 1945–1957. The author concludes that democracy remains a fragile growth in Japan and not something to be taken for granted.

Africa

THE DEATH OF AFRICA. By Peter Ritner. New York: Macmillan, 1960, 312 p. $4.95.

A young American journalist's desperate and often angry book about prospects of the post-colonial Africa that is now emerging. He forecasts starvation, disaster and "Chinification" unless really massive assistance is provided from without.

AFRICAN NATIONALISM. By Ndabaningi Sithole. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959, 174 p. $3.25.

A Rhodesian teacher and minister, the author puts the essential African arguments for independence and democracy in very fundamental terms.

TOWARD UNITY IN AFRICA. By Donald S. Rothchild. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1960, 224 p. $5.00.

An inquiry into the principal motives and tendencies which have contributed to the various recent federation movements in British East, Central and West Africa. Group fears combined with the desire for enlargement are seen as a central theme in all cases.

A SURVEY OF NORTH WEST AFRICA (THE MAGHRIB). Edited by Nevill Barbour. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1959, 406 p. $5.60.

A very useful handbook of information about the area comprising Morocco, Algeria and the Sahara, Tunisia and Libya.

THE GHANA REPORT. New York: Wittman, 1959, 236 p. $25.00.

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A rich handbook of information relating to economic development and investment opportunities.

A GEOGRAPHY OF GHANA. By E. A. Boateng. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1959, 204 p. $4.00.

A concise but very knowledgeable physical and economic geography.

RACE AND NATIONALISM. By Thomas M. Franck. New York: Fordham University Press, 1960, 369 p. $6.75.

An able study of the tense political and racial situation in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, a land of some 7,000,000 Africans and 250,000 whites.

Latin America and the West Indies

ARE WE GOOD NEIGHBORS? By Donald Marquand Dozer. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1959, 456 p. $8.00.

A study of the uneven course of United States-Latin American relations since 1930, including a number of suggestions of ways to improve this relationship, which is hardly in good shape today.

ECONOMIC POLICY REVOLUTION AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA. By Pedro C. M. Teichert. University (Miss.): University of Mississippi, Bureau of Business Research, 1959, 282 p. $8.00.

This book is centrally concerned with bringing together information about the important changes in economic policy in Latin America during the last few years.

PROBLEMY SOVREMENNOI LATINSKOI AMERIKI. Edited by M. V. Danilevich and A. F. Shul'govskii. Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Institut Mirovoi Ekonomiki i Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii, 1959, 429 p. Rubles 16.30.

The Soviet view of the contemporary problems of the Latin American nations and their "national-liberation" movements against "American imperialism."

THE FISCAL SYSTEM OF VENEZUELA. By Carl S. Shoup and Others. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959, 491 p. $8.75.

An extensive report, undertaken by a group of American and British specialists at the request of the Venezuelan government, and dealing with tax policy and administration, governmental accounting, etc.

TRADE UNION DEVELOPMENT AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE BRITISH WEST INDIES. By William H. Knowles. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959, 214 p. $5.00.

A study of the social, economic and political background of the labor movement in the islands of the British West Indies.

PUERTO RICO: A SUCCESS STORY. By Ralph Hancock. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1960, 187 p. $4.75.

An enthusiastic picture of social and economic improvements in recent years.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

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The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. London, Central Office of Information, 1959. 33 p.

Changing continent; South Africa's role in Africa, by E. H. Louw. N. Y., Information Service of South Africa, 1959, 23 p.

Inventory of economic studies concerning Africa south of the Sahara; an annotated reading list of books, articles and official publications. London, Commission for Technical Co-Operation in Africa South of the Sahara, 1960. 301 p. (Publication, 30.)

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